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INTRODUCTION

In a recent article discussing the expanding role of science in
settling legal disputes, Justice Breyer noted the pervasive use of expert
witnesses in modern litigation: "Scientific issues permeate the law.
Criminal courts consider the scientific validity of... DNA sampling or
voiceprints, or expert predictions of defendants' 'future dangerousness,' which can lead courts or juries to authorize or withhold the
punishment of death."' While the extensive use of experts raises a
number of concerns, one of the most pressing is the accessibility of
2
expert assistance for indigent defendants.
The use of experts is costly, 3 and prosecutors have an overwhelm-

ing advantage on this score. A tactical decision by the federal prosecutors in the Oklahoma City bombing cases 4 illustrates this reality. In
that instance, the government faced a significant dilemma regarding
its plan to present expert testimony on the composition of the bomb.
Prior to trial, the Office of the Inspector General issued a report criticizing the FBI crime laboratory, which included an entire section devoted to improper practices during the bomb debris analysis for the
Oklahoma City cases. 5 The prosecutors solved this problem by going
outside of the country to obtain a bomb expert from the Ministry of
I

Stephen Breyer, Science in the Courtroom, ISSUES IN ScI. & TECH., Summer 2000, at

52-53. According to judge Weinstein, "[h]ardly a case of importance is tried today in the
federal courts without the involvement of a number of expert witnesses." Jack B. Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH. L. REv. 473, 473 (1986).
2
See Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1561-62 (E.D. Okla. 1995) ("As
science has increasingly entered the courtroom ... the importance of the expert witness
[W]hen forensic evidence and expert testimony are critical parts of
has also grown. ...
the criminal prosecution of an indigent defendant, due process requires the State to provide an expert who is not beholden to the prosecution."), aff'd sub nom., Williamson v.
Ward, 110 F.3d 1508 (10th Cir. 1997);Jack B. Weinstein, Science, and the Challenges of Expert
Testimony in the Courtroom, 77 OR. L. REv. 1005, 1008 (1998) ("Courts, as gatekeepers, must
be aware of how difficult it can be for some parties-particularly indigent criminal defendants-to obtain an expert to testify. The fact that one side may lack adequate resources
with which to fully develop its case is a constant problem.").
3 See, e.g., Dubose v. State, 662 So. 2d 1156, 1172 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (citing DNA
expert fees of $10,000 to $30,000), affd, 662 So. 2d 1189 (Ala. 1995).
4 See United States v. Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 1999) (upholding conviction
of Terry Nichols); United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 1998) (upholding
conviction of Timothy McVeigh).
5

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., THE FBI LABORATORY. AN

INVESTIGATION INTO LABORATORY PRACTICES AND ALLEGED MISCONDUCT IN EXPLOSIVES-RELATED CASES 217-43 (1997)

[hereinafter FBI LABORATORY INVESTIGATION]; see alsJOHN F.

FBI CRIME
LAB (1998); David Johnston, F.B.L Lab Practices Faulted in Oklahoma Bomb Inquiry, N.Y.
KELLY & PHILLIP K. WEARNE, TAINTING EVIDENCE: INSIDE THE SCANDALS AT THE

TIMES, Jan. 31, 1997, at Al.
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Defense in England. 6 This was not the first time prosecutors had secured an expert from outside the country. In the trial of serial killer
Wayne Williams, Georgia prosecutors retained the services of a hair
and fiber expert from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. 7 The expert examined the evidence for eleven days and then testified without
preparing a report, thus avoiding pretrial discovery.8 In another case,
state prosecutors in Washington went to Holland to find an "earprint"
expert.9
DNA cases offer another illustration of the disparity in laboratory
resources. 10 In the O.J. Simpson case, for example, the prosecution
presented experts from two separate DNA laboratories, one of which
was privately owned.ll In contrast, access to even one defense expert
was foreclosed in an early DNA case "because of a shortage of county
funds."12

In some cases, the prosecution has the added luxury of shopping
for the right expert. Because two police crime laboratories would not
declare a positive bootprint match in the infamous Rolando Cruz
prosecution, 13 prosecutors sought out a third expert, Dr. Louise Rob6 See Nichols, 169 F.3d at 1261-62.
7 See Williams v. State, 312 S.E.2d 40, 52 (Ga. 1983); see also State v. Jones, 541 S.E.2d
813, 818 (S.C. 2001) ("A Canadian researcher (Kennedy), who testified for the State at
trial, is currently conducting a study following R.C.M.P. troopers and their new boots
throughout the training process." (footnote omitted)).
8 See Paul C. Giannelli, Criminal Discovery, Scientific Evidence, and DNA, 44 VAND. L.
REV. 791, 801-02 (1991) (discussing the Wayne Williams case).
9 See State v. Kunze, 988 P.2d 977, 982, 991-92 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (holding inadmissible expert testimony that latent earprint found at murder scene matched defendant's
earprint).
10 For another example of the states' ever-expanding repertoire of scientific techniques, see Ramirez v. State, 810 So. 2d 836, 847-48 (Fla. 2001) (discussing the state's presentation of five experts on the novel technique of matching knifes with cartilage wounds).
I I The private laboratory was Cellmark Diagnostics and the public laboratory was operated by the California Department of Justice. See Rachel Nowak, Forensic DNA Goes to
Court with O.J, Sci., Sept. 2, 1994, at 1352, 1352 ("If both labs reach the same conclusion,
some of the arguments that have been used to keep DNA fingerprinting evidence out of
court in other cases would be seriously undermined.").
12
Prater v. State, 820 S.W.2d 429, 439 (Ark. 1991) (holding that the trial court erred
when it declined to appoint a defense expert); see also Richard L. Fricker, State Falters in
Retrial of Escaped Con, A.B.A. J., June 1995, at 38, 38 ("The court-appointed defense lawyers
in the first [capital] trial were denied money for independent forensic tests because the
judge said the county could not afford it."); PeterJ. Neufeld & Neville Colman, When Science Takes the Witness Stand, Sci. AM., May 1990, at 46, 53.
13
In 1985, Rolando Cruz and Alejandro Hernandez were sentenced to death for the
rape and murder of a 10-year-old girl. Stephen Buckley was initially arrested as a third
accomplice. Despite the shoeprint evidence, Buckley's trial ended in a hungjury. In 1995,
DNA tests showed that neither Cruz nor Hernandez were the contributors of the crime
scene semen. They were retried anyway, but a "sheriffs department lieutenant recanted

testimony he had provided in previous trials." See EDWARD

CONNORS ET AL., CONVICTED BY

JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF

INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL

DNA

EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH

46 (1996). The judge directed a verdict for Cruz, and Her-

nandez's case was dismissed. They had spent eleven years on death row.

2004]

AKE V. OKLAHOMA

1309

bins, who declared a match. 14 A detective, who resigned because he
believed the wrong people had been charged, later observed:
"The first lab guy says it's not the boot." ... "We don't like that
answer, so there's no paper [report]. We go to a second guy who
used to do our lab. He says yes. So we write a report on Mr. Yes.
Then Louise Robbins arrives. This is15the boot, she says. That'll be
$10,000. So now we have evidence.'

Another "shopping" example involved the former head serologist of
the West Virginia State Police Crime Laboratory, Fred Zain, who falsified test results in as many as 134 cases from 1979 to 1989.16 Ajudicial
inquiry concluded that "as a matter of law, any testimonial or documentary evidence offered by Zain at any time in any criminal prosecution should be deemed invalid, unreliable, and inadmissible."' 1 7 Zain
was such a treasured witness that even after he left the state to accept a
position in a San Antonio crime lab,"8 West Virginia prosecutors sent
evidence to him for retesting because the remaining West Virginia serologists apparently could not reach the "right" results. 1 9
Even highly suspect testimony is available for the right price. As
Justice Breyer noted, the use of expert testimony concerning "future
dangerousness" is frequently introduced in capital trials. 20 Dr. James
Grigson, formerly a star prosecution witness in Texas, testified about
the future dangerousness of defendants in a reported 167 death penSee Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for
Independent Crime Laboratories,4 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 439, 457-62 (1997) (discussing the
prosecution of Buckley, a co-defendant in the Cruz case).
Barry Siegel, Presumed Guilty: An Illinois Murder Case Became a Test of Conscience Inside
15
the System, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1992, (Magazine) at 19, 20 (quoting former detective John
Sam).
16 In re Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d
14

501 (W. Va. 1993).
17
Id. at 520. The West Virginia Supreme Court opinion adopting this report speaks
of Zain's behavior as "shocking and... egregious violations," "[a] corruption of [the] legal
system," and "mock[ing] the ideal of justice under law." Id. at 508.
18
See Laura Frank & John Hanchette, Convicted on False Evidence?: False Science Often
Sways Juries,Judges, USA ToDAy, July 19, 1994, at IA ("In 1989, Zain took his 'pro-prosecution bias' reputation and letter of recommendation from the governor and headed to
Texas.").
19 According to Zain's replacement as director of the serology department, "several
prosecutors expressed dissatisfaction with the reports they were receiving from serology
and specifically requested that the evidence be analyzed by Zain." In re Investigation, 438
S.E.2d at 512 n.16 (summarizing deposition of Ted Smith).
"[Serologist] Myers also testified that after he had been unable to find blood on a
murder suspect's jacket, it was sent to Texas, where Zain found a bloodstain which tested
consistent with the blood of the victim." Id. at 512.
"[Serologist] Bowles also testified that at least twice after Zain left the lab, evidence on
which Bowles had been unable to obtain genetic markers was subsequently sent to Texas
for testing by Zain, who again was able to identify genetic markers." Id.
20
See supra note I and accompanying text.
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alty cases. 21 Known as "Dr. Death" in the documentary film, The Thin
Blue Line, he reportedly earned $200,000 a year ($150 an hour) from
expert-witness fees and his private practice. 22 Dr. Grigson's testimony
generated significant controversy-Professor Dix once characterized
his methods as resting "at the brink of quackery." 23

The disparity between prosecution and defense resources is further illustrated by several firearms identification ("ballistics") cases.
In these cases, there was even money available for the surgical removal
of bullets from suspects' bodies for comparative purposes. 24
A.

Right to Expert Assistance

As the above discussion indicates, securing the services of defense
experts to examine evidence, to advise counsel, and to testify at trial is
frequently critical in modern criminal litigation. Nevertheless, it was
not until 1985 that the United States Supreme Court in Ake v.
21
Dr. Grigson's career as a star witness was sharply curtailed in 1995 when he was
expelled from the American Psychiatric Association. See Hugh Aynesworth, Texas 'Dr.Death'
Retires After 167 Capital Case Trials, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2003, at A2.
22

See RON ROSENBAUM, TRAVELS WITH DR. DEATH 206-07, 231 (1991); see also John

Bloom, Doctorfor the Prosecution, AM. LAW., Nov. 1979, at 25, 25 ("[L1 ast year [Dr. Grigson]
earned more than $67,034 in fees from Dallas County alone, a figure that doesn't include
murder cases in other Texas cities.").
23 George E. Dix, The Death Penalty, "Dangerousness," Psychiatric Testimony, and Professional Ethics, 5 AM.J. CRIM. L. 151, 172 (1977).
24 The Supreme Court indicated that the practice could be permissible tinder certain
circumstances in Winston v. Lee. See 470 U.S. 753, 763-67 (1985) (holding that a removal
procedure which required a general anesthetic represented "an 'extensive' intrusion on
[defendant's] personal privacy and bodily integrity" and therefore the proposed search was
"unreasonable" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). See also United States v.
Crowder, 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (ordering defendant to undergo minor
surgery for the removal of bullet fragments from his arm); Johnson v. State, 521 So. 2d
1006, 1014-15 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) (concluding that trial court properly admitted evidence pertaining to a bullet removed from defendant's body using a local anesthetic);
Creamer v. State, 192 S.E.2d 350, 353 (Ga. 1972) (upholding trial court's decision to order
the removal of a bullet from defendant's body where the "uncontradicted evidence" indicated that the proposed procedure "would amount to a minor intrusion."); Allison v. State,
199 S.E.2d 587, 588-89 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973) (following Creamer); State v. Martin, 404 So. 2d
960, 962-63 (La. 1981) (finding that lower court erred by refusing to grant State's request
for a medical inquiry into the feasibility of removing a bullet from defendant's body);
Hughes v. State, 466 A.2d 533, 535-36 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983) (concluding that Fourth
Amendment does not forbid the use of minor surgery to remove a bullet from a defendant's body); State v. Richards, 585 S.W.2d 505, 506 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (same); Andrews
v. Love, 763 P.2d 714 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (same); State v. Allen, 291 S.E.2d 459, 463
(S.C. 1982) (permitting the extraction of a bullet "lodged superficially beneath [defendant's] skin [and capable of removal] . . . by minor surgery and under local anesthetic").
See generally RonaldJ. Bacigal, Dodging a Bullet, but Opening Old Wounds in Fourth Amendment
Jurisprudence,16 SETON HALL L. REV. 597 (1986) (arguing that Winston reflects the Supreme
Court's willingness to make substantive value judgments when applying the reasonableness
clause of the Fourth Amendment); Thomas W. Dunbar, Under the Knife: The Constitutionality
of SurgicalRemoval of Bullets from Nonconsenting CriminalDefendants, 36 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q.
184 (1989) (exploring the history of surgical removal cases).
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Oklahoma25 recognized, for the first time, a constitutional right to expert assistance. In a system in which an overwhelming majority of
criminal defendants are indigent, 26 Ake was a landmark case, and, not
surprisingly, it spawned much commentary. Some scholarship focused on specific types of experts, such as DNA analysts, 2 7 psychiatrists, 28 memory experts, 29 and battered woman syndrome
specialists, 30 while other discussion was directed at specific issues, such
33
as ex parte proceedings, 3 1 incompetent experts, 32 harmless error,
prosecutorial discovery of reports prepared by defense experts who do
not testify,3 4 and the rights of indigent civil litigants.3 5 Despite this
diversity, the commentators have uniformly concluded that the implementation of Ake falls far short of what is needed. 36 This is not surpris25

470 U.S. 68 (1985).

26

See YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 22-23 (10th ed. 2002) ("A

sampling of felony defendants in the 75 largest counties indicated that approximately 80
receive court appointed attorneys.").
27
See Jay A. Zollinger, Defense Access to State-Funded DNA Experts: Considerationsof Due
Process,85 CAL. L. REv. 1803 (1997);John Devlin, Comment, Genetics andJustice: An Indigent
Defendant's Right to DNA Expert Assistance, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 395;Janet C. Hoeffel, Note,
The Dark Side of DNA Profiling: Unreliable Scientific Evidence Meets the Criminal Defendant, 42
STAN. L. REv. 465, 519-23 (1990).
28 See Pamela Casey & Ingo Keilitz, An Evaluation of Mental Health Expert Assistance Provided to Indigent Criminal Defendants: Organization,Administration, and Fiscal Management, 34
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 19 (1989); Mark P. Goodman, Note, The Right to a PartisanPsychiatric
Expert: Might Indigency Preclude Insanity?, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 703 (1986); Kerrin Maureen
McCormick, Note, The ConstitutionalRight to PsychiatricAssistance: Causefor Reexamination of
Ake, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1329 (1993).
29 See Monica L. Hayes, Note, The Necessity of Memory Experts for the Defense in Prosecutions
for Child Sexual Abuse Based Upon Repressed Memories, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 69 (1994).
30
See Teresa Herdman, Comment, Criminal Law: Marshaling the Defense-Indigent Defendants Guaranteed Psychiatric Assistance at Trial to Explain Battered Woman Syndrome, 32
WASHBURN L.J. 249 (1993).

31 See Donna H. Lee, Note, In the Wake of Ake v. Oklahoma: An Indigent CriminalDefendant's Lack of Ex ParteAccess to Expert Services, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 154 (1992).
32 See Gordon B. Bums, The Right to the Effective Assistance of a Psychiatrist Under Ake v.
Oklahoma, 30 CRIM. L. BULL. 429 (1994); Kenneth S. Roberts, Comment, Curingthe Ake of
an Incompetent Expert: A Separate Reviewable Issue?, 29 SAxNDIEGO L. REv. 799 (1992).
33
For the argument that "denial of psychiatric assistance in violation of Ake [should
warrant] automatic reversal," see MichaelJ. Lorenger, Note, Ake v. Oklahoma and Harmless
Error: The Case for a Per Se Rule of Reversal, 81 VA. L. REv. 521, 524 (1995).
34
See Elizabeth F. Maringer, Note, Witness for the Prosecution: ProsecutorialDiscovery of
Information Generated by Non-Testifying Defense Psychiatric Experts, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 653
(1993).
35
See David Medine, The Constitutional Right to Expert Assistance for Indigents in Civil
Cases, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 281 (1990).
36
See, e.g., STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIELJ. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
802 (6th ed. 2000) ("Generally speaking the courts have read Ake narrowly, and have refused to require appointment of an expert unless it is absolutely essential to the defense.");
Carlton Bailey, Ake v. Oklahoma and An Indigent Defendant's 'Right' to an Expert Witness: A
Promise Denied or Imagined?, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 401, 401 (2002) ("Regrettably, an
indigent's use of... expert assistance has been severely compromised by the Court's failure to clarify Ake, and by the lower federal courts' inability to agree on its purpose." (footnote omitted)); David A. Harris, Ake Revisited: Expert Psychiatric Witnesses Remain Beyond
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ing given the widespread belief that the basic right to counsel under
Gideon v. Wainwright37 has not been fully implemented,3 8 especially in
capital cases.

39

The few available investigations support the view that the progeny
of Ake have often taken a restrictive approach to the right to expert
assistance. In 1990, The National Law Journalpublished the results of a
six-month investigation on the defenses of capital murder defendants
in the South. One of the key findings concerned defense experts:
'Judges routinely deny lawyers' requests for expert/investigative
fees."' 40 As part of this investigation, sixty death row trial lawyers were
interviewed and "54.2% felt [that the] court provided inadequate investigation and expert funds. ' 41 A 1992 study of indigent defense systems sponsored by the National Center for State Courts noted that the
"greatest disparities occur in the areas of investigators and expert witnesses, with the prosecutors possessing more resources [than the public defenders]. '"42 In addition, a 1993 report commissioned by the
Reach for the Indigent, 68 N.C. L. REv. 763, 764 (1990) ("[C]ourts have interpreted Ake too
narrowly, allowing fewer indigents relief than the Supreme Court intended."); David A.
Harris, The Constitutionand Truth Seeking: A New Theory on Expert Services for Indigent Defendants, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 469, 490 (1992) ("Ake... accomplishes too little.");
Mary F. Moriarty, Liberty, Justice... and Experts for All, 6 LAw & INEQ. 247, 251-54 (1988)
(arguing that statutorily imposed requirements often prevent indigent defendants from
obtaining sufficient access to experts); Todd D. Schlossberg, Note, A Question of Competence:
The Indigent Criminal Defendant's Right to Adequate and Competent PsychiatricAssistance After
Ake v. Oklahoma, 14 VT. L. REV. 121, 158 (1989) ("Unfortunately, the systems that states
have adopted to implement [Ake's] mandate frequently do not provide a constitutionally
adequate level of assistance."); John M. West, Note, Expert Services and the Indigent Criminal
Defendant: The ConstitutionalMandate of Ake v. Oklahoma, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1326, 1338-57
(1986) (contending that Ake should be interpreted broadly, rather than limited to its
facts); A. Michelle Willis, Comment, NonpsychiatricExpert Assistance and the Requisite Showing
of Need: A Catch-22 in the Post-Ake CriminalJustice System, 37 EMORY LJ. 995, 997 (1988)
(concluding that "Ake should be read to encompass nonpsychiatric assistance").
37
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
38
See Vivian 0. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths-A
Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 115 (1986) ("In short, the Court's visions of the right to
counsel and the role of counsel are incoherent, or downright cynical."); Douglas L.
Colber, Thirty-Five Years After Gideon: The Illusory Right to Counsel at Bail Proceedings, 1998 U.
ILL. L. REv. 1; Tracey L. Meares, What's Wrong with Gideon, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 215 (2003).
39 See Symposium, The GuidingHand of Counsel: ABA Guidelinesfor the Appointment and
Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REv. 903 (2003).
40
Marcia Coyle et al., FatalDefense: Trial and Errorin the Nation's Death Belt, NAT'L LJ.,
June 11, 1990, at 30. One attorney, who was appointed to represent a death row inmate in
Georgia, had his request for the appointment of an expert denied. He commented:
"'There's an economic presumption of guilt.... The district attorney has all the resources
of the state crime lab, and we have to go hat in hand to the judge and the DA on every
request."' Id. at 38.
41
Id. at 40.
42
ROGER A. HANSON ET AL., INDIGENT DEFENDERS: GET THE JOB DONE AND DONE WELL
100 (1992) (presenting resource parity findings for three jurisdictions using the public
defender system for indigent defense). In contrast, the study concluded that "[t]here is a
close approximation of resource parity in terms of attorney compensation, training, and
staff support." Id.
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State Bar of Texas concluded that "[t] here is a serious underfunding
of essential expert services and other expenses in capital trials and
43
appeals.
These investigations are consistent with the pre-Ake reports. In
their landmark 1966 jury study, Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel commented: "Again, the imbalance between prosecution and defense appears. In 22 percent of the cases the prosecution has the only expert
witness, whereas in only 3 percent of the cases does the defense have
such an advantage. '44 The voiceprint cases offer another illustration.
As a National Academy of Sciences report noted in 1979, "[a] striking
fact about the trials involving voicegram evidence to date is the very
large proportion in which the only experts testifying were those called
45
by the state."
B.

Post-Ake Developments Concerning Experts

Several developments since Ake make the failure to fully implement the right to expert assistance all the more troublesome.
1.

DNA Analysis

The first of these developments, the advent of DNA evidence,
dramatically changed the legal landscape. Indeed, one judge recognized its potential to represent the "single greatest advance in the
'search for truth' . . . since the advent of cross-examination. '4 6 The
initial DNA skirmishes over laboratory protocols 47 quickly morphed
into fights over statistical interpretation and population genetics. 48
43 A Study of Representation in CapitalCases in Texas, 56 TEX. B.J. 333, 408 (1993) (Report of The Spangenberg Group prepared for the State Bar of Texas).
44

45

& HIANs ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 139 (1966).
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF VOICE IDENTIFICATION
HARRY KALVEN, JR.

49 (1979); see also People v. Chapter, 13 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2479, 2479 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Aug. 29, 1973) ("In approximately eighty percent of the twenty-five [voiceprint] cases in
which such expert testimony/opinion was admitted there was no opposing expert testimony on the issue of reliability and general acceptability of the scientific community
46

People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
See Eric S. Lander & Bruce Budowle, DNA FingerprintingDispute Laid to Rest, 371
NATURE 735, 735 (1994) ("The initial outcry over DNA typing standards concerned laboratory problems: poorly defined rules for declaring a match; experiments without controls;
contaminated probes and samples; and sloppy interpretation of autoradiograms. Although there is no evidence that these technical failings resulted in any wrongful convictions, the lack of standards seemed to be a recipe for trouble."); William C. Thompson,
Evaluatingthe Admissibility of New Genetic Identification Tests: Lessons from the "DNA War", 84 J.
CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 22, 24 (1993) ("According to critics.... forensic laboratories are
lacking in scientific rigor and . . . new [DNA] techniques receive inadequate scientific
scrutiny before they are presented in court.").
48
In fact, the National Academy of Sciences felt obliged to consider the issue on two
47

separate occasions. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE (1996); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE (1992)
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The fact that no other technique had been as complex or subject to
rapid change further complicated matters. New DNA technologies
were introduced at the trial level, while cases litigating the older procedures contemporaneously worked their way through the appellate
court system. The initial technique, Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP) 49 was soon supplanted by Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) involving the DQ-alpha loci,50 which was followed by

Polymarkers (PM) and D1S80. 5 1 These, in turn, were replaced by
Short Tandem Repeats (STR), 52 the current procedure. In addition

[hereinafter DNA TECHNOLOGY]; see also Ranajit Chakraborty & Kenneth K. Kidd, The Utility of DNA Typing in Forensic Work, 254 Sci. 1735 (Dec. 20, 1991) (discussing that in the
context of courtroom applications of DNA typing a distinction between "exact values and
valid estimates" is necessary); Leslie Roberts, Fight Erupts over DNA Fingerprinting,254 ScI.
1721 (Dec. 20, 1991) (discussing the debate among "purists" and "technologists" regarding
DNA fingerprinting).
49
See, e.g., United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 568 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding admissible DNA evidence obtained through the RFLP method of analysis); People v. Wesley, 633
N.E.2d 451, 455-56 (N.Y. 1994) (same); State v. Ford, 392 S.E.2d 781 (S.C. 1990) (same);
State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 508-12 (Wash. 1993) (concluding that the RFLP method
was universally accepted in the scientific community). For a procedural description of the
RFLP analysis, see George Bundy Smith & Janet A. Gordon, The Admission of DNA Evidence
in State and Federal Courts, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2465, 2468-70 (1997).
50
See, e.g., United States v. Hicks, 103 F.3d 837, 844-47 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding PCR results admissible); Ingram v.
State, 699 N.E.2d 261, 263 (Ind. 1998) (same); Bolin v. State, 960 P.2d 784, 800 (Nev.
1998) ("DNA results obtained through the use of the PCR technique are admissible for use
within the forensic context."); State v. Stills, 957 P.2d 51, 59 (N.M. 1998) ("We hold that
PCR evidence is admissible in New Mexico Courts."); State v. Lyons, 924 P.2d 802 (Or.
1993) (finding PCR analysis of DNA admissible). For a brief explanation of the PCR technique for DNA testing, see Smith & Gordon, supra note 49, at 2470-72 and 2 PAUL C.
GIANNELLI & EDWARDJ. IMWINKELREID, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 18-3 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing
DQ-alpha PCR).
51
See, e.g., United States v. Beasley, 102 F.3d 1440, 1444-48 (8th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Gaines, 979 F. Supp. 1429, 1435-37 (S.D. Fla. 1997); Smith v. State, 702 N.E.2d
668, 672-73 (Ind. 1998) ("The trial court properly found that the PM and D1S80 tests are
scientifically reliable.").
52
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rosier, 685 N.E.2d 739, 743 (Mass. 1997); State v.
Traylor, 656 N.W.2d 885, 893 (Minn. 2003) ("It is clear that PCR-STR technology, as a
method of DNA typing for forensic identification, is generally accepted in the relevant
scientific community."); State v. Deloatch, 804 A.2d 604, 606 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
2002) ("[T]he STR methodology used to analyze DNA substances is generally accepted for
use by the scientific community and is, therefore, admissible in this court.").
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to nuclear DNA, mitochondrial DNA analysis 53 and animal 54 and
plant DNA evidence 5 5 have been introduced in criminal cases, raising
further evidentiary questions. Finally, the use of DNA databases for
"cold hits" has presented its own fundamental issue: whether DNA evi56
dence alone is sufficient to uphold a conviction.
Few defense attorneys can deal with this type of sophisticated evidence-which raises issues "at the cutting edge of modern law and
science" 5 7-without expert assistance. The National Academy of Sciences recommended appointment of defense DNA experts in every

53
See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 202 F. Supp. 2d 962, 970 (E.D. Mo. 2002)
("[T]he Court believes that mitochondrial DNA analysis is a reliable method, based upon
reliable principles."); Magaletti v. State, 847 So. 2d 523, 528 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003);
People v. Holtzer, 660 N.W.2d 405, 411 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003); State v. Council, 515 S.E.2d
508, 518 (S.C. 1999); see also Mark Curriden, A New Evidence Took First Use of Mitochondrial
DNA Test in a U.S. Criminal Trial, 82 A.B.A. J., Nov. 1996, at 18 (describing how the rape
and murder of a four-year-old girl was solved by performing mitochondrial DNA tests on a
small hair found in the victim's throat). For a discussion of the distinction between nuclear and mitochondrial DNA, see Coleman, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 965-66.
54
See Marilyn A. Menotti-Raymond et al., Pet Cat Hair Implicates Murder Suspect, 386
NATURE 774 (1997) (discussing STR genotyping used in Canadian case); George Sensabaugh & D.H. Kaye, Non-Human DNA Evidence, 39 JURIMETRICSJ. 1, 2-3 (1998) ("[N)onhuman DNA has played a major role [in criminal cases], ranging from homicide prosecutions to patent infringement litigation, with organisms as diverse as household pets, livestock, wild animals, insects, plants, bacteria, and viruses."); Mark Hansen, Beastly Evidence:
Animal DNA Can Put Bite into Criminal Case, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2003, at 20; Richard Willing,
Prosecutors' Latest Tool: Animal DNA, USA TODAY, Nov. 7, 2002, at 24A. But see State v.
Leuluaialii, 77 P.3d 1192, 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) ("[W]e are not convinced that forensic canine DNA identification is a theory that has received general acceptance in the scientific community . . ").
55
See State v. Bogan, 905 P.2d 515, 518-20 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding trial
court's decision to admit results of DNA testing conducted on palo verde trees).
56
Unlike the typical case, a cold hit may mean that there is nothing but the DNA
evidence to tie a defendant to a crime. For cases upholding the sufficiency of uncorroborated DNA evidence, see People v. Soto, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846, 858-59 (Ct. App. 1994)
(rejecting argument that evidence corroborating DNA identification was required to support a conviction), affjd, 981 P.2d 958 (Cal. 1999); People v. Rush, 672 N.Y.S.2d 362, 363
(App. Div. 1998) (finding defendant's argument that "DNA evidence cannot serve as the
sole evidence supporting [a] conviction 'not persuasive' because it is circumstantial in nature and is not absolute or infallible"); Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 156, 170 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2000) ("This court is ... satisfied that the testimony of even one DNA expert that
there is a genetic match . . . is legally sufficient to support a guilty verdict.").
57
HARLAN LEW', AND THE BLOOD CRIED OUT: A PROSECUTOR'S SPELLBINDING ACCOUNT
OF THE POWER OF DNA 21 (1996).
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case, 58 as did a British study. 59 The courts, however, have been far
more restrictive.
2.

60

The Daubert Trilogy

The second post-Ake development was the Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,61 decided in 1993. If DNA evidence revolutionized forensic science,
Daubert and its progeny6 2 revolutionized the admissibility of evidence
based on forensic science. Daubert has been transformed from a case
that most courts and commentators believed lowered the barriers to
the admissibility of scientific evidence 63 to one that the Court now
describes as imposing an "exacting" standard. 6 4 Indeed, some federal
courts have read the Daubert trilogy as "inviting a reexamination even
of 'generally accepted' venerable, technical fields. ' 65 As a result, attacks have been launched against handwriting evidence, 66 hair com58
DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 48, at 147-49 ("When the prosecutor proposes to
use DNA typing evidence or when it has been used in the investigation of the case, an
expert should be routinely available to the defendant.").
59

BEVERLY STEVENTON, ROYAL COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE ABILITY TO CHAL-

DNA EVIDENCE 44 (1993) ("Legal Aid should be granted automatically for one expert assessment of the prosecution work. DNA evidence should only be admissible where
an appropriate expert is available to the defence.").
60
See infra text accompanying notes 529-35, 559-68, and 599-02 (discussing DNA
experts).
61
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
62 The Court followed with General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), and
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), to make up what is now known as the
Daubert trilogy.
63
See Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 610 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[B]y loosening the strictures
on scientific evidence set by Frye, Daubert reinforces the idea that there should be a presumption of admissibility of evidence."); United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 429 (5th Cir.
1995) (stating that "the rationale underlying this circuit's per se rule against admitting
polygraph evidence did not survive Daubert"); United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 568 (6th
Cir. 1993) (holding that "the DNA testimony easily meets the more liberal test set out by
the Supreme Court in Daubert"); State v. Doriguzzi, 760 A.2d 336, 341 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2000) (noting that "Frye has been replaced in the federal court system in favor of the
more lenient standards of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 as set forth in Dauberf).
64
See Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000).
65
United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 67 (D. Mass. 1999) (describing handwriting comparison as "one such field"); see also United States v. Hidalgo, 229 F. Supp. 2d 961,
966 (D. Ariz. 2002) (remarking that "[c]ourts are now confronting challenges to testimony
...whose admissibility had long been settled" in connection with a challenge to the admissibility of handwriting analysis testimony).
66
See Hidalgo, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 966-68 ("[T] he principle of uniqueness of handwriting ... fails to satisfy a Daubert/Kumho analysis."); United States v. Lewis, 220 F. Supp. 2d
548, 550-54 (S.D. W. Va. 2002); United States v. Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1099-1106
(D. Alaska 2001); United States v. Fujii, 152 F. Supp. 2d 939, 940 (N.D. Ill.
2000) ("Handwriting analysis does not stand up well under the Daubertstandards. Despite its long history
of use and acceptance, validation studies supporting its reliability are few, and the few that
exist have been criticized for methodological flaws."); United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F.
Supp. 1027, 1036-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). But see United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 270-71
(4th Cir. 2003) (upholding district court ruling handwriting evidence admissible); United
LENGE
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parisons, 67 fingerprint examinations, 68 firearms identification, 69 bitemark analysis, 70 and intoxication testing. 71 While most of these challenges have been unsuccessful in terms of admissibility, they have exStates v.Jolivet, 224 F.3d 902, 905-06 (8th Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Prime, 220 F.
Supp. 2d 1203, 1209-16 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (denying motion to exclude handwriting
evidence).
The issue of handwriting evidence admissibility following Daubert has divided commentators as well. Compare Andre A. Moenssens, Handwriting Identification Evidence in the
Post-Daubert World, 66 UMKC L. REV. 251 (1997) (arguing for admissibility), with D. Michael
Risinger et al., Brave New "Post-Daubert World--A Reply to Professor Moenssens, 29 SETON
HAL L. REV. 405 (1998) (responding).
67
See Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1558 (E.D. Okla. 1995) ("This court
has been unsuccessful in its attempts to locate any indication that expert hair comparison
testimony meets any of the requirements of Daubert."), affid sub nom. on other grounds, Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508, 1522-23 (10th Cir. 1997) (indicating that "[wihen the
admission of evidence in a state trial is challenged on federal habeas," the proper standard
for review is due process, not Daubert); see also Paul C. Giannelli & Emmie West, Forensic
Science: Hair Comparison Evidence, 37 CRIM. L. BULL. 514 (2001) (discussing DNA exoneration cases in which hair evidence had been used to convict the innocent and concluding
that hair evidence "should be challenged as a matter of routine").
68 See Crisp, 324 F.3d at 266-70 (admitting evidence); United States v. Sullivan, 246 F.
Supp. 2d 700, 704 (E.D. Ky. 2003) ("The ACE-V [method of fingerprint analysis] is generally accepted; has been subject to peer review and publication; is testable, although untested; and ... has an acceptable error rate. Considering these factors, the court finds that
the plaintiffs expert testimony is sufficiently reliable under Daubert."); United States v.
Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (admitting previously excluded fingerprint evidence on prosecution's motion for reconsideration); United States v. MartinezCintron, 136 F. Supp. 2d 17, 20-21 (D. P.R. 2001) (admitting evidence); United States v.
Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 853-55 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (same), affd, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir.
2001); see also Robert Epstein, FingerprintsMeet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint "Science" Is
Revealed, 75 S. CAL. L. Rv. 605 (2002) (arguing that latent fingerprint identification evidence does not satisfy the Daubert standard); Jennifer L. Mnookin, FingerprintEvidence in an
Age of DNA Profiling,67 BROOK. L. REv. 13, 57-70 (2001) (discussing recent challenges to
the admissibility of fingerprint evidence);Jessica M. Sombat, Note, Latent Justice: Daubert's
Impact on the Evaluation of Fingerprint Identification Testimony, 70 FoRDi-"
L. REv. 2819,
2841-67 (2002) (examining the Llera Plaza cases).
69
See United States v. Santiago, 199 F. Supp. 2d 101, 110-12 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (concluding that ballistics identification evidence satisfies the Daubert standard); see also Joan
Griffin & David J. LaMagna, Daubert Challenges to Forensic Evidence: Ballistics Next on the
FiringLine, THE CHAMPION, Sept./Oct. 2002, at 20; Lisa J. Steele, "All we want you to do is
confirm what we already know" A Daubert Challenge to Firearms Identifications, 38 CIuM. L.
BULL. 466, 466 (2002) ("The time is ripe for.., challenges to firearms identification evidence, which will hopefully result in better scientific studies supporting the theory, better
methodology in crime laboratories, and more reliable verdicts.").
70
See Howard v. State, 697 So. 2d 415, 429 (Miss. 1997) ("While few courts have refused to allow some form of bite-mark comparison evidence, numerous scholarly authorities have criticized the reliability of this method of identifying a suspect.... Suffice it to say
that testimony concerning bite marks in soft, living flesh has not been scientifically accredited at this time."); see also I.A. Pretty & D. Sweet, The Scientific Basis for Human Bitemark
Analyses---A Critical Review, 41 Sci. & JusT. 85, 86 (2001) ("Despite the continued acceptance of bitemark evidence in European, Oceanic and North American Courts[,] the fundamental scientific basis for bitemark analysis has never been established.").
71
See United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530, 557 (D. Md. 2002) ("I conclude that
the [standard field sobriety test] evidence in this case does not, at this time, meet the
requirements of Daubert/Kumho Tire and Rule 702 as to be admissible as direct evidence of
intoxication or impairment.").
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posed the lack of empirical support for many commonly employed
forensic techniques. Here, again, defense attorneys are required to
cope with a changing landscape of scientific proof.
3.

Scientific Fraud

A third development involved the increasing manipulation of scientific evidence. 72 Forged fingerprints, 7 3 faked autopsies,7 4 false laboratory reports, 75 and perjured testimony 76 (including the falsification
of credentials 7 7) have all been reported. Fred Zain's conduct at the
72

See David Bernstein, Junk Science in the United States and the Commonwealth, 21 YALE J.

INT'L L. 123 (1996) (discussing cases in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and England);

Giannelli, supra note 14.
73 See Boris Geller et al., A ChronologicalReview of FingerprintForgery, 44 J. FoRENSIC SCI.
963 (1999) (discussing history of fingerprint forgeries); Mark Hansen, Troopers' Wrongdoing
Taints Cases, A.B.A.J., Mar. 1994, at 22 (discussing numerous cases of evidence fabrication,
"usually [involving] fingerprints," by New York State Police troopers).
74 The saga of former Lubbock, Texas pathologist Ralph Erdmann presents a notorious example. See Roy Bragg, New Clues May Be Dugfrom Grave: Furor Touches on Autopsies,
Brains, HoUSTON CHRON., Mar. 28, 1992, at IA ("'[C]all him McErdmann[.]'
...
'He's
like McDonald's - billions served.'
(quoting Dallam County District Attorney Barry
Blackwell)); Chip Brown, Pathologist Accused of Falsifying Autopsies, Botching Trial Evidence,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1992, at A24 ("[F]ormer Dallas County assistant medical examiner
Linda Norton was quoted as saying [Dr.] Erdmann routinely performs 'made-to-order autopsies that support a police version of a story."'); Richard L. Fricker, Pathologist'sPlea Adds
to Turmoil: Discovery of Possibly Hundreds of Faked Autopsies Helps Defense Challenges, A.B.A. J.,
Mar. 1993, at 24 ("'If the prosecution theory was that death was caused by a Martian death
ray, then that was what Dr. Erdmann reported."' (quoting TommyJ. Turner, a judicially
appointed investigator in the Erdmann case)).
75 See United States v. Gault, 141 F.3d 1399, 1403 (10th Cir. 1998) ("Defendant sought
to question [DEA forensic chemist Barry] Goldston about a former DEA colleague's submission of falsified reports [in an unrelated case]. The DEA agent, Ann Castillo, had admitted to failing to perform the controlled substance tests upon which [those] reports
were based."); State v. Ruybal, 408 A.2d 1284, 1285, 1287-89 (Me. 1979) (refusing to grant
defendants' motions for new trials where an FBI analyst who had testified at their trials
subsequently admitted to "report[ing] results of lab tests that he did not in fact conduct" in
connection with an unrelated case); State v. DeFronzo, 59 Ohio Misc. 113, 122 (C.P. Lucas
County 1978) ("[T]here is now considerable doubt in the court's mind who, if anyone,
tested the cocaine as well as the date of the [analysis]. Even if [the prosecution's expert]
tested the cocaine, there is doubt in the court's mind as to the competency of that
[analysis].").
76

See Steve Bailey, Defense Attorneys Want Prosecutors Disqualified, ASSOCIATED PRESS,

Sept. 6, 2002 ("Attorneys for both sides were in court for a hearing in which FBI ballistics
expert Kathleen Lundy was scheduled to testify about lying during a preliminary hearing in
Shane Raglan's murder case."); see also Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113, 120 (Ariz. 2000)
("It turned out that the witness presenting the [non-scientific] dog-scent evidence in Roscoe
was a charlatan.").
77 See Drake v. Portuondo, 321 F.3d 338, 342 (2d Cir. 2003) ("It is now apparent that
[prosecution expert] Walter's testimony concerning his qualifications was perjurious.");
United States v. Gale, 314 F.3d 1,1 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("Johnny St. Valentine Brown for years
testified as an expert witness for the government in narcotics cases. But it later developed
that Brown was something of a con man himself, so much so that he was charged with and
pleaded guilty to having committed perjury about his educational background."); United
States v. Williams, 233 F.3d 592, 593-95 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (denying defendant's motion for
a new trial, despite the post-conviction revelation thatJohnny St. Valentine Brown, a prose-
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West Virginia crime laboratory is probably the most prominent example. 78 A judicial report concluded:
The acts of misconduct on the part of Zain included (1) overstating
the strength of results; (2) overstating the frequency of genetic
matches on individual pieces of evidence; (3) misreporting the frequency of genetic matches on multiple pieces of evidence; (4) reporting that multiple items had been tested, when only a single item
had been tested; (5) reporting inconclusive results as conclusive;
(6) repeatedly altering laboratory records; (7) grouping results to
create the erroneous impression that genetic markers had been obtained from all samples tested; (8) failing to report conflicting results; (9) failing to conduct or to report conducting additional
testing to resolve conflicting results; (10) implying a match with a
suspect when testing supported only a match with the victim; and
79
(11) reporting scientifically impossible or improbable results.
Unfortunately, Zain was not alone. Similar cases have arisen in
Oklahoma City8 ° and Montana.8 1 In Houston, both the DNA8 2 and
toxicology laboratories8 3 had to be closed. In Actual Innocence, Barry
cution expert, had misrepresented his qualifications); Doepel v. United States, 434 A.2d
449, 460 (D.C. 1981) ("To qualify as an expert, [F.B.I. serologist] Curran stated ...that he
held a Bachelor's and a Master's degree in science, whereas in fact he never attained a
graduate degree."); Commonwealth v. Mount, 257 A.2d 578, 579 (Pa. 1969) ("After [Philadelphia Police Department laboratory technician Agnes Mallatratt] had testified in many
cases, it was discovered ... that she had lied about her professional qualifications in that
...she had never fulfilled the educational requirements for a laboratory technician."); see

alsoJames E.Starrs, MountebanksAmong Forensic Scientists, in 2 FORENSIC

SCIENCE HANDBOOK

1, 7, 20-29 (Richard Saferstein ed. 1988) (discussing false credential cases).
78
See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
79
In re Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d
501, 503 (W. Va. 1993) (quoting report).
80
SeeJim Yardley, Inquiry Focuses on Scientist Employed by Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES, May 2,
2001, at A14 (discussing investigations into the testimony of Oklahoma City police laboratory scientist Joyce Gilchrist); see also Mitchell v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1036, 1064 (10th Cir.
2001) ("Ms. Gilchrist thus provided the jury with evidence implicating Mr. Mitchell in the
sexual assault of the victim which she knew was rendered false and misleading by evidence
withheld from the defense."); Pierce v. State, 786 P.2d 1255, 1261 (Okla. Crim. 1990) ("We
find that Gilchrist absolutely violated the terms of a Court Order."); McCarty v. State, 765
P.2d 1215, 1218 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) ("[Ms. Gilchrist's] forensic report was at best
incomplete, and at worst inaccurate and misleading.... We find it inconceivable why Ms.
Gilchrist would give such an improper opinion, which she admitted she was not qualified
to give.").
81
See Adam Liptak, 2 States to Review Lab Work of Expert Who Erred on ID, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 19, 2002, at A24 (discussing erroneous hair evidence testimony by the then-director of
the Montana state police crime laboratory in the trial of Jimmy Ray Bromgard, who spent
15 years in prison before being exonerated by DNA).
82
See Nick Madigan, Houston's Troubled DNA Crime Lab Faces Growing Scrutiny, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 9, 2003, at A20 ("Police officials suspended DNA testing at the laboratory after
an audit completed in December found a host of problems with its methods ....").
83 See Ralph Blumenthal, Double Blow, One Fatal, Strikes Police in Houston, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 30, 2003, at A25 ("The acting police chief announced... that he had shut down the
Police Department's toxicology section after its manager failed a competency test ....").
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Scheck, Peter Neufeld, and Jim Dwyer reported the findings of a Cardozo Law School Innocence Project study of 62 DNA exonerations
secured in the United States; one of the more astounding conclusions
was that a third of these cases involved "tainted or fraudulent
84
science.
The Department of Justice's 1997 report on the FBI laboratory,
issued by the Inspector General, graphically described negligence,
misconduct, and other shortcomings of the premier crime laboratory
in the country.8 5 The investigation found scientifically flawed testimony, inaccurate testimony, testimony beyond the competence of examiners, improperly prepared laboratory reports, insufficient
documentation of test results, inadequate record management and retention, and failures of management "to resolve serious and credible
'' 6

allegations of incompetence."

Such cases are beginning to have an impact on admissibility decisions. For example, the Florida Supreme Court has commented on
the "rising nationwide criticism of forensic evidence in general" and
noted the courts' obligation "to cull scientific fiction and junk science
from fact. ' 87 Defense attorneys can no longer assume (if they ever
could) that expert testimony is competent and instead focus on other
aspects of a case.
4.

Social Science Experts

The fourth development was
ence research. Beginning in the
search has had a significant
Prominent examples 9 of theories

the increased reliance on social sci1980s, the use of social science reimpact on criminal litigation. 88
based on social science research in-

FiVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER Dis(2000).
supra note 5, at 22-399; see also KELLY &
WEARNE, supra note 5, at 2 ("The [report's] findings were alarming. FBI examiners had
given scientifically flawed, inaccurate, and overstated testimony under oath in court; had
altered the lab reports of examiners to give them a pro-prosecutorial slant, and had failed
to document tests and examinations from which they drew incriminating conclusions
... .
.).
86 FBI LABORATORY INVESTIGATION, supra note 5, at 2-3.
87 Ramirez v. State, 810 So. 2d 836, 853 (Fla. 2001) (citations omitted).
88 John Monahan and Laurens Walker have written extensively on the issue of the
proper role of social science evidence in the litigation context. SeeJohn Monahan & Laurens Walker, Empirical Questions Without Empirical Answers, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 569; John
Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining,Evaluating, and Establishing Social
Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 477 (1986); Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social
Facts: Scientific Methodology as Legal Precedent, 76 CAL. L. REv. 877 (1988); Laurens Walker &
John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REv. 559
(1987).
89 For other social science testimony that has been offered, with mixed results, see
United States v. Peralta, 941 F.2d 1003, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 1991) (Stockholm Syndrome);
People v. Cegers, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 297, 300-06 (Ct. App. 1992) (confusional arousal syn84

SeeJiM

DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE:

PATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 246
85
See FBI LABORATORY INVESTIGATION,
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clude battered woman syndrome, 90 rape trauma syndrome, 9 1 child
sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS),92 child interviewing

drome); State v. Nazario, 726 So. 2d 349, 350-51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (fight/flee syndrome); Jennette v. State, 398 S.E.2d 734, 736-37 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (lying child
syndrome); Werner v. State, 711 S.W.2d 639, 640-46 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (Holocaust
syndrome); see also Carol S. Bruch, ParentalAlienation Syndrome and ParentalAlienation: Getting It Wrong in Child Custody Cases, 35 FA. L.Q. 527 (2001) (arguing that Parental Alienation Syndrome lacks scientific foundation); David McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and Other
Mental Exotica: A New Approach to the Admissibility of NontraditionalPsychologicalEvidence in
Criminal Cases, 66 OR. L. REV. 19, 94-107 (1987) (proposing a four-factor balancing test for
admissibility); Robert P. Mosteller, Syndromes and Politics in Criminal Trials and Evidence Law,
46 DuKE L.J. 461, 467-95 (1996) (suggesting that admissibility determinations should focus
on a sliding-scale inquiry into the "quality of the science" and "the use being made" of the
syndrome evidence).
90 See, e.g., United States v. Young, 316 F.3d 649, 658 (7th Cir. 2002) (admitting expert
testimony that victims of domestic violence commonly recant their accusations to protect
their attackers); see also Robert F. Schopp et al., Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony,
and the Distinction Between Justificationand Excuse, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 45, 112 (arguing that
"battered woman syndrome bears almost no relevance to rigorously formulated and interpreted self-defense doctrine," and that "[a] statutory scheme providing justification defenses based on actual necessity and separate excuses for nonculpable mistakes
accommodates many of the most troubling circumstances in which battered women kill
their batterers in nonconfrontational situations"); Regina A. Schuller & Patricia A. Hastings, Trials of Battered Women Who Kill: The Impact of Alternative Forms of Expert Evidence, 20
LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 167, 174, 181 (1996) (comparing, using mockjurors, the effectiveness
of expert testimony concerning battered woman syndrome with a "no expert control" and
concluding that participants "rendered more lenient verdicts in the presence as opposed
to the absence of the expert testimony").
91
See, e.g., Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001) (concluding that district court properly admitted expert testimony concerning "common responses by victims of rape or harassment, such as the failure to resist a perpetrator, bathing
immediately after the assault, and the failure to file or a delay in filing a formal report or
charge"); Chapman v. State, 18 P.3d 1164, 1172 (Wyo. 2001) (reasoning that court properly admitted expert testimony that it was normal for victims of sexual abuse to delay reporting to rebut a claim of fabrication); Arthur H. Garrison, Rape Trauma Syndrome: A
Review of a Behavioral Science Theory and Its Admissibility in Criminal Trials, 23 Am. J. TmiAs
ADvoc. 591 (2000); Krista L. Duncan, Note, "Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics"?Psychological
Syndrome Evidence in the Courtroom After Daubert, 71 IND. L.J. 753, 759-63 (1996).
92
See, e.g., State v. Chauvin, 846 So. 2d 697, 709 (La. 2003) ("We hold that [Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder] evidence, like CSAAS-based evidence, should be admissible
only for the limited purpose of explaining, in general terms, certain reactions of a child to
abuse that would be used to attack the victim/witness's credibility."); State v. Foret, 628 So.
2d 1116, 1123-27 (La. 1993) ("[T] his court finds that [CSAAS] evidence is of highly questionable scientific validity, and fails to unequivocally pass the Daubert threshold test of scientific reliability."); Dara Loren Steele, Note, Expert Testimony: Seeking An Appropriate
Admissibility Standardfor Behavioral Science in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions,48 DuKE LJ. 933,
961-72 (1999) (examining a variety of state courts' approaches to the admissibility of social
science evidence in child abuse cases).
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techniques, 9 3 Munchausen syndrome by Proxy, 94 and neonaticide syndrome-postpartum psychosis. 95 The use of hypnotically refreshed testimony also produced vigorous debate. 96 This was followed by the
related and controversial phenomenon of repressed memory syndrome. 9 7 Meanwhile, experts testifying on the deficiencies of eyewit-

93
See, e.g., Washington v. Schriver, 255 F.3d 45, 57 (2d Cir. 2001) ("An emerging
consensus in the case law relies upon scientific studies to conclude that suggestibility and
improper interviewing techniques are serious issues with child witnesses, and that expert
testimony on these subjects is admissible." (citations omitted)); State v. Sargent, 738 A.2d
351, 353 (N.H. 1999) ("[E]xpert testimony on the danger of false memory implantation
from improper interview techniques may aid a jury in evaluating the reliability of a child's
recollections."). For a more general discussion on the subject of child interviewing, see
Stephen J. Ceci & Richard D. Friedman, The Suggestibility of Children: Scientific Research and
Legal Implications, 86 CORNEL L.REv. 33 (2000).
94 See, e.g., United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126, 129-30 & n.1, 133-34 (1st Cir. 1995)
(explaining Munchausen's disease and concluding that the district court improperly
barred expert testimony that, "contrary to th[e] common sense assumption, [the defendant] suffered from a recognized mental disorder that caused him to make false statements even though they were inconsistent with his apparent self-interest"); In re C.M., 513
S.E.2d 773, 776 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) ("[Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy] is a disorder in
which a parent, usually a mother, induces or fabricates an illness in a child for the purpose
of obtaining medical or some other kind of attention."); Lynn Holland Goldman & Beatrice Crofts Yorker, Mommie Dearest? ProsecutingCases ofMunchausen Syndrome Iy Proxy, CRiM.
JUST., Winter 1999, at 26.
95 See People v. Wernick, 674 N.E.2d 322, 325 (N.Y. 1996) (concluding that trial court
properly precluded expert testimony concerning neonaticide syndrome); Connie Huang,
Note, It's
a Hormonal Thing: Premenstrual Syndrome and Postpartum Psychosis as Criminal Defenses, 11 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 345, 356-60 (2002); Colleen Kelly, Comment,
The Legacy of Too Little, Too Late: The Inconsistent Treatment of PostpartumPsychosis as a Defense
to Infanticide, 19 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLY 247 (2002); Jessie Manchester, Note, Beyond Accommodation: Reconstructing the Insanity Defense to Provide an Adequate Remedy for Postpartum Psychotic Women, 93 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 713 (2003).
96
E.g., Roark v. Commonwealth, 90 S.W.3d 24, 29 (Ky. 2002) ("Perhaps no issue in
the law of evidence has been more hotly debated over the past twenty-five years than the
admissibility of testimony by a witness who has been previously subjected to hypnotism.").
See generally Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Hypnotic Evidence in U.S. Courts, 43 INT'LJ.
CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HvPNOSis 212 (1995).
97 See, e.g., Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 598-99 (2d Cir. 1995) (following hypnotictherapy, plaintiff accused aunt and uncle of sexual abuse that allegedly occurred when she
was 4 and 7 years old, respectively, and of which she had no recollection for over twenty
years); Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113 (Ariz. 2000) (finding erroneous the trial court's
decision to preclude admission of repressed memory testimony in a civil case).
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ness identifications9 8 and the existence of false confessions 99 became
more common. In addition, various types of profile evidence were
offered at trial-profiles of battering parents, 0 0 drug couriers, 0 1 sex

98 See, e.g., United States v. Langan, 263 F.3d 613, 620-25 (6th Cir. 2001) ("The use of
expert testimony in regard to eyewitness identification is a recurring and controversial subject."); United States v. Lester, 254 F. Supp. 2d 602, 612 (E.D. Va. 2003) ("[T]he problem
of cross-race recognition, the phenomenon of weapon focus, the relationship of different
levels of stress on eyewitness perception, and the correlation (or lack thereof) between
confidence and accuracy . . .do seem to fall outside the common sense of the average
juror."); United States v. Sullivan, 246 F. Supp. 2d 696, 698 (E.D. Ky. 2003) ("Dr. Fulero
opined that a photographic array in which photographs are presented sequentially is more
reliable than such an array in which the witness views all of the photographs simultaneously."); Commonwealth v. Christie, 98 S.W.3d 485, 491 (Ky. 2002) ("[T]he particular facts
of this case-that (1) eyewitness identification by strangers of a different race was the main
and most compelling evidence ..., (2) there was no other direct evidence ...,and (3) the
circumstantial evidence ... was weak-make exclusion of [expert testimony about eyewitness identification reliability] .. .an abuse of discretion.").
See, e.g., United States v. Vallejo, 237 F.3d 1008, 1018-19 (9th Cir. 2001) ("The
99
expert was prepared to testify about Vallejo's long-standing, severe language disorder...
and the difficulties he experienced understanding and expressing English. The testimony
was offered to explain the discrepancies between Vallejo's and the Agents' recollection of
the communications which occurred during the interrogation."); State v. Cobb, 43 P.3d
855, 868-69 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002) ("State and federal courts are split on whether to admit
expert testimony on false confessions."); Holloman v. Commonwealth, 37 S.W.3d 764, 767
(Ky. 2001) ("The defense sought to introduce [expert] testimony . .. concerning Holloman's mental retardation and how that condition affects his ability to understand and to
communicate. It maintains that... [Holloman's] condition ...makes him vulnerable to
suggestibility, to manipulation and to intimidation."). For more on false confessions, see
Morgan Cloud et al., Words Without Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions, and Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 495 (2002), Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The
Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and MiscarriagesofJustice in the Age of
PsychologicalInterrogation,88J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998), and Richard A. Leo &
Richard J. Ofshe, The Truth About False Confessions and Advocacy Scholarship, 37 CRIM. L.
BULL. 293 (2001).
See, e.g., Sanders v. State, 303 S.E.2d 13, 18 (Ga. 1983); State v. Durfee, 322 N.W.2d
100
778, 784-85 (Minn. 1982); State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Minn. 1981). For general
discussion of Battering Parent Syndrome, see Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Admissibility at
Criminal Prosecution of Expert Testimony on Battering Parent Syndrome, 43 A.L.R.4th 1203
(1986), and Note, The Battering Parent Syndrome: Inexpert Testimony as CharacterEvidence, 17
MICH. J. L. REFORM 653, 658-59 (1984).
See, e.g., Salcedo v. People, 999 P.2d 833, 837 (Colo. 2000) ("Almost uniformly,
101
courts and commentators have rejected the use of drug courier profiles as substantive evidence."); MarkJ. Kadish, The Drug CourierProfile: In Planes, Trains, and Automobiles; And Now
in the Juiy Box, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 747, 774-75 (1997) ("The majority of courts have concluded that expert testimony on the 'drug courier profile' [is inadmissible] when offered
as substantive evidence of guilt ... ."); see also David Rudovsky, The Impact of the War on
Drugs on ProceduralFairness and Racial Equality, 1994 U. CH. LEGAL F. 237, 244 (1994) (noting that "[d]rug courier profiles are remarkably vague, indeterminate, and overbroad").
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Defense attorneys, once again,

faced unfamiliar categories of expert knowledge.
5.

Modus Operandi Experts

A final development was an explosion of police testimony on the
10 4
modus operandi of various types of crimes, such as counterfeiting,
bookmaking, 10 5 pickpocketing, 0 6 fraud, 10 7 organized crime, 0 8 gangrelated crimes, 10 9 and other offenses.°10 The most frequent use of this
type of testimony occurs in drug trafficking cases. Courts have admitted expert testimony on the operation of clandestine laboratories,"'
the street value of drugs, 112 the amount of drugs seized being consis102
See, e.g., People v. Robbie, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 479, 486 (Ct. App. 2001) ("[Expert]
was asked hypothetical questions assuming certain behavior that had been attributed to the
defendant and ... opine[d] that it was the most prevalent kind of sex offender conduct.
The jury was invited to conclude that if defendant engaged in the conduct described, he
was indeed a sex offender."); Commonwealth v. Poitras, 774 N.E.2d 647, 650 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2002) ("The expert fatally crossed the line ... when she testified at length.., about the
typical attributes and characteristics of those most likely to abuse children.").
103
See, e.g.,
United States v. Long, 328 F.3d 655, 665-68 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (upholding
district court decision to admit general evidence concerning the behavior of preferential
sex offenders); United States v. Romero, 189 F.3d 576, 582-85 (7th Cir. 1999) (same). But
cf State v. Hughes, 841 So. 2d 718, 723 (La. 2003) ("[The accused] may not present the
opinion of a mental health expert, based either on a 'profile' of a child sex abuser or on
the results of standardized psychological tests, that the defendant is a moral person without
deviant sexual tendencies which might prompt pedophiliac behavior.").
104
See United States v. Burchfield, 719 F.2d 356, 358 (11th Cir. 1983).
105
See United States v. Scavo, 593 F.2d 837, 843-44 (8th Cir. 1979).
106
See United States v. Jackson, 425 F.2d 574, 576-77 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
107
See, e.g., United States v. Hutchings, 757 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir. 1985) (confidence
schemes); People v. Singh, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 644, 653-54, 662-63 (Ct. App. 1995) (staged
automobile accidents for fraudulent insurance recovery).
108
See, e.g., United States v. Amuso, 21 F.3d 1251, 1263-64 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Agent
Taylor testified about a broad range of topics including common cosa nostra terminology
necessary to explain tape recorded evidence, and the existence and structure of New York
crime families.. .. "); United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 936-37 (2d Cir. 1993) (upholding the admission of expert testimony on the "inner workings of the Gambino Family" in
the John Gotti trial); United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1148-49 (3d Cir. 1990)
(finding admissible expert testimony concerning the structure and organization of La Cosa
Nostra).
109
See, e.g., People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713, 720-23 (Cal. 1996) ("The subject matter
of the culture and habits of criminal street gangs, of particular relevance here, meets [the
expert witness] criterion."); People v. Valdez, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 135, 141-44 (Ct. App. 1997)
("In general, where a gang enhancement is alleged, expert testimony concerning the culture, habits, and psychology of gangs is permissible because these subjects are 'sufficiently
beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact."'
(citations omitted)).
110 See Gail Sweeney Stephenson, Note, Police Expert Witnesses and the Ultimate Issue Rule,
44 LA. L. REv,.
211, 214 (1983) (listing additional examples).
111
See United States v. Anderson, 61 F.3d 1290, 1297-98 (7th Cir. 1995) (clandestine
PCP laboratory).
112
See, e.g., United States v. Nobles, 69 F.3d 172, 182-84 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[DEA agent]
explained that the 774.9 grams of 94% pure cocaine that Nobles was carrying in his bag...
would sell for roughly $300,000 on the street [after processing]. . . . [The agent] opined
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tent with distribution rather than personal use, 1 3 strategies of deception, 11 4 and other aspects of the drug trade.11 5 In addition, expert
testimony on the tools of the drug trade, including the use of
118
duct tape," t 9 and the like,120
beepers t1 6 code words, 1 7 weapons,
has been used. The expansion of expert testimony to even the most
routine drug case 12' is a recent phenomenon and presents formidable

that this large quantity of cocaine could only have been intended for distribution, and not
for personal use.").
1 3
See, e.g., United States v. Valle, 72 F.3d 210, 214-16 (1st Cir. 1995) (explaining how
expert testified that "so large a quantity of crack was consistent with distribution as opposed to personal use[, then] listed the visible characteristics of the prototypical crack
addict, and noted that the appellant manifested none of these symptoms"); United States
v. Cotton, 22 F.3d 182, 184-85 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d 1236,
1239-43 (7th Cir. 1994).
114 See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 86 F.3d 394, 399-400 (5th Cir. 1996) ("The average juror... may not be aware that large drug trafficking organizations commonly use 'car
swaps,' 'stash houses' and conduct 'heat runs."'); United States v. Penny, 60 F.3d 1257,
1265 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that the district court properly admitted testimony that
"drug dealers place coffee beans in door frames in order 'to throw off the dogs for the
scent of drugs or cocaine"').
115 See, e.g., United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 627, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (discussing
roles and behavior of drug traffickers-who was a "runner," who was a "holder," and who
was "going to actually make the sale"); United States v. Sparks, 949 F.2d 1023, 1025-26 (8th
Cir. 1991) (use of street gangs to distribute drugs); United States v. Foster, 939 F.2d 445,
451-52 (7th Cir. 1991) (methods used by narcotics traffickers); United States v. Dunn, 846
F.2d 761, 762-63 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (modus operandi of drug distributors); United States v.
Monu, 782 F.2d 1209, 1210-11 (4th Cir. 1986) (narcotics distributor's "tool of the trade");
United States v. Pugliese, 712 F.2d 1574, 1581-82 (2d Cir. 1983) (quantity and purity of
heroin typically possessed by addicts); State v. Berry, 658 A.2d 702, 713-14 (N.J. 1995)
(explaining that street level drug dealers commonly use juveniles as drug "mules" and a
money man" to hold drug proceeds). For more on the drug trade, see Ralph V. Seep,
Annotation, Admissibility of Expert Evidence Concerning the Meaning of Narcotics Code Language
in Federal Prosecutionfor Narcotics Dealing-Modern Cases, 104 A.L.R. Fed. 230 (1991).
116 See, e.g., United States v. Solis, 923 F.2d 548, 550-51 (7th Cir. 1991).
117 See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 118 F.3d 318, 321-22 (5th Cir. 1997) ("Drug traffickers' jargon is a specialized body of knowledge, familiar only to those wise in the ways of
the drug trade, and therefore a fit subject for expert testimony."); United States v. Hoffman, 832 F.2d 1299, 1309-10 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Ramirez, 796 F.2d 212, 216
(7th Cir. 1986).
118
See, e.g., United States v. Conyers, 118 F.3d 755, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (concluding
that the trial court's admission of testimony that "the .357 Magnum is the revolver of
choice among local drug dealers" was not an abuse of discretion).
119 See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("[D]uct tape
such as that found under the hood of Moore's car is often used 'by people in the drug
world to bind hands, legs, and mouths of people who are either being robbed in the drug
world or who need to be maintained."').
120 See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 32 F.3d 395, 400 (8th Cir. 1994) (admitting agent's
testimony that certain entries in a notebook were "drug notes").
121
See Weinstein, supra note 2, at 1008 ("Much of the so-called expert testimony, such
as that of police officers who opine that criminals keep revolvers in glove compartments, or
that the mafia is a gang, seems useless. This information really does not help the jury, but
rather amounts to preliminary summation.").
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problems for defense counsel, who may find it difficult to locate a
22
defense witness with this type of expertise.
None of the above developments could have been anticipated by
the Ake Court. Nor could that Court have foretold that a successor
Supreme Court would undercut the doctrinal basis for the Ake deci23
sion in Medina v. California.1
C.

Beyond Ake

The Ake right is far more important today than when the case was
handed down in 1985. At that time, no one could have foreseen the
dramatic increased use of scientific evidence in criminal litigation.
Unfortunately, many courts have adopted a restrictive approach when
interpreting Ake. Even commentators, who have generally taken an
expansive view of Ake, have failed to look at this right in the context of
the entire criminal justice system and, therefore, neglect the resources
of prosecutors or possible alternative methods of implementing Ake.
In addition, they have generally ignored the immense cost of a fully
effective right to expert assistance.
Parts I and II of this Article discuss the availability of expert testimony to prosecutors and defense attorneys, respectively, including
statutory provisions that provide for expert assistance. Part III traces
the Supreme Court's antecedent decisions and the lower courts' approaches prior to Ake. In addition to the due process right upon
which Ake rests, these courts relied on equal protection, compulsory
process, and right to counsel rationales. A recurring question is
whether these alternative bases support a more extensive right to expert assistance.
The final sections examine post-Ake issues. Part IV explores the
scope of Ake-its application beyond capital cases and beyond psychiatric assistance. Part V focuses on the standard for the appointment
of defense experts, the most intractable issue. Part VI examines the
role of the expert (i.e., whether Ake requires a "partisan" expert or
only a neutral expert), an issue that has implications for several related legal questions. Finally, Part VII discusses possible reforms of
the status quo in defendants' access to expert testimony.

122 See, e.g., Kansas v. Call, 760 F. Supp. 190, 192 (D. Kan. 1991) (quashing a defense
subpoena seeking to compel DEA agents to appear as expert witnesses in a state criminal
prosecution of which they had no prior knowledge and reasoning that Ake was not
implicated).
123
505 U.S. 437 (1992); see infra notes 376-84 and accompanying text (discussing
Medina).
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I
PROSECUTION ACCESS TO EXPERT ASSISTANCE

Obtaining expert assistance generally is not difficult for the prosecution.1 24 There are over 300 crime laboratories in this country, and
state prosecutors typically have access to the services of state, county,

regional, or metropolitan crime laboratories.1 25 Additionally, in
homicide cases, Coroner and Medical Examiner Offices provide testimony ranging from time of death determinations to testimony on battered child syndrome, 126 sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS),127
and shaken baby syndrome.128 When needed, government-employed
129
experts from sister states are often available.
124

See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE

FUNCTION 3-2.4(b), at 28 (3d ed. 1993) ("[T]he prosecutor should also be provided with
funds for the employment of qualified experts as needed for particular cases."). The accompanying commentary states that "[t] he value of a modern crime laboratory such as that
maintained by the FBI, in the investigation and solution of crime, is universally recognized." Id. at 30.
125 Most states have either established independent crime laboratories or facilitated
access to existing laboratories. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 691.1 (West 1997); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-2502 (1997); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:2261 (West 1997); MoNr. CODE ANN. § 443-301 (1997); N.D. CENrT. CODE § 19-01-10 (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 307.75 (West
1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 38-6-103 (1982); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-426 (Michie 1998); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 165.75 (West 1997); see also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT &
ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 255 (1967) (stating that
crime laboratories are "the oldest and strongest link between science and technology and
criminal justice"); Irving C. Stone, Capabilitiesof Modern ForensicLaboratories,25 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 659, 659 (1984) (attributing a trend toward specialization in the field of forensic
science to a "sophistication of equipment and diversity of applications" and noting that
"[a] modern forensic laboratory ... must include a broad range of scientific disciplines").
126 See, e.g., State v. Heath, 957 P.2d 449, 459 (Kan. 1998) (following autopsy, county
coroner concluded that victim suffered from battered child syndrome and later testified at
trial that "the major diagnostic feature of battered child syndrome is a discrepancy between
the history given by the caretaker and the physical findings, as well as no injury occurring
during the time the child is in a protected environment"); State v. Holland, 346 N.W.2d
302, 307-08 (S.D. 1984); State v, Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 544 (Utah 1983) ("The medical
examiner's expert opinion was that the multiple bruises on [the decedent's] chin were not
consistent with a single fall."). See generally Allan H. McCoid, The Battered Child and Other
Assaults Upon the Family: Part One, 50 MINN. L. REv. 1, 18-19 (1965) (describing battered
child syndrome); Milton Roberts, Annotation, Admissibility of Expert Medical Testimony on
Battered Child Syndrome, 98 A.L.R.3d 306 (1980) (discussing admissibility of expert testimony on Battered Child Syndrome).
127 See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 803 A.2d 1034, 1044-45 (Md. 2002) (concluding that
"there is not general agreement in the medical community that multiple SIDS deaths in a
single family are genetically unrelated" and holding that admission of expert testimony
applying the product rule to calculate the statistical possibility of multiple sudden infant
deaths in one family was error).
128 See, e.g., People v. Cauley, 32 P.3d 602, 605 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Lopez,
412 S.E.2d 390, 391-92 (S.C. 1991).
129 For example, the expert in a majority of the voiceprint cases was Lieutenant Ernest
W. Nash of the Michigan State Police. See, e.g., United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463,
464-65 (4th Cir. 1975); United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 742-43 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1242-43 (Cal. 1976); Commonwealth v. Topa, 369 A.2d
1277, 1279-80 (Pa. 1977). State experts also testify in federal court. See, e.g., United States
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Federal prosecutors have access to several federal crime laboratories. The FBI Crime Laboratory130 is the most famous, but other agencies also have laboratories, including the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) ,'13 Internal Revenue Service (IRS),132 Postal
Inspection Service, 133 Secret Service, 134 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms (ATF),135 Customs Service, 13 6 Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), 13 7 Food & Drug Administration (FDA), 138 Environmental

Protection

(EPA),1 39

Agency

National

Institute

for

v. Cavely, 318 F.3d 987, 997 (10th Cir. 2003) (Tulsa police department drug expert);
United States v. Washington, 146 F.3d 219, 221 (4th Cir. 1998) (cocaine report prepared
by Pennsylvania State Police regional lab); United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1336
(9th Cir. 1982) (handwriting analysis testimony by Los Angeles Police Department expert).
130
See, e.g.,
United States v. Davis, 103 F.3d 660, 673-74 (8th Cir. 1996) (compositional
analysis of bullet lead). For an in-depth look at the FBI Crime Laboratory, see DAVID
FISHER, HARD EVIDENCE: How DETECTIVES INSIDE THE FBI's ScI-CRIME LAB HAVE HELPED
SOLVE AMERICA'S TOUGHEST CASES

(1995).

131
See, e.g., United States v. Gault, 141 F.3d 1399, 1403 (10th Cir. 1998); United States
v. Stewart, 104 F.3d 1377, 1383 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Coleman, 631 F.2d 908,
914 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
132
See United States v. Tipton, 964 F.2d 650, 653-54 (7th Cir. 1992) (handwriting
analysis of fraudulent documents).
133
See, e.g., United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 434 (6th Cir. 1970) (neutron activation analysis of mail-bomb debris); United States v. Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1098 (D.
Alaska 2001) (handwriting analysis of address labels).
134
See United State v. Rosario, 118 F.3d 160, 162 (3d Cir. 1997) (handwriting examination of forged check).
135
See United States v. Alson, 112 F.3d 32, 33-34 (1st Cir. 1997) (firearm repair for
possible ballistics testing).
136
See United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 63 (2d Cir. 1977) (heroin analysis).
137
See, e.g., United States v. Fujii, 152 F. Supp. 2d 939, 941 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (handprinting analysis of immigration forms); see also United States v. Gricco, 2002 WL 746037, at *6
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2002) ("Questioned document analysis is used by law enforcement agencies worldwide, including ...the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration & Naturalization Service, the United States Postal Inspection Service,
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and the United States Secret Service.").
138
SeeUnited States v. Garnett, 122 F.3d 1016, 1018 (11th Cir. 1997) (chemical analysis of medication in tampering case).
139
Cf United States v. Hrubik, 280 F. Supp. 481, 481 (D. Alaska 1981) ("Defendant
Hrubik has moved for an order requiring plaintiff to produce a water sample in its possession for analysis in order to verify or contradict a prior analysis made by plaintiff."). For
state cases, see Ex pane Gingo, 605 So. 2d 1237, 1241 (Ala. 1992) and People v. Green, 474
N.Y.S.2d 171, 173 (Sup. Ct. 1984). See also David H. Kaye & George F. Sensabaugh,Jr., DNA

Typing, in 3 MODERN

SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE

§ 25-2.7, at 282 (Faigman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002)

("In one investigation, the National Fish and Wildlife Forensic Laboratory, using DNA testing, determined that the material offered for export actually came from a pig absolving the
suspect of any export violations.").
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Occupational Safety and Health, 41 National Highway and Transporta42
tion Safety Administration, 1 4 1 and the military.'
In addition, federal forensic laboratories often provide their services to state law enforcement agencies. The services of the FBI Laboratory are available without charge to "all duly constituted law
enforcement agencies ... which may desire to avail themselves of the
service."' 143 These services include both the examination of evidence
and the court appearance of an expert. It is quite common to find
FBI or other federal experts testifying in state criminal proceedings
about a diverse array of forensic procedures, including the analysis of
drugs, 144 blood, 145 hair, 146 fibers, 14 7 firearms, 148 fingerprints, 14 9 gun-

140
See United States v. Hansen, 262 F.3d 1217, 1235-36 (11th Cir. 2001) (field and
laboratory testing of mercury exposure levels).
141
See United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530, 549 (D. Md. 2002) ("I cannot agree
that the [intoxication] tests, singly or in combination, have been shown to be as reliable as
asserted by Dr. Burns, the NHTSA publications, and the publications of the communities
of law enforcement officers and state prosecutors.").
142
See, e.g., United States v. Mahoney, 58 M.J. 346, 347 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (Air Force
Drug Testing Lab, Brooks AFB, Texas); United States v. Holt, 52 M.J. 173, 178 (C.A.A.F.
1999) (U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory, Fort Gillem, Georgia).
1428 C.F.R. § 0.85(g) (2004); see also FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, HANDBOOK
OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 20 (1994) ("The FBI Laboratory is the only federal full-service forensic science laboratory, serving the law enforcement community."); Marion E. Williams, The
FBI Laboratoyy-ItsAvailability and Use by Prosecutorsfrom Investigationto Trial,28 U. KAN. Criy
L. REV. 95, 99 (1960) ("The facilities of the FBI Laboratory are available without charge to
all duly constituted state, county, and municipal law enforcement agencies of the United
States and its territorial possessions."); cf Gordon v. Thornberg, 790 F. Supp. 374, 375-76,
378 (D.R.I. 1992) (rejecting defendant's Freedom of Information Act request for FBI lab
report which had been prepared for the prosecution).
144
See, e.g., State v. Lowe, 2002 WrL 31051631, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 16, 2002)
(DEA chemist).
145
See, e.g., People v. Garries, 645 P.2d 1306, 1307 (Colo. 1982) (FBI serologist); State
v. Rolls, 389 A.2d 824, 826 (Me. 1978) (same); State v. Thomas, 421 S.E.2d 227, 230-31
(W.Va. 1992) (FBI bloodstain expert).
146
See, e.g., Fensterer v. Delaware, 474 U.S. 15, 16 (1985) (FBI examiner); Padilla v.
People, 397 P.2d 741, 743 (Colo. 1964) (same); Kennedy v. State, 578 N.E.2d 633, 638
(Ind. 1991) (same); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 183 S.E.2d 179, 179-80 (Va. 1971)
(same); State v. Cameron, 674 P.2d 650, 654 (Wash. 1983) (same).
147
See, e.g., Williams v. State, 312 S.E.2d 40, 52 (Ga. 1983) (FBI examiner); Kennedy,
578 N.E.2d at 638 (same); State v. Buell, 489 N.E.2d 795, 804-05 (Ohio 1986) (same);
Robinson, 183 S.E.2d at 179-80 (same).
148
See, e.g., Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 174 (1986) (FBI ballistics examiner in
Florida case); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 166 (1986) (FBI ballistics examiner in
Arkansas trial); State v. Grube, 883 P.2d 1069, 1071, 1074-75 (Idaho 1994) (ATF and FBI
examiners); State v. King, 546 S.E.2d 575, 583-84 (N.C. 2001) (FBI examiner).
149
See, e.g.,
Hays v. State, 488 So. 2d 77, 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (FBI fingerprint
examiner); State v. Cline, 909 P.2d 1171, 1176 (Mont. 1996) (same); State v. Viola, 82
N.E.2d 306, 311 (Ohio 1947) (same).
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15 2
and the like. 153
shot residues,1 5 0 shoeprints, 151 voice comparisons,

Most recently, states have turned to federal laboratories for assistance
with DNA profiling. 154 In some of these cases, federal laboratories
provided services based on analyses that most state and local laboratories could not perform-for example, neutron activation analysis
(NAA), 15 5 compositional analysis of bullet lead, 15 6 and, when initially
introduced, DNA profiling. In one case, Earhart v. State,157 six differ158
ent FBI experts testified.
When necessary, prosecutors have also retained private experts.159 For instance, the experts in bite-mark comparison cases are
150
See, e.g., Meis v. Wyoming Dept. of Corrections, 9 F.3d 695, 698 (8th Cir. 1993) (FBI
examiner in Wyoming trial); Troedel v. State, 462 So. 2d 392, 394 (Fla. 1984) (FBI examiner using neutron activation analysis (NAA)); State v. Warden, 592 P.2d 836, 839 (Idaho
1979) (AFT examiner reviewing results of NAA); People v. Salzar, 535 N.E.2d 766, 772 (Ill.
1988) (FBI examiner using NAA); State v. Spencer, 216 N.W.2d 131, 133-34 (Minn. 1974)
(ATF examiner using NAA).
151
See, e.g., Patler v. Slayton, 503 F.2d 472, 479 & n.5 (4th Cir. 1974) (FBI examiner in
Virginia case testifying concerning the results of a battery of tests conducted on physical
evidence, including footprints).
152
See, e.g., State v. Cunningham, 763 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) ("Steven
Cain, a voice print expert from the Department of Treasury, identified appellant, Michael
Cunningham as being the person who made six of the seven 911 calls to the police.").
153
See, e.g., State v. Genrich, 928 P.2d 799, 801-02 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (ATF tool
mark expert examining bomb debris); Pennel v. State, 602 A.2d 48, 54 (Del. 1991) ("F.B.I.
Agent Douglas... testif[ied] as an expert on serial murders."); Narvaiz v. State, 840 S.W.2d
415, 431 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (FBI tape enhancement expert).
154
See, e.g., Moore v. State, 915 S.W.2d 284, 288 (Ark. 1996); Prater v. State, 820 S.W.2d
429, 430 (Ark. 1991); Prince v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855, 856 (Ct. App. 1992);
Jenkins v. State, 627 N.E.2d 789, 792 (Ind. 1993); State v. Alt, 504 N.W.2d 38, 40 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1993); State v. DeMarco, 646 A.2d 431, 432 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994); People v.
Monagas, 615 N.Y.S.2d 633, 634 (Sup. Ct. 1994); Brown v. State, 881 S.W.2d 582, 585 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1994).
155
See, e.g., United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 435 (6th Cir. 1970) (Post Office Department Inspection Service laboratory); Jones v. State, 425 N.E.2d 128, 130 (Ind. 1981)
(FBI Laboratory); State v. Coolidge, 260 A.2d 547, 559 (N.H. 1969) (U.S. Treasury laboratory), rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
156
See, e.g., State v. Grube, 883 P.2d 1069, 1078 (Idaho 1994) (FBI Laboratory); People
v. Johnson, 499 N.E.2d 1355, 1366 (Il1. 1986) (same); Commonwealth v. Daye, 587 N.E.2d
194, 207 (Mass. 1992) (same); State v. Noel, 723 A.2d 602, 603-04 (N.J. 1999) (same);
State v. Reynolds, 297 S.E.2d 532, 534 (N.C. 1982) (same); Bryan v. State, 935 P.2d 338, 360
(Okla. Crim. App. 1997) (same); Earhart v. State, 823 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex. Crim. App.
1991) (same); State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 817 (Utah 1994) (same).
157
823 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc).
158
The FBI experts' testimony concerned bullet composition, firearms identification,
hair analysis, fingerprint analysis, blood analysis, and soil testing. Although the soil analysis
expert testified for the defense, the state had requested the examination. See id. at 614-15.
As noted earlier, prosecutorial access may even extend to other countries. See supra notes
6-9 and accompanying text (discussing British, Dutch, and Canadian experts).
159
Dr. Louise Robbins, for example, testified often for the prosecution. See United
States v. Ferri, 778 F.2d 985, 988 (3d Cir. 1985) (testifying that shoes found at scene of
arson matched defendants' shoe and footprint exemplars); People v. Puluti, 174 Cal. Rptr.
597, 603 (Ct. App. 1981) (stating that Robbins "had never before been qualified as an
expert to testify about foot imprints left inside of shoesfor purposes of identification"); People v.
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typically privately employed dentists. 160 The early DNA cases are also
illustrative; private laboratories were the pioneers of this technology.1 6 1 Even today, mitochondrial DNA analysis is performed only by
the FBI, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, and a few private
laboratories.

162

This does not mean that prosecutors never have problems securing experts, only that, as discussed below, they have an overwhelming
advantage when compared to defense counsel.
II
DEFENSE ACCESS TO EXPERT ASSISTANCE

Forensic laboratory services are not generally available to criminal defendants. A survey of approximately 300 crime laboratories revealed that "fifty-seven percent . . . would only examine evidence
submitted by law enforcement officials.' 63 FBI experts have testified
64
for the defense in some cases, but only pursuant to a subpoena.1
Barker, 170 Cal. Rptr. 69, 72 (Ct. App. 1980) ("[Robbins] considered herself the chief
proponent of the 'unique shoeprint' concept, in that she was the only person presently
working on this subject."); People v Ferguson, 526 N.E.2d 525, 531 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)
(rejecting Robbins's testimony, because there was no evidence that "any one other than
Robbins employed the theory used to make the identification in this case"); State v. Bullard, 322 S.E.2d 370, 374-76 (N.C. 1984); State v. Maccia, 316 S.E.2d 241, 255 (N.C. 1984).
160
See, e.g., Handley v. State, 515 So. 2d 121, 129-31 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987); State v.
Garrison, 585 P.2d 563, 566 (Ariz. 1978); Verdict v. State, 868 S.W.2d 443, 445 (Ark. 1993);
Bundy v. State, 455 So. 2d 330, 348-49 (Fla. 1984); People v. Holmes, 601 N.E.2d 985,
991-93 (Il1. App. Ct. 1992); Niehaus v. State, 359 N.E.2d 513, 516 (Ind. 1977); State v.
Peoples, 605 P.2d 135, 139-40 (Kan. 1980); Commonwealth v. Cifizzari, 492 N.E.2d 357,
361-62 (Mass. 1986); People v. Marsh, 441 N.W.2d 33, 34-35 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); Bludsworth v. State, 646 P.2d 558, 559 (Nev. 1982); State v. Green, 290 S.E.2d 625, 628 (N.C.
1982); Kennedy v. State, 640 P.2d 971, 975-76 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982); State v. Jones, 259
S.E.2d 120, 124-25 (S.C. 1979); State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 258 (Tenn. 1994); Spence
v. State, 795 S.W.2d 743, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
161
See, e.g., Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 843 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (Lifecodes
Corp.); People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 986 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (same); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 785, 791 (Va. 1989) (same).
162
See People v. Klinger, 713 N.Y.S.2d 823, 828 (Sup. Ct. 2000) ("There are approximately a half dozen labs in the United States that conduct mtDNA analysis. Two of those
labs are noncommercial-the FBI lab and the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology. There
are over 50 labs in Europe that do mtDNA analysis.").
163
Joseph L. Peterson et al., The Capabilities, Uses, and Effects of the Nation's Criminalistics
Laboratories, 30J. FoRENsIc SCi. 10, 13 (1985).
164
In the Rickey Hammond case, a kidnapping and rape prosecution tried in Hartford, a DNA expert from the FBI appeared as a defense witness, testifying that semen stains
taken from the victim's panties did not come from Hammond. Nevertheless, the jury, at
the prosecutor's urging, convicted. Jack Ewing, Conn. Jury DisregardsDNA Test, NAT'L L.J.,
Apr. 23, 1990, at 9. Hammond's conviction was reversed on appeal, see State v. Hammond,

604 A.2d 793 (Conn. 1992), and he was acquitted at a retrial, see EDWARD

CONNORS ET AL.,

supra note 13, at 54. See also Earhart v. State, 823 S.W.2d 607, 614-15 (Tex. Crim. App.
1991) (en banc) (FBI soil expert testified for the defense after the state originally requested the examination). In one capital murder case, State v. Johnston, No. 412 (Ohio
App. Aug. 6, 1986), affd in part, rev'd in part, 529 N.E.2d 898 (Ohio 1988), rehg denied, 534

1332

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:1305

If a defendant has sufficient financial resources, there are sources
for obtaining expert assistance. 165 O.J. Simpson, for example, hired a
number of nationally recognized experts in criminalistics, forensic pathology, blood spatter, and DNA. 166 Similarly, John Hinckley's in16 7
sanity defense was based on the testimony of a number of experts.
In the infamous Leopold and Loeb case, the prosecution hired the
best-known psychiatrists in Chicago before the defense could act.
Nevertheless, Clarence Darrow retained three of the most prominent
1 68
psychiatrists in the country.
If the defendant is indigent, however, the picture is alteredoften drastically. The Ake Court gave the states some leeway in implementing the right to expert assistance, 1 69 and a number of statutory
provisions-state and federal-attempt to provide this assistance to
indigent defendants. In addition, most jurisdictions have provisions
for court-appointed experts and special procedures for competency
determinations and insanity defenses. These provisions are examined
in the following sections.
A.

Criminal Justice Act

The Criminal Justice Act of 1964 (CJA)1 70 provides expert assistance for indigent defendants in federal trials. Under subsection
(e) (1) of the Act, an indigent defendant has the right to expert assistance when "necessary for an adequate representation." 171 According
N.E.2d 850, 850 (Ohio 1988), laterproceeding,580 N.E.2d 1162 (Ohio App. 1990), the FBI's
top shoeprint expert, William Bodziak, compared a plaster cast of a purported footprint
found in a muddy riverbank with three boots seized from the defendant. Johnston was
sentenced to death. Mark Hansen, Believe It or Not, A.B.A. J., June 1993, at 64.
165
See DIRECTORY OF EXPERT WITNESSES IN TECHNOLOGY (1987). In addition, there are
several organizations that assist in securing experts: The American Academy of Forensic
Sciences, 410 North 21st Street, Suite 203, Colorado Springs, CO 80904; Technical Advisory Service for Attorneys, 428 Pennsylvania Avenue, Fort Washington, PA 19034; Law and
Technology Associates, 575 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10022.
166
See Lorraine Adams & Serge F. Kovaleski, The Dream Team's Resources, in POSTMORTEM: THE O.J. SIMPSON CASE 126-27 (Jeffrey Abramson ed., 1996) ("Money meant that
the day after Simpson was first questioned by police, defense attorney Robert L. Shapiro
had hired the nations's two best forensic scientists, criminalist Henry Lee and pathologist
Michael Baden, men who usually testify for the prosecution.").
167
See PETER W. Low ET AL., THE TRIAL OFJOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR.: A CASE STUDY IN THE
INSANITY DEFENSE 28 (1986) (noting that Hinckley hired three psychiatrists and a clinical
psychologist).
168
See HAL HIGDON, LEOPOLD & LOEB: THE CRIME OF THE CENTURY 137 (2d ed. 1999).
169 See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985) ("[A]s in the case of the provision of
counsel we leave to the State the decision on how to implement this right.").
170
18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2000). On the Criminal Justice Act more generally, see Robert
J. Kutak, The CriminalJusticeAct of 1964, 44 NEB. L. REV. 703 (1965); Dallin H. Oaks, Improving the CriminalJustice Act, 55 A.B.A. J. 217 (1969); Dallin H. Oaks, ObtainingCompensation
and Defense Services Under the Federal CriminalJustice Act, in I CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES
ch. 7 (1985).
171 The complete subsection reads:

AKE V. OKLAHOMA

2004]

1333

to the reported cases, psychiatrists are the experts most commonly
sought pursuant to the CJA.' 72 Other requests have involved polygraph examiners, 173 psychologists for eyewitness identification testiCounsel for a person who is financially unable to obtain investigative, expert, or other services necessary for an adequate representation may request them in an ex parte application. Upon finding, after appropriate
inquiry in an ex parte proceeding, that the services are necessary and that
the person is financially unable to obtain them, the court, or the United
States magistrate judge if the services are required in connection with a
matter over which he has jurisdiction, shall authorize counsel to obtain the
services.
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (1)

(2000); see 3B CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-

DURE § 740 (3d ed. 2000); Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Construction and Application of Provision in Subsection (e) of CriminalJustice Act of 1964 (18 USC § 3006A(e)) Concerning Right of
Indigent Defendant to Aid in Obtaining Services of Investigator or Expert, 6 A.L.R. FED. 1007
(1971).
Failure of the defense to make a timely request under the Act constitutes a waiver. See,
e.g., United States v. Scott, 48 F.3d 1389, 1396 (5th Cir. 1995) ("[C)ounsel never referred
to the statute, or to Scott's financial ability to procure an expert. The request made by
counsel was for 'time to employ' [a voice identification] expert, not for permission to
employ an expert at government expense."); United States v. Patterson, 438 F.2d 328, 329
(5th Cir. 1971) ("The rights established by 18 U.S.C.A_ § 3006A(e) are procedural, and the
failure to make a timely motion or request waives the necessity for the court's consideration of an appointment of an expert witness."); see also United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d
693, 731-32 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (denying request that was withdrawn and reinstated two
hours before trial).
Circuit courts use an "abuse of discretion" standard when reviewing a trial court's
decision concerning the appointment of an expert under the CJA. See, e.g., United States v.
Gilmore, 282 F.3d 398, 406 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Cravens, 275 F.3d 637, 639
(7th Cir. 2001).
172 See, e.g., United States v. Roman, 121 F.3d 136, 143-44 (3d Cir. 1997) ("[T]he district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Samuel Roman funds to retain a psychiatrist .... "); United States v. Castro, 15 F.3d 417, 422 (5th Cir. 1994) ("[Defendant] never
provided the district court with any evidence, aside from his drug addiction, to support his
request for psychiatric evaluation."); United States v. Smith, 987 F.2d 888, 890-91 (2d Cir.
1993); United States v. Rinchack, 820 F.2d 1557, 1563-66 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Crews, 781 F.2d 826, 833-34 (10th Cir. 1986) ("[A]n indigent defendant raising an insanity
defense is entitled to the aid of a psychiatrist."); United States v. Reason, 549 F.2d 309,
310-11 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Bass, 477 F.2d 723, 726 (9th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Theriault, 440 F.2d 713, 714 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Taylor, 437 F.2d 371,
375 (4th Cir. 1971). For more on requests for psychiatrists under the CJA, see Catherine
R. Larzuran, Annotation, Right of Federal Indigent Criminal Defendant to Obtain Independent
PsychiatricExamination Pursuantto Subsection (e) of CriminalJusticeAct of[1964, as Amended (18
USC § 3006(e), 40 A.L.R.FED. 707 (1978); Travis H. Lewin, Mental Disorder and the Federal
Indigent, 11 S. DAx. L. REv. 198 (1966); Comment, Developing Standardsfor PsychiatricAssistance for Indigent Defendants Under the CriminalJustice Act, 59 IoWA L. REv. 726 (1974); Eugene M. Elliott Jr., Note, The CriminalJustice Act of 1964-The Defendant's Right to an
Independent PsychiatricExamination,28 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 443 (1971); Dean C. Gramlich,
Note, An Indigent CriminalDefendant's ConstitutionalRight to a PsychiatricExpert, 1984 U. Ill.
L. Rev. 481; Serge Novovich, Note, Criminal Law: Indigent Defendant's Right to Independent
Psychiatrist, 7 TULSA L.J. 137 (1971); Barbara Shaw, Recent Development, CriminalProcedure-The Indigent's Right to Psychiatric Assistance at Trial, 20 WAYNE L. REV. 1365 (1974).
173
See, e.g., United States v. Penick, 496 F.2d 1105, 1109-10 (7th Cir. 1974) (request
granted in part and denied in part). For a more general discussion, see Wanda Ellen
Wakefield, Annotation, Right of Indigent CriminalDefendant to Polygraph Test at Public Expense,
11 A.L.R. 4TH 733 (1982).
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mony, 1 74 fingerprint experts, 17 5 handwriting examiners, 17 6
accountants, 177 and hypnotists. 178 These are the stock-and-trade experts in criminal litigation. 79 Less commonly, criminal defendants

174
See, e.g.,
United States v. Labansat, 94 F.3d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Counsel can
easily expose through cross-examination and closing argument the unreliability, if any, of
delayed eyewitness identifications."); United States v. Larkin, 978 F.2d 964, 971 (7th Cir.
1992) (finding that it was not error to refuse appointment); United States v. George, 975
F.2d 1431, 1432 (9th Cir. 1992) (same); United States v. Brewer, 783 F.2d 841, 842-43 (9th
Cir. 1986) (same); United States v. Purham, 725 F.2d 450, 454 (8th Cir. 1984) (same);
United States v. Sims, 617 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1980) (same); United States v. Fosher,
590 F.2d 381, 382 (1st Cir. 1979) (same).
175
See, e.g.,
United States v. Walborn, 730 F.2d 192, 194 (5th Cir. 1984) (denying request not error); United States v. Patterson, 724 F.2d 1128, 1131 (5th Cir. 1984) (denying
request error); United States v. Durant, 545 F.2d 823, 829 (2d Cir. 1976) (same).
176
See, e.g., United States v. Perrera, 842 F.2d 73, 76-77 (4th Cir. 1988) (denying request not error); United States v. Sailer, 552 F.2d 213, 215-16 (8th Cir. 1977) (finding no
abuse of discretion, under circumstances of the case, in district court's denial of request).
177
See, e.g., United States v. Lefkowitz, 125 F.3d 608, 620 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding no
due process violation where court limited accused to "$169,000 in accountant expert fees
under the Criminal Justice Act"); United States v. Sloan, 65 F.3d 861, 863-64 (10th Cir.
1995) (finding denial of request for CPA to examine defendant's financial status to show
lack of drug dealing proper where prosecution conceded that defendant had no funds);
United States v. Kennedy, 64 F.3d 1465, 1472-73 (10th Cir. 1995) ("[W]e conclude that
the court did not abuse its discretion by denying the accounting services because Kennedy
did not demonstrate their necessity to his representation."); United States v. Hope, 901
F.2d 1013, 1021 n.13 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding denial of request not error).
178
See United States v. Bercier, 848 F.2d 917, 919 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding denial of
request not error).
179
Other types of experts have also been requested. See, e.g.,
United States v. Deering,
179 F.3d 592, 597 (8th Cir. 1999) ("Deering next argues the district court erred in denying
him additional funds to test a[n] ...audio tape made by the Cedar Rapids Police Department. . . . The district court authorized several thousand dollars for testing of the tape,
and we think... [denying] the additional expert funds [was not error]."); United States v.
Bailey, 112 F.3d 758, 767 (4th Cir. 1997) ("About a month or more before trial, Bailey had
had made available to him a forensic psychologist, a forensic pathologist and an addictionologist. And at least a week before trial, the court authorized a blood, hair and fiber
expert."); United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495, 1503-04 (8th Cir. 1996) (upholding
denial of request for chemist to testify concerning composition of cocaine and cocaine
base); United States v. Manning, 79 F.3d 212, 218-19 (1st Cir. 1996) (concluding that
denial of request for retired police officer to testify about inadequacies of police investigation and failure to test broken glass of window for fingerprints and to trace origins of pipe
bomb components was not error); Sloan, 65 F.3d at 864 (denying request for medical doctor to show defendant was not a drug user proper where prosecution conceded this fact);
United States v. Scott, 48 F.3d 1389, 1395-96 (5th Cir. 1995) (upholding determination
that request for voice identification expert had been waived by lack of timely motion);
United States v. Greschner, 802 F.2d 373, 376 (10th Cir. 1986) (denying request for penologist not error); United States v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283, 1315-16 (7th Cir. 1976) (concluding that request for clinical psychologist to assist injury selection and request for urban
sociologist properly denied); Stead v. United States, 67 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1075 (D.S.D.
1999) ("[I]t appears unlikely that the trial court would have appointed an expert to testify
generally on the issue of intoxication if timely application had been made for one.").
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request optometrists, 180 addictionologists,I 8 1 theologians, 8 2 linguists, 8 3 sexual offender profilers, a8 4 and psychiatrists to examine alleged child sex abuse victims.' 8 5
1.

Purpose of CJA

The CJA, which was enacted two decades before Ake was decided,
is instructive in many ways. For one thing, the courts cannot agree on
the underlying purpose of the Act. The general purpose of the CJA is
to "achieve more meaningful and effective representation for defendants in Federal criminal cases." 18 6 In interpreting subsection (e), however, the courts have identified three different purposes. First, some
courts specify the purpose as "redress [ing] the imbalance in the criminal process when the resources of the United States Government are
pitted against an indigent defendant."' 8 7 This purpose incorporates a
due process concern: an imbalance between the prosecution and defense.' 8 8 Second, other courts speak of "plac[ing] indigent defendants as nearly as may be on a level of equality with nonindigent
defendants in the defense of criminal cases."1 8 9 This reflects an equal
protection rationale: an imbalance between indigent and non-indigent defendants.' 9 0 Third, still other courts refer to "accord [ing] federal prisoners full constitutional rights under Due Process and the
Sixth Amendment." 9 1 By referring to the Sixth Amendment, these
19 2
courts focus on an effective-assistance-of-counsel rationale.
180 See United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693, 731-32 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (denying request for optometrist not error); United States v. Moss, 544 F.2d 954, 961-62 (8th Cir.
1976) (rejecting argument that district court abused its discretion by deferring appointment of optometrist "pending introduction of evidence that [defendant's] eyesight was
material to an adequate defense").
181
See Bailey, 112 F.3d at 767.
182
See United States v. Bauer, 84 F.3d 1549, 1559 (9th Cir. 1996) (considering request
for a theology expert to support defense under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
183 See United States v. Valverde, 846 F.2d 513, 517 (8th Cir. 1988) (upholding denial
of request).
184
See United States v. St. Pierre, 812 F.2d 417, 420 (8th Cir. 1987) (denying request
for expert to determine whether defendant fit sexual offender profile was not error).
185
See United States v. Spotted War Bonnet, 882 F.2d 1360, 1362 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion by denying request for psychiatrist to
examine alleged child sex abuse victims).
186
H.R. REP. No. 1546, at 4 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3982, 3984.
187
United States v. Durant, 545 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1976).
188 See infra text accompanying notes 300-26 (discussing due process rationales).
189 United States v. Tate, 419 F.2d 131, 132 (6th Cir. 1969); accord United States v.
Schappel, 445 F.2d 716, 721 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
190 See infra text accompanying notes 263-80 (discussing equal protection rationale).
191
Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1352 (9th Cir. 1974); accord Proffitt v. United
States, 582 F.2d 854, 857 (4th Cir. 1978).
192 See infra text accompanying notes 327-52 (discussing right-to-counsel rationale).
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Standardfor Appointment

Another issue is the standard used for the appointment of experts. The CJA requires the provision of "expert... services necessary
for an adequate representation." 193 The Fifth Circuit, applying this
language, has reasoned that "where the government's case rests heavily on a theory most competently addressed by expert testimony, an
indigent defendant must be afforded the opportunity to prepare and
present his defense to such a theory with the assistance of his own
expert pursuant to section 3006A(e)."'19 4 This standard looks to the
prosecution's case in determining necessity, suggesting a due process
or right to counsel rationale. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit requires
expert services when "a reasonable attorney would engage such services for a client having the independent financial means to pay for
them."'195 This "private attorney" standard for determining necessity
is based on the equal protection rationale. In addition, the relative
strictness of the standard is sometimes difficult to discern. The First
Circuit requires that the proffered expert testimony be "pivotal" or
"critical" to the defense. 19 6 In contrast to this stringent test, the Eleventh Circuit has held that the trial court may reject an application for
appointment if the accused "does not have a plausible claim or defense"' 97 -a far less demanding test.
193
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (1) (2000) (emphasis added). The First Circuit has noted:
"In 1986, subsection (e) was amended by substituting 'adequate representation' for 'an
adequate defense.' Although the legislative history does not provide an explanation for
this change, one could infer that the change was meant to broaden the reach of subsection
(e)'s provisions." United States v. Abreu, 202 F.3d 386, 389 n.1 (1st Cir. 2000) (citations
omitted); see also United States v. Sailer, 552 F.2d 213, 215 (8th Cir. 1977) (stating that a
defendant seeking CJA funds must meet a two-pronged test: "(1) The accused must satisfy
the court that financial inability prevents him from obtaining the services he requests; and
(2) The accused must show need for such services to present an adequate defense." (quoting United States v. Schultz, 431 F.2d 907, 908 (8th Cir. 1970))).
194 United States v. Patterson, 724 F.2d 1128, 1130 (5th Cir. 1984); see United States v.
Williams, 998 F.2d 258, 263-64 (5th Cir. 1993).
195 United States v. Bass, 477 F.2d 723, 725 (9th Cir. 1973). This standard was derived
from Judge Wisdom's concurring opinion in United States v. Theriault. 440 F.2d 713, 717
(5th Cir. 1971) (Wisdom, J., concurring); accord United States v. Smith, 987 F.2d 888, 891
(2d Cir. 1993); Brinkley v. United States, 498 F.2d 505, 509-10 (8th Cir. 1974); see also
United States v. Labansat, 94 F.3d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Labansat must show that the
lack of an expert deprived him of effective assistance of counsel. He must demonstrate
both that reasonably competent counsel would have required the assistance of the requested expert for a paying client, and that he was prejudiced by the lack of expert
assistance.").
196 United States v. Manning, 79 F.3d 212, 218 (1st Cir. 1996).
197 United States v. Rinchack, 820 F.2d 1557, 1564 (11th Cir. 1987); accord United
States v. Gilmore, 282 F.3d 398, 406 (6th Cir. 2002) ("Gilmore's defense was not plausible.
The evidence that he was the perpetrator was overwhelming. Gilmore can point to nothing that could have been done by an expert or an investigator that had the potential of
helping his case."); United States v. Roman, 121 F.3d 136, 143 (3d Cir. 1997) ("[A] court
should first 'satisfy itself that a defendant may have a plausible defense.'" (quoting United
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Scope of the Right

Third, the federal courts have also addressed the scope of assistance provided by the CJA. An adequate defense includes both "pretrial and trial assistance to the defense as well as potential trial
testimony." 198 Thus, the statutory right is not limited to the trial. The
right also includes "preparation for cross-examination of a government expert as well as presentation of an expert defense witness." 199
This indicates that the expert may be an advisor in lieu of, or in addition to, a trial witness. Therefore, the admissibility of expert testimony may not be the sole, determinative factor in responding to a
request for services. 20 0 In addition, requests for expert assistance in
20 2
sentencing 20 1 and collateral proceedings have been permitted.
One court has even held that the Act extends to plea bargaining, 20 3 an
20 4
important development given the decreasing number of trials.
States v. Alden, 767 F.2d 314, 318 (7th Cir. 1984))); Alden, 767 F.2d at 318-19 (applying
"plausible defense" requirement in connection with "private attorney" standard).
198 Bass, 477 F.2d at 726; accord United States v. Sims, 617 F.2d 1371, 1375 n.3 (9th Cir.
1980).
199 United States v. Durant, 545 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1976).
200
See Sims, 617 F.2d at 1375 n.3 ("While the admissibility or acceptance of a particular
type expert's field of study may be a factor in considering the 'necessity' of appointing an
expert, to hold that it was the only factor would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the Criminal Justice Act." (citation omitted)). But see United States v. Fosher, 590
F.2d 381, 384 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Penick, 496 F.2d 1105, 1110 (7th Cir. 1974).
201
See United States v. Abreu, 202 F.3d 386, 390 (1st Cir. 2000) ("[R]eading the [CJA]
as a whole, it appears that Congress intended the provisions of subsection (e) to apply to
sentencing. ... [1It appears that this may be the first circuit opinion to so hold."); United
States v. Barney, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1314 (D. Utah 1999) ("[A]s to whether an expert
should be appointed for evaluation sentencing purposes, for a possible downward departure.... , it would appear this is within the range of authority of the court under 18 USC
§ 3006A(e)."); see also United States v. Craven, 275 F.3d 637, 639 n.3 (7th Cir. 2001) (assuming without deciding that CJA applies to request for expert in support of motion for
downward sentencing departure); United States v. Smith, 987 F.2d 888, 891 (2d Cir. 1993)
("At sentencing, expert testimony would also be relevant because . . . the guidelines allow[ ] a downward departure for an incomplete defense of duress. Testimony as to Smith's
unusual susceptibility to coercion would be relevant in determining whether he had an
honest but unreasonable belief that he was being coerced."); United States v. Nusz, 809 F.
Supp. 814, 816 (D. Kan. 1992) (denying request for psychologist to determine future dangerousness for sentencing purposes), affd, 17 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1994).
202
See Lawson v. Dixon, 3 F.3d 743, 750 (4th Cir. 1993) ("[D]efendants who wish to
have the assistance of experts at trial or in collateral-attack proceedings may apply for government funds to pay the cost of employing such experts pursuant to section
3006A(e) (1).").
203
See Barney, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1313.
204
See Adam Liptak, U.S. Suits Multiply, But Fewer Ever Get to Trial, Study Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 2003, at Al ("The percentage of federal criminal prosecutions resolved by
trials ... declined... to less than 5 percent last year from 15 present in 1962. The number
of prosecutions more than doubled in the last four decades, but the number of criminal
trials fell, to 3,574 last year from 5,097 in 1962.").
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Monetary Limit

Fourth, the monetary limits imposed by the CJA are unrealistic,
restricting expenses for expert services to $1,000 unless the court certifies that a greater amount is "necessary to provide fair compensation
for services of an unusual character or duration ...."205 Until 1986,
the maximum had been $300.206 Even today, however, "[t]he Act's
$1,000 limit for defense experts is far too low .. .and must be in20 7
creased if due process is to be afforded defendants.
5.

Ex parte Applications

Finally, the CJA addresses an issue that has proved controversial
under Ake. both the application for defense services and the proceedings to determine whether to grant the request are ex parte.208 As one
court has noted, "[t] he manifest purpose of requiring that the inquiry
be ex parte is to insure that the defendant will not have to make a
premature disclosure of his case." 20 9 In effect, this provision permits
the expert to "be a partisan witness. His conclusions need not be re2 10
ported in advance of trial to the court or to the prosecution.
B.

State Statutes

A number of state statutes and rules also provide expert assistance for indigent defendants. 21 ' These provisions, however, differ in
205
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (3) (2000). The CJA also specifies that $300 may be expended by appointed counsel for expert services without prior authorization. Such an
expenditure, however, is "subject to later review." 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (2); see also United
States v. Bryant, 311 F. Supp. 726 (D.D.C. 1970) (holding that expenditures over $300
remain reimbursable under Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure where
that rule applies).
206
See H.R. REp. No. 417, at 16 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6165, 6178.
207
Weinstein, supra note 2, at 1008.
208
See infra text accompanying notes 633-41 (discussing ex parte applications).
209
Marshall v. United States, 423 F.2d 1315, 1318 (10th Cir. 1970); accord United
States v. Chavis, 476 F.2d 1137, 1141-42 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. Sutton, 464 F.2d
552, 553 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Hamlet, 456 F.2d 1284, 1284-85 (5th Cir. 1972);
see also United States v. Bailey, 112 F.3d 758, 768 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that it was not
error to unseal ex parte motions for experts where the defendant had not properly complied with discovery requests); United States v. Lawson, 653 F.2d 299, 304 (7th Cir. 1981)
(rejecting claim that the government improperly participated in ex parte proceeding by
informing court that defendant seeking appointment of expert had posted a $25,000
surety bond).
210
United States v. Bass, 477 F.2d 723, 726 (9th Cir. 1973); accord United States v.
Theriault, 440 F.2d 713, 715 (5th Cir. 1971). Courts have held that a defendant's failure to
object to the presence of a prosecutor or the lack of an ex parte hearing is subject to plain
error analysis. See United States v. Pofahl, 990 F.2d 1456, 1472 (5th Cir. 1993) (lack of
hearing); United States v. Greschner, 802 F.2d 373, 380 (10th Cir. 1986) (prosecutors
present).
See NORMAN LEFSTEIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR app. B (1982)
211
(listing state statutes); Mary F. Moriarty, "Liberty,Justice.. . and Experts For All," 6 LAw &
INEQ. 247, 269-72 (1988).
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many respects. Some explicitly provide for the services of experts, 2 12
while others mention only investigative services. 2 13 Still others refer to
the reimbursement of reasonable or necessary expenses incurred by
2 4
attorneys representing indigent defendants.
The coverage of the state provisions also varies. Some are limited
2 16
to capital cases, 2 15 while one applies only in drug prosecutions.
Moreover, some statutes provide for the payment of reasonable expenses, 21 7 while others specify a maximum amount. 21 8 Some of these
2 19
limits are shamefully low: $250 for each capital defendant in Illinois

and $300 per expert in Nevada 2 20 and New Hampshire. 22 1 In some
instances, statutes that establish maximums do permit reimbursement
22 2
for expenses above the maximum in extraordinary circumstances.
The procedures specified for obtaining expert assistance also vary. A
223
number of statutes, like the CJA, provide for ex parte proceedings,
while other statutes are silent on this point.
212 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 802-7 (Michie 2003); IowA CODE ANN. § 813.2 R.
19(4) (West 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4508 (1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 261, § 27A &
27C(4) (1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.21 (a) (West 2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 604-A:6
(2001); N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 722-c (McKinney 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-454 (2003); OR.
REV. STAT. § 135.055(3) (2001); TEX. CRiM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 26.05(a) (Vernon 1989);
WASH. SuP. CT. CiM. R. 3.1(f).

213 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.85.100(a) (Michie 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32301(3) (2003).
214 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-12-21(d) (1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4605 (2003);
IDAHO CODE § 19-860(b) (Michie 1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-3-80 (Law. Co-op. 2003).
215 See, e.g.,
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4013(B) (West 2001); CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.9
(West 1985); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/113-3(d) (West 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-14207(b) (2003); seeJudith Olmstead, Comment, The ConstitutionalRight to Assistance in Addition to Counsel in a Death Penalty Case, 23 DUQUESNE L. REv. 753 (1985).
216 See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2925.51(E) (Anderson 2003).
217 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 914.06 (West 2001); IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2 R. 19(4)
(West 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 224508 (1995); WASH. Sup. CT. CRIM. R. 3.1(0(3).
218
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.21(b) (West 2003) ($1000 maximum); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 17-3-80 (Law. Co-op. 2000) ($2000 maximum); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-21-13a(e)
(Michie 2001) (establishing a $1500 maximum for cases other than those "involving felonies for which a penalty of life imprisonment may be imposed").
219
725 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/113-3(d) (West 1992).
220 NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7.135 (Michie 1998).
221
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 604-A:6 (Michie 2001) (establishing $300 limit "unless the
court determines that the nature or quantity of [the expert's] services reasonably merits
greater compensation").
222 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.21 (b) (West 2003) (establishing $1,000 limit unless
"services [are] of an unusual character or duration"); N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 722-c (McKinney
1991) (establishing $300 maximum absent extraordinary circumstances); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 29-21-13a(e) (Michie 1999) (establishing $1,500 maximum for cases where life imprisonment is not a possible penalty unless "good cause shown").
223
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4508 (1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.21(a) (West
2003); N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 722-c (McKinney 2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.055(3) (a) (2001);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-14-207(b) (2003); see also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 165.79(1) (West 1997)
(providing that the results of any state laboratory analysis conducted for the defense in a
felony action are privileged); People v. Berryman, 864 P.2d 40, 53 (Cal. 1993) (holding
that state statute specifying that application for expert funds be confidential does not pre-

1340

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:1305

The Virginia statute is somewhat unique because it established a
laboratory independent of law enforcement agencies. Defense counsel in Virginia, with court approval, may submit evidence directly to
this laboratory. Other states also have statutory provisions which permit the defense to submit evidence for analysis. 224 Prosecution access
to the lab results, however, negates the efficacy of such provisions. 225
C.

Mental Competency & Insanity Statutes

Frequently, a specific statute governs the appointment of experts
to determine the mental competency of an accused to stand trial and
to conduct psychiatric examinations where insanity is raised as a defense. 226 Although both competency and insanity determinations in-

they present different legal issues. 2 27
Competency is a due process issue, 228 and either party or, more signifvolve

psychiatric experts,

clude cross-examination of criminalist about compensation received under statute); Ex
pane Lexington County, 442 S.E.2d 589, 593 (S.C. 1994) (concluding that a county has no
standing to participate in an ex parte hearing to determine the expenses necessary to the
defense of an indigent in a capital case).
224
See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-01-10 (1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 165.79 (West 1997).
225
Symposium on Science and the Rules of Legal Practice, 101 F.R.D. 599, 646 (1984) (statement of Professor Andre Moenssens). Professor Andre Moenssens stated:
Control of the forensic science laboratory in Virginia was transferred about
11 years ago from the Department of Public Safety, where it functioned as a
police laboratory, to the Department of General Services, where it operates
as part of the consolidated laboratory system of the state. I assure you that
this was a change in name only and not in attitude of the personnel. Prosecuting attorneys and other members of the law enforcement community
continue to be the main consumers of forensic science services, and the
forensic scientists still are in spirit, if no longer in law, members of that
police community. A Virginia statute allows defense attorneys to use these
services, but only four requests have been submitted in over a decade. As
nearly as I have been able to determine, this disappointing response is due
to mistrust by defense attorneys of the laboratory personnel, whom they
consider to be employees of a police laboratory.
226
For example, a federal district court may order a mental examination to determine
competency to stand trial or insanity at the time of the crime under the Insanity Defense
Reform Act of 1984. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241-42 (2000).
227
Mental competency concerns the accused's mental condition at the time of trial,
while insanity refers to the defendant's mental condition at the time of the offense. Moreover, the insanity defense raises substantially different policy issues than does competency.
Insanity concerns a defendant's culpability for his criminal acts; it is a substantive criminal
law issue. In contrast, mental competency is a due process issue. Accordingly, different
standards apply in these two contexts. "[T]he 'test [for competency] must be whether [the
defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree
of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding
of the proceedings against him.'" Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per
curiam) (quoting Solicitor General).
228
The Supreme Court has held that "the failure to observe procedures adequate to
protect a defendant's right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent to stand trial
deprives him of his due process right to a fair trial." Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172
(1975) (citing Pate v Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966)).
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icantly, the court can raise it at any time. 229 In contrast, insanity is an
affirmative defense, governed by substantive law and subject to the
adversarial process. 2 30 In either case, understanding the role of the
expert is critical. As the Fifth Circuit has explained, an expert appointed under a competency statute is not a defense expert:
A psychiatrist appointed under § 4242 at the government's request
or on the court's own motion is "expected to be neutral and detached," and reports his findings to the court even if the defendant
does not wish him to do so. Under the Criminal Justice Act, 18
U.S.C. § 3006A, by contrast, the mental health expert "fills a different role." The § 3006A expert's conclusions need not be reported
23 1
either to the court or to the prosecution.
D.

Court-Appointed Experts

A trial court has inherent authority to appoint expert witnesses. 23 2 In many jurisdictions, this authority has been codified in
statutes and court rules 2 33-for example, Federal Evidence Rule 706.
23 4
Here, again, the role of the expert is not that of a defense expert.
229
See Drope, 420 U.S. at 181 ("Even when a defendant is competent at the commencement of his trial, a trial court must always be alert to circumstances suggesting a change
that would render the accused unable to meet the standards of competence to stand
trial.").
230
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(c) ("If the defendant provides notice [that he will assert
the insanity defense], the court must, upon the government's motion, order the defendant
to be examined under 18 U.S.C. § 4242.").
231
United States v. Williams, 998 F.2d 258, 263 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States
v. Theriault, 440 F.2d 713, 715 (5th Cir. 1971)).
232
See FED. R. EVID. 706 advisory committee's note ("The inherent power of a trial
judge to appoint an expert of his own choosing is virtually unquestioned."); Tahirih V.
Lee, Court-AppointedExperts andJudicialReluctance: A Proposal to Amend Rule 706 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 6 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 480 (1988); John M. Sink, The Unused Power of a
FederalJudge to Call His Own Expert Witness, 29 S. CAL. L. REv. 195 (1956); Pamela Louise
Johnston, Comment, Court-Appointed Scientific Expert Witnesses: Unfettering Expertise, 2 HIGH

TECH.
233

L.J. 249 (1987).
See 2 JOHN

HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE

ing rules and statutes);

JOE S. CECIL

§ 563 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 1979) (list-

& THOMAS E.

WILLGING, COURT-APPoINTrED EXPERTS:

706 (1993);
see also Annotation, Trial Court's Appointment, in Civil Case, of Expert Witness, 95 A.L.R. 2d 390
(1964) (examining cases "in which matters pertinent to the trial court's appointment of an
expert witness in a civil case have been discussed or mentioned").
234
The rule provides:
The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any party enter an
order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and
may request the parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint any
expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint expert witnesses of its own selection. An expert witness shall not be appointed by the
court unless the witness consents to act. A witness so appointed shall be
informed of the witness' duties by the court in writing, a copy of which shall
be filed with the clerk, or at a conference in which the parties shall have
opportunity to participate. A witness so appointed shall advise the parties
of the witness' findings, if any; the witness' deposition may be taken by any
DEFINING THE ROLE OF EXPERTS APPOINTED UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE

1342

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:1305

Indeed, Rule 706(d) recognizes the right of the parties to call their
own experts, notwithstanding the appointment of an expert by the
court.

235

E. Post-Conviction Provisions
Some statutes address the use of expert services in post-conviction
collateral attacks on federal and state court convictions. 2 36 Moreover,
the increasing influence of DNA profiling has made post-conviction
testing critical. 23 7 Illinois was one of the first jurisdictions to specifically authorize post-conviction DNA testing. 23 8 In Texas, the relevant
statute 239 provides for a three-step procedure: (1) an initial inquiry in
the trial court regarding whether forensic DNA testing is appropriate;
(2) in the event testing is ordered, a second hearing in the trial court
to determine whether the test results are favorable; and (3) an appeal
party; and the witness may be called to testify by the court or any party. The witness
shall be subject to cross-examination by each party, including a party calling
the witness.
FED. R. EVID. 706(a) (emphasis added).
235
FED. R. EVID. 706(d) ("Nothing in this rule limits the parties in calling expert witnesses of their own selection."). Even though the authority to appoint expert witnesses is
firmly established, few courts exercise that authority. See Lee, supra note 232, at 480-82. In
contrast, court experts are the tradition in civil-law countries. See Edward J. lmwinkelried,
The Court Appointment of Expert Witnesses in the United States: A Failed Experiment, 8 INT'L J.
MED. & LAw 601 (1989). For a persuasive argument for the mandatory appointment of all
experts, see Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 1113, 1220-30.
236
Eg., 21 U.S.C. § 84 8(q) (4) (B) & (q)(9) (2000); see Lawson v. Dixon, 3 F.3d 743,
750-51 (4th Cir. 1993) (concluding that exparte proceedings are required for the adjudication of appointment requests made under § 848(q)); Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 929
(Tenn. 1995) (concluding that Tennessee statute providing for the reimbursement of expert fees incurred by indigent capital defendants applies to post-conviction cases). But see
Davis v. State, 912 S.W.2d 689, 695-97 (Tenn. 1995) (concluding that the Tennessee statute does not apply in non-capital post-conviction cases, and finding no constitutional requirement to provide assistance in such circumstances because "[i]n the absence of a
Constitutional right to counsel, there can be no Constitutional right to support services at
state expense").
237
A 1996 Department of Justice DNA report highlights the need for post-conviction
proceedings. The report discusses the exoneration of 28 convicts through the use of DNA
technology-some of whom had been sentenced to death. See CONNORS ET AL., supra note
13, at 34-76.
238
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-3 (West 1997); see Gregory W. O'Reilly, A Second
Chance forJustice: Illinois' Post-TrialForensic Testing Law, 81 JUDICATURE 114, 114 (1997).
239
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 64.01-64.05 (Vernon 1989). Article 64.03(a) permits a convicting court to order post-conviction forensic DNA testing in cases where identity was at issue if two conditions are met. First, the convicting court must find that the
evidence remains in a condition that makes DNA testing possible and that the evidence was
subjected to a sufficient chain of custody. Second, the convicted person must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence both that he would not have been convicted if DNA testing
had yielded exculpatory results and that the request for post-conviction testing was not
merely a delay tactic. See id. § 64.03(a).
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of either determination. 240 Recently, the Justice Department's Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence addressed the issue, recommending procedures for dealing with these cases. 241 In situations
where statutory authority is absent, some courts have themselves
2 42
stepped in to provide for DNA testing.
F.

Ad Hoc Procedures

A few courts have been quite inventive in providing for the defen243
dant's right to expert assistance. For example, in People v. Evans,
the court ordered the New York City Police Department's Auto Crime
Division to assign an experienced officer to assist the defense in inspecting vehicles: "Where the government holds a monopoly of expertise on a matter that reasonably bears on a defense in a criminal
action, due process requires that a defendant be afforded access to
this expertise. ' 244 In another case, People v. Dickerson,2 45 the Illinois
Appellate Court ordered the trial court to direct "the Illinois State
crime lab [to] perform a handwriting analysis" for an indigent defendant. 246 In still a third case, a federal district court ordered the gov24 7
ernment to make laboratory facilities available to the defense.
III
THE RoAD TO AKE

The need for expert assistance was recognized as early as 1929
when Justice Cardozo commented: "[U]pon the trial of certain issues,
240

See Gray v. State, 69 S.W.3d 835, 837 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (holding that an indi-

gent person has a statutory right to counsel for appeals commenced under these
provisions).
241

NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, NAT'L INST. OFJUSTICE, POSTCON-

viCTION DNA TESTING: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HANDLING REQUESTS xiv (1999) (commenting that "[b] ecause of this present state of legal uncertainty, litigating postconviction DNA
applications often will be unnecessarily complex, expensive, and time consuming," and
suggesting that "prosecutors, defense counsel, and trial courts work cooperatively to assess
cases, find the evidence, arrange for DNA testing, and make joint requests for judicial or
executive relief when the facts so warrant after a result favorable to the petitioner").
242
See Lambert v. State, 777 So. 2d 45, 49 (Miss. 2001) ("[W]e cannot say with definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has not been made. The least we can do ... is allow
Lambert to apply modern science to the evidence used against him. Accordingly, we remand.., for entry of an order granting DNA analysis of the appropriate evidence."); State

v. Hogue, 818 A.2d 325, 327-28 (N.J. 2003) ("A convicted person has the right to request
DNA testing. . . . 'Thus, the absence of a rule specifically authorizing a post-judgment
motion seeking a DNA analysis.., does not deprive the trial court of the right, in appropriate circumstances, to grant the relief requested."' (quoting State v. Cann, 775 A.2d 773
(NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001))).
243 534 N.Y.S.2d 640 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
244

Id. at 642.

245
246
247

606 N.E.2d 762 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1992).
See id. at 767-68.
See United States v. Bockius, 564 F.2d 1193, 1196 (5th Cir. 1977).
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such as insanity or forgery, experts are often necessary both for prosecution and for defense.... [A] defendant may be at an unfair disadvantage, if he is unable because of poverty to parry by his own
witnesses the thrusts of those against him." 248 Judge Jerome Frank
made a similar observation in 1956, remarking that "[t]he best lawyer
in the world cannot competently defend an accused person if the lawyer cannot obtain existing evidence crucial to the defense, e.g., if the
defendant cannot pay the fee ...

of an expert accountant or mining

249

Judge Frank went on to observe: "In such
engineer or chemist."
circumstances, if the government does not supply the funds, justice is
denied the poor-and represents but an upper-bracket privilege. 25 °
Several early studies reached the same conclusion. In 1968, the
first edition of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards observed: "The
quality of representation at trial ... may be excellent and yet valueless

to the defendant if his defense requires the assistance of a psychiatrist
or handwriting expert and no such services are available."'25'

Even

President Nixon's Crime Commission report commented on the
sue. 2 52 Thus, it is somewhat surprising that the Warren Court,
launching its criminal procedure revolution, never addressed the
sue. Ake was not decided until 1985, over a decade after the demise
253
the Warren Court.

A.

isin
isof

United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi

Prior to Ake, the Supreme Court had considered an indigent accused's right to expert services only once. In United States ex rel. Smith
v. Baldi,254 a murder defendant argued that "the assistance of a psychiatrist was necessary to afford him adequate counsel" in the presentation of his insanity defense, and, thus, the state was obligated to
provide such assistance. 2 55 In rejecting this argument, the Supreme
Reilly v. Berry, 166 N.E. 165, 167 (N.Y. 1929).
United States v. Johnson, 238 F.2d 565, 572 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting),
vacated, 352 U.S. 565 (1957).
250
Id.
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE RELATING TO PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 66
251
(1988); see also ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARD 7-1.1, at 4-6 (2d ed.
1989) (discussing differences between a consulting and testifying expert).
248
249

252

NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, NAT'L INST.

280 (1973) (stating that Public Defender budgets should include
"[flunds for the employment of experts and specialists, such as psychiatrists, forensic pathologists, and other scientific experts in all cases in which they may be of assistance to the
defense").
253
When Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), was decided, a perceptive law
review note connected an indigent's right to counsel to the right to an expert. Note, Right
to Aid in Addition to Counselfor Indigent CriminalDefendants, 47 MINN. L. Rv. 1054 (1963).
344 U.S. 561 (1953).
254
Id. at 568. Specifically, the defendant's claim was that the State was constitutionally
255
required to provide him with the "technical pretrial assistance" of an expert. Id.
OF JUSTICE, COURTS
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Court stated, "[w] e cannot say that the State has that duty by constitutional mandate. '2 56 Smith, however, was not a convincing precedent
because it could easily be distinguished on the facts. Two defense psychiatrists had examined the defendant, and the Court's opinion consequently could be read as rejecting only a right to additional
experts. 25 7 More importantly, Smith was decided in 1953, and its continued vitality after the Warren Court's revolution in criminal procedure during the 1960s was suspect. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit noted in
1979 that "[t]he [Smith] decision . . .was severely undercut by the
''
Supreme Court's decision in Griffin v. Illinois. 258

Nevertheless, some courts continued to refuse to recognize a
right to expert assistance in criminal cases. 2 59 In 1967, the Mississippi
Supreme Court concluded: "Neither the United States Constitution
nor the Mississippi Constitution requires that the Nation or State furnish an indigent defendant with the assistance of a psychiatrist. The
2 60
only assistance that they require is the assistance of legal counsel.
Similarly, the Virginia Supreme Court wrote in 1984 that there is "no
constitutional right to the appointment, at public expense, of an investigator to assist in [an accused's] defense. When a trial court employs an investigator at public expense, it is 'an act of judicial grace
26 1
not constitutionally required."'
Id.
See id. ("[T]he issue of petitioner's sanity was heard by the trial court. Psychiatrists
testified. That suffices."); Bush v. McCollum, 231 F. Supp. 560, 564 (N.D. Tex. 1964) (distinguishing Smith on this ground), aff'd, 344 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1965).
258
Pedrero v. Wainwright, 590 F.2d 1383, 1390 n.6 (5th Cir. 1979); see United States ex
rel. Huguley v. Martin, 325 F. Supp. 489, 493 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting, in its discussion of
Smith, "intervening decisions by the Supreme Court, which have greatly expanded the
rights of the accused under the due process clause"); infra note 263 (discussing Griffin).
259
See Ruby B. Weeks, Annotation, Right of Indigent Defendant in Criminal Case to Aid of
State by Appointment ofInvestigator or Expert, 34 A.L.R. 3d 1256 (1970) (summarizing cases in
which an indigent requested expert assistance).
260
Phillips v. State, 197 So. 2d 241, 244 (Miss. 1967).
261
Stockton v. Commonwealth, 314 S.E.2d 371, 382 (Va. 1984) (quoting Quitana v.
Commonwealth, 295 S.E.2d 643, 646 (Va. 1982)). The right to expert assistance is closely
related to the right to investigative assistance, which several courts recognized. See Mason
v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir. 1974) ("[T]he effective assistance of counsel
guarantee... requires, when necessary, the allowance of investigative expenses or appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys."); Davis v. Coiner, 356 F. Supp. 695, 696-97
(N.D. W. Va. 1973) (granting habeas corpus relief and concluding that state court's refusal
to authorize the expenditure of state funds for defendant's court appointed attorney to
travel to North Carolina to depose a material witness violated the Constitution); United
States v. Germany, 32 F.R.D. 421, 423-24 (M.D. Ala. 1963); Lucero v. Superior Court, 176
Cal. Rptr. 62, 64 (Ct. App. 1981) ("The right to effective counsel does include the right of
an indigent to have funds allocated for investigative services, but only for necessary investigative services."); State v. Madison, 345 So. 2d 485, 490 (La. 1977). For a broader discussion of state-paid investigators for indigent defendants, see Thomas J. Ashcraft, Note,
Providing Indigent Criminal Defendants State-Paid Investigators, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 655
(1977).
256
257
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The Trend Toward Recognition of the Right

Despite these cases, a number of pre-Ake decisions recognized a
constitutional right to expert assistance, although they, like the com262
mentators, disagreed on the constitutional basis for this right.
1.

Equal Protection

Prior to Ake, several courts relied on the equal protection guarantee to support an indigent's right to expert assistance. 263 For example, the Fourth Circuit wrote:
It is obvious that only [the defendant's] inability to pay for the services of a psychiatrist prevented a proper presentation of his case.
The Supreme Court has unmistakably held that in criminal proceedings it will not tolerate discrimination between indigents and
264
those who possess the means to protect their rights.

Similarly, in Williams v. Martin,265 in which an indigent defendant requested the services of a forensic pathologist to evaluate the victim's
262 See John F. Decker, Expert Services in the Defense of Criminal Cases: The Constitutional
and Statutory Rights of Indigents, 51 U. CIN. L. REv.574 (1982); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The
Use of Expert Services by Privately Retained CriminalDefense Attorneys, 13 Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 1
(1981); Ephraim Margolin & Allen Wagner, The Indigent CriminalDefendant and Defense Services: A Searchfor ConstitutionalStandards, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 647 (1973); Dennis W. Alexander, Comment, Assistance in Addition to Counselfor Indigent Defendants: The Need for; The Lack
of- The Right To, 16 VILL. L. REv. 323 (1970); Craig Bowman, Note, The Indigent'sRight to an
Adequate Defense: Expert and InvestigationalAssistance in CriminalProceedings, 55 CORNELL L.
REv. 632 (1970); Gramlich, supra note 172; Note, Right to Aid, supra note 253.
263 The equal protection argument had its genesis in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956), in which an indigent defendant challenged a state practice of conditioning appellate review upon the availability of a transcript, which the defendant could not afford. The
Supreme Court held that failure to provide a free transcript denied the accused due process and equal protection. According to the Court, "[t]here can be no equal justice where
the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has." Id. at 19 (plurality
opinion). In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the Court extended the Griffin
principle to the appointment of counsel for a first appeal as of fight. See id. at 357-58
("There is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment where the rich
man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel[ ] ... , while the indigent,
already burdened by a preliminary determination that his case is without merit, is forced to
shift for himself."). Other cases also echoed this principle. See Britt v. North Carolina, 404
U.S. 226, 227 (1971) ("Griffin v. Illinois and its progeny establish the principle that the
State must, as a matter of equal protection, provide indigent prisoners with the basic tools
of an adequate defense or appeal, when those tools are available for a price to other prisoners."); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 42 (1967) ("Our decisions for more than a
decade now have made clear that differences in access to the instruments needed to vindicate legal rights, when based upon the financial situation of the defendant, are repugnant
to the Constitution.").
264 Jacobs v. United States, 350 F.2d 571, 573 (4th Cir. 1965); accord Bradford v. United
States, 413 F.2d 467, 474 (5th Cir. 1969); State v. Olin, 648 P.2d 203, 206 (Idaho 1982);
State v. Anaya, 456 A.2d 1255, 1261-63 (Me. 1983).
265 618 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1980). For discussion of the Williams case, see Katherine F.
Fortino, Note, An Indigent's ConstitutionalRight to a State-PaidExpert-Williams v. Martin, 16
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1031 (1980); An Accused's Right to Court-Appointed Expert TestimonyWilliams v. Martin, Recent Decisions, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 191 (1980).
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cause of death in a homicide prosecution, the Fourth Circuit held that
the trial court's refusal to appoint an expert "denied [the defendant]
266
equal protection of the law."
The principal problem with this analysis is the Supreme Court's
later cases-in particular, Ross v. Moffitt 267-which undercut this rationale. 268 Ross involved the appointment of counsel for discretionary
appeals. The Court held that a state practice not to appoint counsel
in such cases satisfied the equal protection guarantee. 2 69 According
to the Court, the equal protection clause "'does not require absolute
equality or precisely equal advantages.' -270 Although the Court recognized the disadvantage an indigent suffered in this context, it reasoned that "[t]he duty of the State . . . is not to duplicate the legal
arsenal that may be privately retained by a criminal defendant in a
continuing effort to reverse his conviction, but only to assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly in
the ... appellate process." 271 Thus, the focus of the Court's analysis
was not the disparity between indigent and nonindigent, but whether
the indigent had an "adequate opportunity" to present his case. 27 2
This approach smacks more of a due process than an equal protection
analysis. 273 Subsequently, the Court acknowledged that "[d]ue process and equal protection principles converge in the Court's analysis
2 74
in these cases."
266
Williams, 618 F.2d at 1027. The court also found a denial of the effective assistance
of counsel. Id.; see infta note 345 and accompanying text.
267 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
268

See LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-51, at 1647 (2d ed. 1988)

(suggesting that Douglaswas "neutralized" by Ross); Yale Kamisar, Poverty, Equality and Criminal Procedure:From Griffin v. Illinois and Douglas v. California to Ross v. Moffitt, in NATIONAL
COLLEGE OF DISTRICT ATTORNEYS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw DESKBOOK 1-79 (3d ed. 1978).
269 See Ross, 417 U.S. at 612 ("[W] e do not believe that the Equal Protection Clause...
requires North Carolina to provide free counsel for indigent defendants seeking to take
discretionary appeals to the North Carolina Supreme Court, or to file petitions for certiorari in this Court.").
270 Id. at 612 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24
(1973)).
271

Id. at 616.

272 The notion that equal protection requires only an "adequate opportunity" for a
defendant to present his claims was reaffirmed in United States v. MacCollom. 426 U.S. 317,
324 (1976); see also Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587-88 (1982) (reasoning that
because the defendant had no constitutional right to counsel for a discretionary appeal
following Ross, he could not be deprived of the effective assistance of counsel in connection with such an appeal).
273
See Kamisar, supra note 268, at 1-101. Earlier (in Ross) the Court pointed out that
equal protection analysis "emphasizes disparity in treatment by a State between classes of
individuals whose situations are arguably indistinguishable," whereas due process analysis
"emphasizes fairness between the State and the individual dealing with the State, regardless of how other individuals in the same situation may be treated." Ross, 417 U.S. at 609.
274
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983). In Bearden, the Court held that a
sentencing court could not revoke a defendant's probation for failure to pay a fine absent
evidence and findings that the defendant was responsible for such failure and that alterna-
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Although Ross undermines the equal protection argument for expert assistance, 2 75 some lessons can be drawn from these cases. First,
the equal protection rationale was far too utopian. No system could
afford to supply indigents with the resources that O.J. Simpson or Leopold and Loeb could afford. 2 76 Second, several issues in these cases
resurface in the post-Ake decisions. For example, in Williams v. Martin27 7 the Fourth Circuit specified the standard for determining when
an expert is required as follows: "(a) whether a substantial question
requiring expert testimony arose over the cause of death, and (b)
whether [the defendant's] defense could be fully developed without
professional assistance." 2 78 Significantly, the court held that "[i]t is
not incumbent upon [the defendant] to prove . .. that an independent expert would have provided helpful testimony at trial. An indigent prisoner
should not be required to present proof of what an
expert would say when he is denied access to an expert."2 79 Under
Ake many courts require a far higher showing than "helpfulness" in
280
determining whether appointment of an expert should be made.
2.

Compulsory Process

In Washington v. Texas, 28 1 the Supreme Court held that the Compulsory Process Clause applied in state trials. 28 2 Moreover, the Court
adopted a liberal view of the clause; it was not limited to the right to
subpoena witnesses but also included the right to present defense evidence: "The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel
their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a
defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts ... to
tive forms of punishment were inadequate. In so holding, the Court preferred to rest its
decision on due process grounds. See id. at 666 n.8, 672; see also Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S.
387, 402-05 (1985) (holding that due process guarantees the right to effective assistance of
counsel in an appeal of right).
275 The Ake Court cited Ross for the proposition that "a State [need not] purchase for
the indigent defendant all the assistance that his wealthier counterpart might buy," Ake v.
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985), and a number of courts have cited Ross in upholding
denials of requests for expert assistance, see, e.g., Dorsey v. Solomon, 435 F. Supp. 725, 736
(D. Md. 1977); State v. Parton, 277 S.E.2d 410, 418-19 (N.C. 1981); State v. Gray, 233 S.E.2d
905, 911 (N.C. 1977); Graham v. State, 547 S.W.2d 531, 535-36 (Tenn. 1977).
276 SeeHIGDON, supra note 168, at 137 ("The legal bills would exceed $100,000."); supra
note 166 and accompanying text (discussing O.J. Simpson case).
277 618 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1980).
278 Id. at 1026. The court's examination of the record revealed that a substantial question about the cause of death had existed and that the absence of an expert witness hampered the development of this defense. See id. at 1026-27.
279

Id.

280
281
282

See infra text accompany notes 494-500 (discussing a "second prong" requirement).
388 U.S. 14 (1967).
See id. at 17-19.

20041

AKE V. OKLAHOMA

1349

the jury so it may decide where the truth lies." 28 3 Although Washington did not involve expert witnesses, "it is scarcely conceivable that
defendants could be constitutionally denied the opportunity to call
experts to give opinion evidence about such matters as fingerprints,
bloodstains, sanity, and other matters that routinely arise in criminal
' 28 4
litigation."
Prior to Ake, a number of courts had based the right to expert
assistance on the compulsory process guarantee. 285 The most signifi-

cant decision was People v. Watson,2 8 6 in which an indigent forgery defendant requested the appointment of a handwriting expert. 287 The
Illinois Supreme Court held that refusal to appoint the expert violated
the compulsory process guarantee:
The court recognizes that there is a distinction between the right to
call witnesses and the right to have these witnesses paid for by the
government, but in certain instances involving indigents, the lack of
funds with which to pay for the witness will often preclude him from
calling that witness and occasionally prevent him from offering a
defense. Thus, although the defendant is afforded the shadow of
288
the right to call witnesses, he is deprived of the substance.
The court went on to indicate that " [w] hether it is necessary to subpoena expert witnesses in order to assure a fair trial will depend upon
the facts in each case. ' 28 9 Watson was such a case, the court concluded, because the "issue of handwriting goes to the heart of the
283
Id. at 19; see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) ("To ensure that
justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory process be available for the production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or by the defense.").
In Taylor v Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988), the Court further explained that "[t]he right to
compel a witness' presence in the courtroom could not protect the integrity of the adversary process if it did not embrace the right to have the witness' testimony heard by the trier
of fact." Id. at 409. Therefore, "[t]he right to offer testimony is... grounded in the Sixth
Amendment even though it is not expressly described in so many words." Id.
284
Peter Westen, Compulsory Process II, 74 MICH. L. REv. 192, 203 (1975); see EDWARDJ.
IMWINKELRIED & NORMAN M.

GARLAND, EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE: THE AccUSED'S CONSTITU-

TIONAL RIGHT TO INTRODUCE FAvORABLE EVIDENCE

(2d ed. 1996); see also Janet C. Hoeffel,

The Sixth Amendment's Lost Clause: Unearthing Compulsory Process, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 1275,
1351-60 (offering "[a] compulsory process solution to scientific evidence problems").
285
In Flores v. Estelle, 492 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1974), for example, the defendant attempted to elicit expert opinion testimony from a state toxicologist who had been subpoenaed by the defense. The expert refused to express an opinion because he had not been
retained as an expert witness, and the trial court declined to require him to testify. See id.
at 712. The reviewing courts agreed "that the trial court erred in refusing to require [the
expert] to testify, thereby depriving Flores of effective compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor." Id.; see English v. Missildine, 311 N.W.2d 292, 293 (Iowa 1981); State
v. Sims, 52 Ohio Misc. 31, 42 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1977).
286
221 N.E.2d 645 (Ill. 1966).
287
288

289

See id. at 646.
Id. at 648.
Id.
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defense" and the expert's testimony "may have been crucial" to that
290
defense.
The compulsory process rationale does not seem to provide any
more protection than Ake does under the banner of due process. 29 1
Watson was decided prior to Ake, but in a subsequent case, the Illinois
Supreme Court concluded that its analysis in Watson "pose [d] no conflict" with the Ake decision. 292 Moreover, as with equal protection, the
Supreme Court has cut back on the compulsory process guarantee.
According to the Court, a violation of the Compulsory Process Clause
"requires some showing that the evidence lost would be both material
and favorable to the defense." 293 Of course, materiality in this context
means outcome determinative, a stringent standard.
3.

Right of Confrontation

One commentator argued that the right of confrontation also
supports a right to expert assistance. 294 This right would apply to
"confronting" prosecution experts, and would have to be supplemented with the compulsory process rationale to cover the affirmative
use of defense experts. 295 Although research has not found cases endorsing this rationale, the Supreme Court has repeatedly cited the
right to cross-examination in its scientific evidence cases. In Daubert,
for example, the Court rejected the argument that its new reliability
standard would necessarily lead to cases in which "befuddled juries
are confounded by absurd and irrational pseudoscientific assertions." 29 6 According to the Court, this represents an "overly pessimis290 Id. at 649. The Illinois courts have interpreted and applied Watson on numerous
occasions. See People v. Walker, 292 N.E.2d 387, 393 (Ill. 1973) (finding no error in refusal
to provide expert because no showing had been made that the requested assistance was
"sufficiently related to the defendant's theory of defense"); People v. Glover, 273 N.E.2d
367, 370 (Ill. 1971) (ruling that Watson requires the defendant to show that the requested
assistance is "necessary to prove a crucial issue"); People v. Nichols, 388 N.E.2d 984, 988
(Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (concluding that the trial court's failure to appoint psychiatrist violated
the Watson rule); People v. Vines, 358 N.E.2d 72, 74 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (ruling that defendant had made an insufficient showing to implicate Watson); People v. Clay, 311 N.E.2d
384, 386 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (same).
291
In order to be complete, the compulsory process rationale would have to be augmented by a right of confrontation analysis. See David A. Harris, supra note 36, at 473
("[C]ourts should look to the Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clauses of the Sixth
Amendment and to the constitutional right to present a defense [when deciding when
expert assistance is required]."); Hoeffel, supra note 284, at 1307 ("The right to confrontation and the right to compulsory process are intimately related, as each is the sister clause
of the other. Together, the two rights make the presentation of a defense at trial
complete.").
292 People v. Lawson, 644 N.E.2d 1172, 1188-89 (Ill. 1994).
293 United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 873 (1982).
294 See Bowman, supra note 262, at 642-43.
295 See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
296 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595-96 (1993).
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29 7
tic" view of the "capabilities of the jury and of the adversary system."
The Court noted that " [v]igorouscross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the
traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible
evidence." 298 This theory, however, requires another (and significant) step: finding that cross-examination of a prosecution expert ne299
cessitates the assistance of a defense expert.

Other Due Process Theories

4.

As the Court has recognized on more than one occasion, the
term "due process" is not self-defining. 30 0 Not surprisingly, then,
there are several lines of due process cases that may support the right
30 1
to a defense expert.
a.

Right to Present a Defense

The leading case on this topic is Chambers v. Mississippi,30 2 in
which the Supreme Court held that state evidentiary rules that precluded the admission of critical and reliable evidence denied the deId. at 596.
298 Id. (emphasis added). Here, the Court cited Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987),
which dealt with hypnotically-refreshed testimony. See id. at 61 (holding that Arkansas's
per se rule excluding the testimony of accused whose memory had been hypnotically-refreshed violated accused's right to testify); see also California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479,
490 (1984) (noting defendant's right to introduce evidence to show possible interference
with a breath analyzer's measurements and the right to cross-examine the police concerning operator error); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1967) ("Knowledge of
the techniques of science and technology is sufficientiy available, and the variables in techniques few enough, that the accused has the opportunity for a meaningful confrontation
of the Government's case.., through the ordinary processes of cross-examination ...and
the presentation of the evidence of his own experts.").
299
Some support for this view can be found injustice Blackmun's concurring opinion
in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), which involved a subpoena for state youth
services agency records in an incest case. See id. at 39 (Blackmun, J.,concurring). Justice
Blackmun reasoned that "there might well be a confrontation violation if, as here, a defendant is denied pretrial access to information that would make possible effective cross-examination of a crucial prosecution witness." Id. at 61-62 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The
plurality, however, rejected the view that the right of confrontation was a pretrial right,
remarking that "the right to confrontation is a trial right, designed to prevent improper
restrictions on the types of questions that defense counsel may ask during cross-examination." Id. at 52. The plurality concluded that "[t]he ability to question adverse witnesses
...does not include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of any and all information
that might be useful in contradicting unfavorable testimony." Id. at 53.
300
See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981) ("For all its consequence,
'due process' has never been, and perhaps can never be, precisely defined. . . . [T]he
phrase expresses the requirement of 'fundamental fairness,' a requirement whose meaning can be as opaque as its importance is lofty.").
301
See Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The Supreme
Court's Searchfor Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 303 (2001) (discussing development of Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence).
410 U.S. 284 (1973).
302
297
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fendant due process. 30 3 One of the evidentiary rules at issue in
Chamberswas the hearsay rule. According to the Court, "where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat
the ends of justice." 30 4 Even though Chambers rests on due process
grounds, it obviously echoes Washington v. Texas, a compulsory process
case.305

In California v. Trombetta,30 6 the Court recognized a qualified
right to preservation of evidence in the government's control, observing: "We have long interpreted [the due process] standard of fairness
to require that criminal defendants be afforded 'a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense."'

30

7

Although Ake was decided

the next year and spoke of providing a defendant "a fair opportunity
to present a defense,"308 it did not rely on this line of authority. 30 9
After Ake the Court broadened the constitutional basis of this
right in Crane v. Kentucky, 310 writing that "[w] hether rooted directly in
303
See id. at 302-03. See generally Robert N. Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An
Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REv. 771 (1976) (suggesting
that there is a federally protected constitutional right of an accused to present a defense);
Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REv. 71, 149-59 (1974) (discussing
the constitutional basis of the right to offer exculpatory evidence).
304
410 U.S. at 302. In a later case, the Court again overturned a conviction because
the application of the hearsay rule at trial precluded the admission of defense evidence.
See Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979). The Court commented:
Regardless of whether the proffered testimony comes within Georgia's
hearsay rule, under the facts of this case its exclusion constituted a violation
of [due process]. The excluded testimony was highly relevant to a critical
issue in the punishment phase of the trial and substantial reasons existed to
assume its reliability.
Id (citations omitted).
305
See Hoeffel, supra note 284, at 1299 ("While the [Chambers] Court relied on due
process, the case clearly involved a violation of the Compulsory Process Clause ....");see
also Peter Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process:A Unified Theory of Evidencefor Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REv. 567, 607 n.108 (1978) (noting that the accused in Chambers
objected only on due process, not compulsory process, grounds).
306
467 U.S. 479 (1984).
307
Id. at 485.
308
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985) ("This Court has long recognized that
when a State brings its judicial power to bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding, it must take steps to assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to present his
defense.").
309
Instead, the Court relied on the three-part test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976). See infra text accompanying notes 363-68.
310 476 U.S. 683 (1986). The defendant moved to suppress a confession on the
ground that it had been coerced in violation of due process. The trial court determined
that the confession was voluntary and denied the motion. See id. at 684. At trial, the defendant sought to introduce evidence concerning the psychological and physical environment
in which the confession was obtained to show its unreliability. The trial court excluded the
evidence because it related to the due process voluntariness issue. See id. The Supreme
Court stated that the circumstances surrounding the taking of a confession may be relevant
to two separate issues, one legal and one factual. See id. at 688-89. The legal issue con-
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the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or in the
Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 'a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense."' 31 1 Nevertheless, in its
latest case in this area, the Court took a restrictive view of the right to
3 12
present a defense.
b.

Balance of Resources

A different due process argument is based on the state's provision
of expert assistance to the prosecution and not the defense-a "balance of resources" rationale. In other contexts, the Supreme Court
has noted that due process "speak[s] to the balance of forces between
the accused and his accuser. '3 13 Thus, in discussing the right to expert assistance under the Criminal Justice Act, one court noted that
"[i]f the fairness of our system is to be assured, indigent defendants
must have access to minimal defense aids to offset the advantage
presented by the vast prosecutorial and investigative resources available to the Government."3 14 Similarly, in the leading neutron activation case, the Sixth Circuit wrote: "[I]f the government sees fit to use
this time consuming, expensive means of fact-finding, it must both
allow time for a defendant to make similar tests, and in the instance of
3 1t 5
an indigent defendant, a means to provide for payment for same.
It should be recognized, however, that while this line of cases reinforces the right-to-present-a-defense cases, it does not supplant those
cases.

cerns the constitutional issue of voluntariness, which the trial court must decide. The factual issue concerns the reliability of the confession, a jury issue. See id. at 689.
311
Id. at 690 (citations omitted) (quoting Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 485).
312
In United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998), the Supreme Court upheld the
military's per se rule excluding polygraph results as evidence in court-martial proceedings
in the face of a constitutional challenge. See id. at 305; Hoeffel, supra note 284, at 1306
("With Scheffer, then, the Court left the Compulsory Process Clause with an uncertain status. If the Court were to follow this course, then an accused's right to present a defense
would be meaningless.").
313
Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474-76 (1973) (discussing an imbalance in Oregon's pretrial discovery rules); see also Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981)
("[The] adversary system presupposes (that] accurate and just results are most likely to be
obtained through the equal contest of opposed interests . . . ."); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S.
600, 609 (1974) ("'Due Process' emphasizes fairness between the State and the individual
dealing with the State . . ").
314
United States v.,Hartfield, 513 F.2d 254, 258 (9th Cir. 1975); see also State v. Johnson, 333 So. 2d 223, 225 (La. 1976) ("Due process and fundamental fairness require that a
defendant charged with homicide be given the right to choose his own ballistics expert to
examine the alleged murder weapon and bullet in order to rebut testimony by the State's
expert witnesses.").
315
United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 441 (6th Cir. 1970).
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Disclosure of FavorableEvidence

Still another due process argument centers on the prosecutor's
duty to disclose favorable evidence to the defense under Brady v. Maryland.316 Some cases regard the failure of the state to provide expert
assistance as a denial of the right to exculpatory defense evidence.
For example, the Seventh Circuit wrote: "[T] he denial of a reasonable
request to obtain the services of a necessary psychiatric witness is effectually a suppression of evidence violating the fundamental right of
due process." 31 7 One problem with this analysis is determining, pretrial, whether the requested expert testimony will be exculpatory.31 8
Moreover, defendants often need expert assistance to attack the prosecution's incriminatingevidence, something not covered by Brady.
d.

Duty to Preserve Evidence

Courts have recognized that Brady's due process disclosure requirement sometimes includes the right to have evidence preserved. 3 19 In California v. Trombetta,3 20 the Supreme Court ruled that
such a due process right is extremely limited. 32 1 As part of its analysis,
316 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."). Thus, in order to establish a Brady violation, the defendant must show that (1) the
prosecution failed to disclose evidence, (2) the evidence was favorable to the defense, and
(3) the evidence was material. See id.
317
United States ex rel. Robinson v. Pate, 345 F.2d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 1965); accord
Bowen v. Eyman, 324 F. Supp. 339, 340 (D. Ariz. 1970) ("[The state's] refusal to run the
tests [requested by the accused] is tantamount to a suppression of evidence such as there
was in Brady .... ); see also Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 6 (1981) (characterizing indigent's
due process claim for financial assistance in funding a blood test as "premised on the
unique [quality] of blood grouping tests as a source of exculpatory evidence" in paternity
actions); State v. Hanson, 278 N.W.2d 198, 200 (S.D. 1979) (citing Brady in finding a right
to an independent expert).
318
See Hanson, 278 N.W.2d at 200 ("If [the] independent test [requested by the accused] were to show that the substance is not marijuana, the results would be both material
and exculpatory. On the other hand, if the independent test were in agreement with that
conducted by the State, any benefit to defendant would be minimal.").
319
See 5 WAYNE R. LAFAvE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.3(b) (2d ed. 1999); Jean
Wegman Burns, Comment, JudicialResponse to Governmental Loss or Destruction of Evidence, 39
U. CHI. L. REV. 542 (1972); Government Has Duty to Implement Effective Guidelines to Preserve
Discoverable Evidence, 1971 DUKE L.J. 644; Che H. Lee, Comment, The Prosecution'sDuty to
Preserve Evidence Before Trial, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1019 (1984); Jay Hartley Newman, Note, The
Right to Independent Testing: A New Hitch in the Preservation of Evidence Doctrine, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 1355 (1975); Michael E. Rusin, Comment, The Prosecutor'sDuty ofDisclose: From Brady to
Agurs and Beyond, 69J. CRaM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 197, 220-24 (1978).
320
467 U.S. 479 (1984).
321
According to the Court:
Whatever duty the Constitution imposes on the States to preserve evidence,
that duty must be limited to evidence that might be expected to play a
significant role in the suspect's defense. To meet this standard of constitutional materiality, evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was
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the Court considered the availability of alternative methods of attacking the results of breath analysis tests conducted by the state without
requiring the state to preserve breath samples for independent testing
by the defense. The Court noted that the defendant had the right
under state law to inspect the breath analyzer, the right to introduce evidence to show possible interference with the machine's measurements, and the
322
Of
right to cross-examine the police concerning operator error.
course, an expert would be needed to establish interference with the
"machine's measurements." Here, again, this line of cases supple3 23
ments, rather than replaces, the right-to-present-a-defense cases.
e.

Right to Independent Testing

Another line of cases recognized the right of a defendant to retest physical evidence. In one case, a defendant's request for independent inspection of a murder weapon and bullet was denied by a state
court. 324 The Fifth Circuit granted habeas relief, observing that
"[f]undamental fairness is violated when a criminal defendant ... is
denied the opportunity to have an expert of his choosing, bound by
appropriate safeguards imposed by the Court, examine a piece of critical evidence whose nature is subject to varying expert opinion."325
The right to retest necessarily means the right to have an expert appointed, if indigent, to do the retesting.
apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that
the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other
reasonably available means.
Id. at 488-89 (citation omitted). The Court held that neither of these conditions were
satisfied. See id. at 489-90. As to the first condition, the Court reasoned that, given the
reliability of the breath analyzer used by the state, "[preserved] breath samples were much
more likely to provide inculpatory [rather] than exculpatory evidence." Id. at 489.
322

See id. at 490.

323 Indeed, Trombetta was also discussed above as a right to present a defense case. See
id at 485.
324 See Barnard v. Henderson, 514 F.2d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1975).
325 Id.; accord White v. Maggio, 556 F.2d 1352, 1356-59 (5th Cir. 1977); Warren v.
State, 288 So. 2d 826, 830 (Ala. 1973); Gayle v. State, 591 So. 2d 153, 154-55 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1991); McNutt v. Superior Court, 648 P.2d 122, 124-25 (Ariz. 1982); People v.
Backus, 590 P.2d 837, 851 (Cal. 1979); Sabel v. State, 282 S.E.2d 61, 67-68 (Ga. 1981);
Patterson v. State, 232 S.E.2d 233, 234 (Ga. 1977); Jackson v. State, 243 So. 2d 396, 398
(Miss. 1970); State v. Hanson, 278 N.W.2d 198, 200 (S.D. 1979); State v. Adkins, 280 S.E.2d
293, 295-96 (W. Va. 1981); State v. McArdle, 194 S.E.2d 174, 178-79 (W. Va. 1973); see also
Jean Montoya, A Theory of Compulsory Process Clause Discovery Rights, 70 IND. L. J. 845, 880-84
(1995) (arguing that the Compulsory Process Clause "include[s] a defense right to test
tangible evidence, even when that evidence has been previously analyzed by prosecution
experts"). Many courts have denied an accused's request to independently examine tangible evidence. See, e.g., Gray v. Rowley, 604 F.2d 382, 384 (5th Cir. 1979) (finding that
requested evidence not "critical"); State v. Koennecke, 545 P.2d 127, 133 (Or. 1976) (requiring preliminary showing that results will be favorable to defendant); State v. Faraone,
425 A.2d 523, 526 (R.I. 1981) (concluding that proposed testing conditions did not include appropriate safeguards).
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However, like the other alternative due process rationales, these
cases do not provide protection beyond the right-to-present-a-defense
cases. Nevertheless, they are instructive. These "right to test" cases
raised an issue that would later be resurrected in the Ake cases; in
rejecting a due process right to retest, several courts reasoned that the
defendant's opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution's expert
326
witnesses provides sufficient protection for an accused.
5.

Right to Counsel

Several pre-Ake courts grounded the right to expert assistance in
the right to counsel. In Gideon v. Wainwright,327 the Supreme Court
held the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applicable to the states.
In an oft-quoted passage, the Court wrote that "in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor
to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is pro'3 28
vided for him.
a.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The right to counsel includes the right to effective assistance of
counsel, 329 and ineffectiveness claims involving expert testimony are
becoming more common as the use of scientific evidence increases. 330
For example, a court found ineffectiveness where defense counsel
knew that gunshot residue testimony was "critical," but
"[n]evertheless, [the lawyer] neither deposed . . .the State's expert
witness, nor bothered to consult with any other expert in the field. ' 331
326
See Frias v. State, 547 N.E.2d 809, 813 (Ind. 1989); People v. Anderson, 276 N.W.2d
924, 926 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979); People v. Bell, 253 N.W.2d 726, 729 (Mich. Ct.App. 1977);
infta notes 465-78 and accompanying text (discussing effectiveness of cross-examination).
327
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
328
Id. at 344; see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (extending the right to
counsel to all trials, including misdemeanor cases, in which imprisonment is imposed).
But cf.Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (declining to extend Argersinger to cases where
imprisonment is authorized but not imposed).
329
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984); United States v. Cronic,
466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932); see also Evitts v. Lucey,
469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985) ("[A] party whose counsel is unable to provide effective representation is in no better position than one who has no counsel at all.").
330
See, e.g., Driscoll v. Delo, 71 F.3d 701, 709 (8th Cir. 1995) ("[D]efense counsel's
failures to prepare for the introduction of the serology evidence, to subject the state's
theories to the rigors of adversarial testing, and to prevent the jury from retiring with an
inaccurate impression [of the serology test results] fall short of reasonableness under the
prevailing professional norms."); State v. Glass, 488 N.W.2d 432, 433 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992)
(finding that defense counsel "rendered constitutionally defective assistance" by failing to
call "a state crime laboratory employee who would have testified that tests he conducted on
vaginal swabs from the alleged [sexual assault] victim were negative for semen" and instead
stipulated that the test results were "inconclusive").
331
Troedel v. Wainwright, 667 F. Supp. 1456, 1461 (S.D. Fla. 1986), affd,828 F.2d 670
(llth Cir. 1987).
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For present purposes, cases finding ineffectiveness due to a failure to
consult or call an expert are most germane. 332 As one court commented, " [t] he failure of defense counsel to seek such assistance when
the need is apparent deprives an accused of adequate representation
in violation of his sixth amendment right to counsel. '33 3 These cases
include the failure to secure or properly employ the services of experts in psychiatry, 334 handwriting comparison,3 3 5 forensic pathol3 37 serology, 3 38 DNA profiling, 33 9
3 36
gunshot residue analysis,
ogy,

332 See, e.g., Pavel v. Hollins, 261 F.3d 210, 223 (2d Cir. 2001); Lindstadt v. Keane, 239
F.3d 191, 201-02 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Tucker, 716 F.2d 576, 581 (9th Cir. 1983)
(reasoning that, in a complex fraud case, "it should have been obvious to a competent
lawyer that the assistance of an accountant [was] necessary"); Spencer v. Donnelly, 193 F.
Supp. 2d 718, 733 (W.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Knott v. Mabry, 671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (8th
Cir. 1982) (noting that, in appropriate cases, counsel may be found ineffective for failing
to consult an expert where "there is substantial contradiction in a given area of expertise,"
or where counsel is not sufficiently "versed in a technical subject matter ... to conduct
effective cross-examination").
333 Proffitt v. United States, 582 F.2d 854, 857 (4th Cir. 1978).
334 See, e.g., Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204, 1209-11 (6th Cir. 1995); Wood v. Zahradnick,
578 F.2d 980, 982 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Fessel, 531 F.2d 1275, 1279 (5th Cir.
1976) ("[W]hen an insanity defense is appropriate and the defendant lacks funds to secure
private psychiatric assistance, it is the duty of his attorney to seek such assistance through
the use of [the Criminal Justice Act]."); Halton v. Hesson, 803 F. Supp. 1272, 1277-78
(M.D. Tenn. 1992). But see Bonin v. Vasquez, 794 F. Supp. 957, 962-64 (C.D. Cal. 1992)
(finding that counsel's decision not to call a court-appointed psychiatric witness at penalty
phase of capital murder trial was based on valid strategic considerations).
335 See, e.g., United States v. Tarricone, 996 F.2d 1414, 1417-19, 1425 (2d Cir. 1993)
(remanding case to district court with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether counsel's failure to consult a handwriting expert constituted inadequate
assistance).
336
See Rogers v. Israel, 746 F.2d 1288, 1295 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Although we decline to
rule that the defense counsel was required to contact a [forensic] pathologist, we hold...
that the defense counsel owed a duty to the petitioner to ask a qualified expert whether
[the victim] would have been immediately incapacitated by his wound.").
337
See Sims v. Livesay, 970 F.2d 1575, 1580-81 (6th Cir. 1992) (failure to have quilt
examined for gunshot residue).
338
See Moore v. State, 827 S.W.2d 213, 215-16 (Mo. 1992).
339
See State v. Hicks, 536 N.W.2d 487, 491-92 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) ("Before the trial,
[defense counsel] knew that the root tissue of hair specimens could be subject to DNA
testing .... He did not discuss this with his client or with the district attorney, or petition
the court to have this test performed ....");see also People v. Smith, 645 N.E.2d 313, 315,
318-19 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (finding that counsel's failure to investigate possible alternative
DNA testing methods may have constituted ineffective assistance, where the expert initially
consulted by the defense indicated that the sample size was too small to conduct standard
DNA test, but that it may have sufficed for alternative procedure available in California).
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polygraph testing,340 battered woman syndrome, 341 and other subject
342
areas.
b.

Affirmative Right to Expert

If failure to secure expert assistance may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, it requires but a short step to recognize that the
Sixth Amendment places an affirmative duty upon the state to provide
expert services to indigent defendants upon request. 34 3 A number of
courts have taken that step.3 44 According to one court, "the right to
counsel is meaningless if the lawyer is unable to make an effective
defense because he has no funds to provide the specialized testimony
which the case requires. ' '345 Under a Sixth Amendment theory, an
expert should be appointed whenever necessary for counsel to render
340
See Houston v. Lockhart, 982 F.2d 1246, 1253 (8th Cir. 1993) ("[W]e remand this
case for an evidentiary hearing into whether Houston received the ineffective assistance of
his trial counsel as a result of... favorable polygraph test results being neither offered nor
admitted into evidence."); Gregory G. Samo, Annotation, Adequacy ofDefense Counsel's Representation of Criminal Client Regarding Hypnosis and Truth Tests, 9 A.L.R. 4th 354 (1981).
341
See Paine v. Massie, 339 F.3d 1194, 1201-04 (10th Cir. 2003); People v. Romero, 13
Cal. Rptr. 2d 332, 339-40 (Ct. App. 1992).
342
See, e.g., Foster v. Lockhart, 9 F.3d 722, 726 (8th Cir. 1993) (failure to adequately
pursue an impotency defense in a rape case); People v. Ackerman, 282 Cal. Rptr. 312, 319
(Ct. App. 1991) ("Defense counsel's reliance on . .. a psychiatrist with no asserted expertise in the scientific testing of blood, to advise him concerning the feasibility of testing the
available blood sample was a fatal lapse.").
343
See Lickey v. State, 827 P.2d 824, 826 (Nev. 1992) ("If failure to request a psychological examination constitutes grounds for a finding of ineffective counsel, it logically follows
that a defendant facing charges of sexual assault of a minor should be afforded an expert
psychiatric witness.").
344
See, e.g., Matlock v. Rose, 731 F.2d 1236, 1243-44 (6th Cir. 1984); Brinks v. Alabama, 465 F.2d 446, 449 (5th Cir. 1972); Hintz v. Beto, 379 F.2d 937, 941 (5th Cir. 1967)
("[E]ffective assistance of counsel ... may necessitate a psychiatric examination of a defendant."); Greer v. Beto, 379 F.2d 923, 925 (5th Cir. 1967) (stating that state policy of not
providing psychiatric experts for defense "may not... avoid the federal constitutional right
to the effective assistance of counsel"); Corenevsky v. Superior Court, 682 P.2d 360, 366-67
(Cal. 1984) (declaring that right to counsel "includes the right to reasonably necessary
ancillary defense services"); In re Ketchel, 438 P.2d 625, 627 (Cal. 1968); Taylor v. Superior
Court, 215 Cal. Rptr. 73, 74-75 (Ct. App. 1985); People v. Worthy, 167 Cal. Rptr. 402,
404-06 (Ct. App. 1980); English v. Missildine, 311 N.W.2d 292, 293-94 (Iowa 1981); State
v. Anaya, 456 A.2d 1255, 1262-63 (Me. 1983); State v. SecondJudicial Dist. Court, 453 P.2d
421, 422-23 (Nev. 1969); State v. Rush, 217 A.2d 441, 450 (NJ. 1966); State v. Parton, 277
S.E.2d 410, 418 (N.C. 1981); State v. Dickamore, 592 P.2d 681, 683 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979).
But see United States ex rel. Huguley v. Martin, 325 F. Supp. 489, 492-93 (N.D. Ga. 1971);
State v. Superior Court, 409 P.2d 742 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966).
345
Bush v. McCollum, 231 F. Supp. 560, 565 (N.D. Tex. 1964), affd, 344 F.2d 672 (5th
Cir. 1965). In Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1980), a leading pre-Ake case, an
indigent murder defendant requested the appointment of an independent forensic
pathologist to determine the victim's cause of death. The request was denied by the state
trial court. See id. at 1023-24. In granting habeas relief, the Fourth Circuit based its decision on the equal protection guarantee and the right to counsel, see id. at 1027, and observed that "[t]here can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the
assistance of an expert witness," id. at 1025.

AKE V. OKLAHOMA

2004]

1359

effective assistance 34 6 -"whenever the [expert] services are 'necessary
to the preparation and presentation of an adequate defense.' ,,347
c.

Supreme Court Cases

The Supreme Court has never gone so far, using the right to effective assistance as a "sword" rather than a "shield." Nevertheless,
indirect support for the right to counsel argument can be found in
the Court's lineup cases. In United States v. Wade, 348 the Court held
that the right to counsel applied to postindictment eyewitness identification procedures. In the Court's view, counsel was required at the
lineup to "assure a meaningful confrontation at trial." 349 Significantly, the Wade Court distinguished eyewitness identification procedures from the scientific analysis of physical evidence, 350 reasoning
that "[k] nowledge of the techniques of science and technology is sufficiently available, and the variables in techniques few enough, that the
accused has the opportunity for a meaningful confrontation of the
Government's case ... through the ordinary processes of cross-exami'35 1
nation . . . and the presentation of the evidence of his own experts.
346
347

See United States v. Fessel, 531 F.2d 1275, 1278 (5th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 1279 (quoting United States v. Chavis, 476 F.2d 1137, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
348
388 U.S. 218 (1967). The case also has strong confrontation aspects; indeed, they
may dominate the opinion. See 2 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 319, § 7.3(a), at 646 ("Such
language gave support to an interpretation of Wade as being grounded in the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation and cross-examination, with counsel being required simply to
give sufficient protection to that other right.").
349
Wade, 388 U.S. at 236. The Court also wrote:
Insofar as the accused's conviction may rest on a courtroom identification
in fact the fruit of a suspect pretrial identification which the accused is
helpless to subject to effective scrutiny at trial, the accused is deprived of
that right of cross-examination which is an essential safeguard to his right
to confront witnesses against him.
Id. at 235.
350
According to the Court:
The Government characterizes the lineup as a mere preparatory step in the
gathering of the prosecution's evidence, not different-for Sixth Amendment purposes-from various other preparatory steps, such as systemized
or scientific analyzing of the accused's fingerprints, blood sample, clothing,
hair, and the like. We think there are differences which preclude such
stages being characterized as critical stages at which the accused has the
right to the presence of his counsel.
Id. at 227.
351
Id. at 227-28 (emphasis added). The Court concluded that "[t]he denial of a right
to have ... counsel present at such analyses does not therefore violate the Sixth Amendment; they are not critical stages since there is minimal risk that ... counsel's absence at
such stages might derogate from [the] right to a fair trial." Id. at 228.
In Gilbert v. California,388 U.S. 263 (1967), a companion case to Wade, the defendant
contended that his right to counsel had been violated when he was compelled to provide
handwriting exemplars in the absence of an attorney. See id. at 265-67.
hile Wade focused on the time of analysis, see Wade, 388 U.S. at 228, Gilbert focused on the time the
evidence was obtained from the suspect. See Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 267 (concluding that "[t]he
taking of exemplars was not a 'critical' stage of the criminal proceedings"). Nevertheless,
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As explained later, a right-to-counsel rationale would solve some,
35 2
but not all, post-Ake issues.
C.

Little v. Streater and Barefoot v. Estelle

After Smith, but before Ake, the Supreme Court decided two cases
which, in hindsight, presaged the Ake decision. In 1981, the Court in
Little v. Streatey853 ruled that an indigent defendant in a civil paternity

action, which the Court labeled a "quasi-criminal" proceeding, had
the right to a blood grouping test at state expense.3 54 In 1983, the
Court in Barefoot v. Estelle3

55

upheld the admissibility of expert testi-

mony of future dangerousness in capital cases. 356 In so ruling, the
Court wrote that the 'jurors should not be barred from hearing the
views of the State's psychiatrists along with opposing views of the defendant's doctors. 3' 5 7 In a footnote, the Court made the passing com-

ment that there was no "contention that, despite petitioner's claim of
indigence, the court refused to provide an expert for petitioner. '358
Ake came two years later.
D.

Ake v. Oklahoma

Ake was charged with capital murder. 359 At arraignment, his conduct was "so bizarre" that the trial judge ordered, sua sponte, a mental
evaluation. 360 He was found incompetent to stand trial, but later recovered due to antipsychotic drugs. When the prosecution resumed,
Ake's attorney requested a psychiatric evaluation at state expense to
prepare an insanity defense. Citing Smith, the trial court refused.
the result was the same-the right to counsel did not apply. See id. As in Wade, the Court
in Gilbert found significant differences between conducting a lineup and obtaining
exemplars:
If, for some reason, an unrepresentative exemplar is taken, this can be
brought out and corrected through the adversary process at trial since the
accused can make an unlimited number of additional exemplars for analysis and comparison by government and defense handwriting experts. Thus,
"the accused has the opportunity for a meaningful confrontation of the
State's case at trial through the ordinary processes of cross-examination of
the State's expert [handwriting] witnesses and the presentation of the evidence of his own [handwriting] experts.
Id. (emphasis added) (alterations in original) (quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 227-28).
352
See infra text accompanying notes 617-701.
353
452 U.S. 1 (1981).
354
See id. at 10, 16-17.
355
463 U.S. 880 (1983).
356
See id. at 896-905.
357
358

Id. at 898-99.
Id. at 899 n.5.

359
See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 72 (1985). Following the Supreme Court's decision, Ake was retried and convicted. See Ake v. State, 778 P.2d 460, 461-62 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1989). He again raised a right to expert assistance issue. This time, the issue involved
the requested appointment of a psychiatrist for a competency hearing. See id. at 464-65.
360
See Ake, 470 U.S. at 71.
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Thus, although insanity was the only contested issue at trial, no psychiatrist testified for either the defense or prosecution on this issue, and
Ake was convicted. In seeking the death penalty, the prosecution relied on state psychiatrists, who testified that Ake was "dangerous to
society. '3 6 1 This testimony stood unrebutted because Ake could not
afford an expert.
In an opinion authored by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Supreme Court overturned Ake's conviction, quickly dismissing the
precedential value of Smith.362 The Court's due process analysis relied
363
on a three-pronged test derived from Mathews v. Eldridge
Three factors are relevant to this determination. The first is the
private interest that will be affected by the action of the State. The
second is the governmental interest that will be affected if the safeguard is to be provided. The third is the probable value of the additional or substitute procedural safeguards that are sought, and the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if those
364
safeguards are not provided.
Applying these factors, the Court found that a defendant's interest in
the accuracy of a criminal trial that "places [his] life or liberty at risk is
almost uniquely compelling."' 36 5 In contrast, the state's only interest is
economic. Although the state claimed that the cost of providing ex3 66
pert assistance would result in "a staggering burden to the State,"

the Court dismissed this argument, pointing out (1) that many other
jurisdictions provided psychiatric assistance to indigent defendants
and (2) that its holding was limited to "one competent psychiatrist. 3' 67
Finally, the Court considered the probable value of the assistance
sought and the risk of error if it was not provided. On this point, the
Court concluded that the need for expert assistance was critical and
that the risk of error would be "extremely high" if the assistance was
3 68
not provided.
The Court used different formulae to state its holding. In one
passage, the Court wrote that "when a State brings its judicial power to
361

See id. at 73.

362 Id. at 84-85. Since defense psychiatrists had testified in Smith, the Court held that
Smith did not stand for the broad proposition that there was no constitutional right to a
psychiatric examination, but at most "supports the proposition that there is no constitutional right to more psychiatric assistance than the defendant in Smith had received." Id. at
85. More importantly, the Court recognized that Smith had been decided "at a time when
indigent defendants in state courts had no constitutional right to even the presence of
counsel." Id. Thus, according to the Court, Smith did not preclude consideration of
"whether fundamental fairness ... require[d] a different result." Id.
363
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
364 Ake, 470 U.S. at 77.
365

Id. at 78.

366

Id.

367
368

See id. at 78-79.
at 82.

Id.
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bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding, it must take
steps to assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to present his
defense.

'3 69

This notion of fair opportunity, in the Court's view, man-

dates that an accused be provided with the "'basic tools of an adequate defense." 3 70 In another passage, the Court elaborated on what
it meant by a "fair opportunity" and the "basic tools of an adequate
defense," holding that "when a defendant has made a preliminary
showing that his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial, the Constitution requires that a State provide access to a psychiatrist's assistance on this issue if the defendant cannot
371
otherwise afford one.
The facts met this standard: (1) Ake's only defense was insanity;
(2) his bizarre behavior at the arraignment, just four months after the
crime, prompted the trial court to order sua sponte a mental examination; (3) a state psychiatrist declared Ake incompetent to stand trial;
(4) he was found competent six weeks later, provided that he continue to receive Thorazine, an antipsychotic drug; (5) the state's psychiatric testimony acknowledged the severity of Ake's mental illness,
as well as the possibility that it "might have begun many years earlier";
and (6) the burden of producing evidence of insanity rested, under
state law, with the defendant. 3 72 In a footnote, however, the Court
commented: "We express no opinion as to whether any of these fac373
tors, alone or in combination, is necessary to make this finding.
This footnote was one of the ways that uncertainty was introduced into
the Ake opinion.
Significantly, the Court also found a due process violation as a
result of the denial of expert assistance at the death penalty hearing,
at which state experts testified about Ake's "future dangerousness.

374

Here, the Court extended the right to expert assistance to the sentencing phase (albeit in a death penalty case) and to an issue other
than insanity.
While the Ake decision settled the core issue by recognizing a
right to expert assistance, it left numerous important issues unresolved for the lower courts to grapple with. 375 The post-Ake issues
Id. at 76.
Id. at 77 (quoting Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971)).
371
Id. at 74.
372
See id. at 86.
373
Id. at 86 n.12.
374 See id. at 86-87.
375
The question of establishing indigence does not appear to have produced much
litigation. For example, it appears settled that a defendant who has the resources to hire
an attorney may nevertheless request state funds to hire an expert. See Ex parle Sanders,
612 So. 2d 1199 (Ala. 1993) (private attorney retained by third party); State v. Huchting,
927 S.W.2d 411, 419 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) ("[A] defendant who spends down his resources
in the middle of his defense or who relies on the largesse of friends and family for initial
369
370
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can be divided into several categories. The first involves the scope of
the right to expert assistance, including (1) whether the right to expert assistance extends to nonpsychiatric experts and (2) whether Ake
applies to noncapital trials or other proceedings, such as juvenile
transfer hearings and sex offender commitments. The second issue is
the standard for appointing an expert. If the standard is too demanding, the right is gutted. If the standard is lax, the costs skyrocket. Finally, a cluster of post-Ake issues revolve around the role of the expert,
particularly whether Ake mandates a partisan rather than neutral expert. The expert's role also affects procedural issues, such as whether
there is a right to an ex parte proceeding when requesting a defense
expert, whether the prosecution may call a nontestifying defense expert as a government witness, and whether Ake requires a "competent"
expert. These issues are discussed in subsequent Parts of this Article.
However, before examining them, another case must be considered.
E.

Medina v. California

In Medina v. California,3 76 the Court stated that the Mathews v.
Eldridge test, the linchpin of the Ake right, 3 7 7 was not the appropriate
standard in criminal proceedings:
In our view, the Mathews balancing test does not provide the appropriate framework for assessing the validity of state procedural rules,
which, like the one at bar, are part of the criminal process.... The
Bill of Rights speaks in explicit terms to many aspects of criminal
procedure, and the expansion of those constitutional guarantees
under the open-ended rubric of the Due Process Clause invites undue interference with both considered legislative judgments and
the careful balance that the Constitution strikes between liberty and
378
order.
The Court noted that it had applied the Matthews balancing test in
criminal cases only twice. One was Ake. The other was United States v.
Raddatz,379 which rejected a due process challenge to a provision in
the Federal Magistrates Act authorizing magistrates to make proposed
findings of fact and issue recommendations concerning suppression
defense expenses is no less entitled to due process and fundamental fairness than is a
defendant who enters the judicial system penniless."); State ex rel. Rojas v. Wilkes, 455
S.E.2d 575, 578 (W. Va. 1995) ("[F]inancial assistance provided by a third party which
enables an indigent criminal defendant to have the benefit of private counsel is not relevant to the defendant's right to have expert assistance provided at public expense.").
376
505 U.S. 437 (1992) (holding that allocating the burden of persuasion to the accused in connection with the determination of mental competency to stand trial does not
violate due process).
377
See supra notes 363-68 and accompanying text.
378
Medina, 505 U.S. at 443 (citations omitted).

379

447 U.S. 667 (1980).
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motions.38 0 The Medina Court quickly commented, however, that
"[w]ithout disturbing the holdings of Raddatz and Ake, it is not at all
clear that Mathews was essential to the results reached in those
More specifically, the Court reasoned that "[t] he holding in
cases."38'
Ake can be understood as an expansion of earlier due process cases
holding that an indigent criminal defendant is entitled to the minimum assistance necessary to assure him 'a fair opportunity to present
his defense' and 'to participate meaningfully in [the] judicial proceeding." 38 2 Here, somewhat enigmatically, the Court was quoting a
passage in Ake that referred to due process but was followed by citations to cases based, at least in part, on equal protection 383 and the
384
right to counsel.
In effect, Medina severed Ake from its moorings, leaving it a virtual orphan. Because the Court in Ake had rested its decision on due
process grounds, it noted that there was "no occasion to consider the
applicability of the Equal Protection Clause, or the Sixth Amendment," to Ake's request. 38 5 As a result, the Court did not address
whether these theories might provide a more expansive right to expert assistance, or at least provide a framework to answer some of the
more vexing post-Ake issues. Moreover, the Court subsequently passed
386
over several opportunities to clarify the Ake opinion.
Meanwhile, courts continue to cite equal protection 8 7 and right
to counsel grounds in connection with the right to expert assistance.
380
381

382

See id. at 680-81.
Medina, 505 U.S. at 444.
Id. at 444-45 (second alteration in original) (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S.

68, 76 (1985)).
383
See Ake, 470 U.S. at 76 (citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Little v. Streater,
452 U.S. 1 (1981); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252
(1959)).
384
See Ake, 470 U.S. at 76 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Evitts v.
Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)).
385
Ake, 470 U.S. at 87 n.13.
386
See Vickers v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 1033, 1033 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (contending that Court should accept the case "to decide whether the
Constitution requires a State to provide an indigent defendant access to diagnostic testing
necessary to prepare an effective defense based on his mental condition, when the defendant demonstrates that his sanity at the time of the offense will be a significant issue at
trial"); Johnson v. Oklahoma, 484 U.S. 878, 880 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (contending that Court should accept the case to decide the "important
questions [of] whether and when an indigent defendant is entitled to non-psychiatric expert assistance").
387
See, e.g., ExparteMoody, 684 So. 2d 114, 120 (Ala. 1996) (holding that "an indigent
criminal defendant is entitled to an ex parte hearing on whether expert assistance is necessary, based on the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments" and citing equal protection
cases); State v. Apelt, 861 P.2d 634, 650 (Ariz. 1993) (en banc) (concluding that neither
due process nor equal protection require an ex parte hearing); Husske v. Commonwealth,
476 S.E.2d 920, 925 (Va. 1996) ("[M]ost courts ... have held that the Due Process and
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For example, an Iowa court cited the Sixth Amendment in ruling that
a trial court erred in failing to appoint an accident reconstruction expert in a vehicular homicide case, remarking that "[e]ffective repre3 88
sentation of counsel includes the right to an expert witness."
Likewise, the Alabama Supreme Court wrote that the right to effective
assistance of counsel "includes access to expert witnesses where it is
appropriate."'3 8 9 While a right-to-counsel rationale would not necessarily alter the result of many Ake issues, such as the scope of the right or
the applicable standard, it more effectively supports the argument
390
that a neutral expert does not satisfy Ake---an issue discussed later.

SCOPE OF THE

IV
RIGHT To

EXPERT ASSISTANCE

As noted above, the Supreme Court left the scope of the right to
expert assistance undefined. Consequently, several important issues
needed resolution: the applicability of Ake (1) to nonpsychiatric experts, (2) to noncapital trials (including pretrial and sentencing hearings), and (3) to other proceedings, such as juvenile court transfer
hearings, sex offender procedures, and civil commitments.
A.

Nonpsychiatric Experts

Ake involved psychiatric experts in an insanity case, and although
expert psychiatric testimony in that type of trial played a significant
role in the decision, 39' the Court's rationale extends to other types of
experts. Indeed, the Court not only held that Ake had a right to expert assistance with respect to his insanity defense in the guilt phase,
but also to the "future dangerousness" issue raised in the death pen-

Equal Protection clauses require the appointment of non-psychiatric experts to indigent
defendants depending upon whether the defendants made a particularized showing of the
need for the assistance of such experts.").
388
State v. Van Scoyoc, 511 N.W.2d 628, 629-30 (Iowa 1993) (indicating that expert's
testimony was relevant to determining the "recklessness" of defendant's conduct).
389 Moody, 684 So. 2d at 120 (citing United States v. Wright, 489 F.2d 1181, 1188 n.6
(D.C. Cir. 1973)); see People v. Gaglione, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 169, 176 (Ct. App. 1994) ("[T]he
right to effective assistance of counsel entitles indigent defendants to access to public funds
for expert services."); State v. Dunn, 571 S.E.2d 650, 660 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (holding
that the right to effective assistance of counsel bars the State from calling as witnesses
experts consulted by the defendant but not presented at trial).
390
See infra text accompanying notes 617-32 (discussing right to partisan expert).
391
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985) ("Psychiatry is not.., an exact science,
and psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes mental illness, on the
appropriate diagnosis to be attached to given behavior and symptoms, on cure and treatment, and on likelihood of future dangerousness.").
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alty stage.3 92 In a later case, Caldwell v. Mississippi,3 9 3 the Court de-

clined to consider a trial court's refusal to appoint fingerprint and
ballistics experts because the defendant had not made a sufficient
showing of need.39

4

Importantly, however, the Court gave no indica-

tion that fingerprint or ballistic experts were beyond the scope of Ake.
In addition, the Court in Little v. Streater,a pre-Ake case, ruled that an
indigent defendant in a civil ("quasi-criminal") paternity action had
395
the right to a blood grouping test at state expense.
Nevertheless, some early cases attempted to limit Ake in nonpsychiatric contexts. For example, the Alabama Supreme Court rejected a defense request for the appointment of a forensic pathologist
by noting that "there is nothing contained in the Ake decision to suggest that the United States Supreme Court was addressing anything
other than psychiatrists and the insanity defense."3 9 6 This position
continues to find support. For example, the Fourth Circuit expressed
39 7
this view in 1999.

392
See id. at 84 ("[Dlue process requires access to a psychiatric examination on relevant issues, to the testimony of the psychiatrist, and to assistance in preparation at the
sentencing phase."); see also Tuggle v. Netherland, 79 F.3d 1386, 1395-96 (4th Cir. 1996)
(holding that while trial court's refusal to provide psychiatric expert to rebut future dangerousness testimony offered in sentencing phase violated Ake, the error was harmless);
Castro v. Oklahoma, 71 F.3d 1502, 1514 (10th Cir. 1995) ("The Ake duty was triggered here
by the State's presentation of any evidence of Mr. Castro's future dangerousness or continuing threat to society. There is no necessity for the State to offer psychiatric testimony or
evidence during the sentencing phase of a capital trial for its Ake duty to apply." (citation
omitted)); Brewer v. Reynolds, 51 F.3d 1519, 1529 (10th Cir. 1995) (rejecting "a narrow
construction of Ake"). Some jurisdictions specify future dangerousness as a relevant factor
in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed. E.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 71/12(b) (7) (2002) (including "existence of a probability that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society" in factors to
consider when imposing death penalty); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(b) (1)
(Vernon 2003) (allowing courts to consider "whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to
society"); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(C) (Michie 2000) (including as a relevant consideration whether defendant is likely to "commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute
a continuing serious threat to society").
';9;
472 U.S. 320 (1985).
394
See id. at 323 n.1; see alsoJohnson v. Oklahoma, 484 U.S. 878, 880 (1987) (Marshall,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (contending that Court should accept the case to
decide "the important questions [of] whether and when an indigent defendant is entitled
to non-psychiatric expert assistance").
395
See supra notes 353-54 and accompanying text.
396
Exparte Grayson, 479 So. 2d 76, 82 (Ala. 1985) (denying application for rehearing);
accord Stafford v. Love, 726 P.2d 894, 896 (Okla. 1986); Plunkett v. State, 719 P.2d 834, 839
(Okla. Crim. App. 1986). Notably, the Alabama Supreme Court later reversed its position
on this issue. See infra note 412 and accompanying text.
397
See Weeks v. Angelone, 176 F.3d 249, 265-66 (4th Cir. 1999) (arguing that Supreme Court in Caldwell "flatly declined to resolve the question of what, if any, showing
would entitle an indigent defendant to private non-psychiatric assistance as a matter of
federal constitutional law"); see also Lorenger, supra note 33, at 544-45 (arguing Ake "was
couched specifically in terms of the provision of psychiatric services" and that "an extension [to non-psychiatric expert services] was probably not intended by the Court").
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In contrast, the Eighth Circuit has ruled that:
[T] here is no principled way to distinguish between psychiatric and
nonpsychiatric experts. The question in each case must be not what
field of science or expert knowledge is involved, but rather how important the scientific issue is in the case, and how much help a de3
fense expert could have given.

98

Other cases have recognized a right to assistance outside of the insanity defense, extending Ake to toxicologists, 399 pathologists, 40 0 fin40 2
DNA analysts, 40 3 serologists, 40 4
gerprint experts, 40 1 hypnotists,

398
Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1243-45 (8th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (finding
that it was error to fail to appoint hypnotist); see also State v. Mason, 694 N.E.2d 932, 943
(Ohio 1998) ("While Ake involved the provision of expert psychiatric assistance only, the
case now is generally recognized to support the proposition that due process may require
that a criminal defendant be provided other types of expert assistance when necessary to
present an adequate defense."); Rey v. State, 897 S.W.2d 333, 338 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)
(en banc) (finding that "Ake is not limited to psychiatric experts"); Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920, 925 (Va. 1996) ("[M]ost courts . . . have applied the rationale
articulated in Ake, and . . . have held that the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses
require the appointment of non-psychiatric experts to indigent defendants [upon a proper
showing].").
399
See Bright v. State, 455 S.E.2d 37, 50-51 (Ga. 1995) (finding that failure to appoint
toxicologist to assist at death penalty sentencing hearing violated Ake).
400
See, e.g., Terry v. Rees, 985 F.2d 283, 284 (6th Cir. 1993); State v. Ballard, 428 S.E.2d
178, 180 (N.C. 1993) (listing cases applying Ake to requests for pathologists, medical- experts, fingerprint examiners, and investigators); Rey, 897 S.W.2d at 338-39; see also Sommers v. Commonwealth, 843 S.W.2d 879, 882-85 (Ky. 1992) (holding that failure to
appoint defense pathologist violated state statute designed to implement due process right
to present an effective defense").
401
See, e.g., People v. Lawson, 644 N.E.2d 1172, 1192 (Ill. 1994); State v. Carmouche,
527 So. 2d 307, 307 (La. 1988); State v. Bridges, 385 S.E.2d 337, 339 (N.C. 1989); State v.
Moore, 364 S.E.2d 648, 656-57 (N.C. 1988). For a general discussion of the right to a
fingerprint expert, see Michael J. Yaworsky, Annotation, Right of Indigent Defendant in State
Criminal Case to Assistance of FingerprintExpert, 72 A.L.R. 4th 874 (1989).
402
See Little, 835 F.2d at 1243-45.
403
See, e.g., Ex parteDubose, 662 So. 2d 1189, 1192-94 (Ala. 1995); Prater v. State, 820
S.W.2d 429, 439 (Ark. 1991) (concluding that trial court erred when it declined to appoint
a defense expert "because of a shortage of county funds"); Cade v. State, 658 So. 2d 550,
555 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Polk v. State, 612 So. 2d 381, 393-94 (Miss. 1992) (providing, in appendix to opinion, guidelines for future DNA cases); see also DNA TECHNOLOGY,
supra note 48, at 147-50 (recommending that "[d]efense counsel . .. have access to adequate expert assistance.., to review the quality of the laboratory work and the interpretation of results" and that "authorities... make funds available to pay for expert witnesses").
But see People v. Leonard, 569 N.W.2d 663, 669 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) ("[O]nly two courts
have held that whenever the prosecution intends to introduce DNA evidence against a
defendant at trial, the defendant has a due process right to an appointment of a DNA
expert to assist in his defense."); State v. Huchting, 927 S.W.2d 411, 419-20 (Mo. Ct. App.
1996); Husske, 476 S.E.2d at 926 (concluding that indigent defendant had failed to show a
"particularized need" for the services of a DNA expert).
404
See Carmouche, 527 So. 2d at 307.
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handwriting examiners, 40 6 blood spatter special-

forensic dentists for bite-mark comparisons, 4°1 psychologists on
410
the battered wife syndrome, 40 9 as well as other types of experts.
41
The Alabama Supreme Court even reversed its original position, '
ruling in 1995 that an indigent was entitled to a DNA expert under
ists,

Ake.

4 12

A pattern that will repeat itself on other issues is discernable here:
some courts give a cramped reading of Ake to limit its scope, while
others appreciate that the opinion cannot be so easily cabined. Restricting Ake to psychiatry would have made it a case of negligible significance because most states had recognized a right in this context
before Ake was decided; 413 Oklahoma was a distinct minority. 4 14 On
the other hand, the more expansive (and correct) reading greatly increases the cost of implementing Ake.
405
SeeExparte Sanders, 612 So. 2d 1199, 1201 (Ala. 1993) (indicating that "[ilt would
have been error to deny the request [for a ballistics expert] because the defendant was
indigent").
406
See People v. Dickerson, 606 N.E.2d 762, 766-67 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
407
SeeJames v. State, 613 N.E.2d 15, 21 (Ind. 1993). But see Stewart v. Commonwealth,

427 S.E.2d 394, 405 (Va. 1993) ("Stewart cites no cases that indicate [the] assistance [of a
blood spatter expert] is required in order to provide the constitutionally required 'basic
tools of an adequate defense."') (quoting Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227
(1971))).
408
See Thornton v. State, 339 S.E.2d 240, 240-41 (Ga. 1986).
409
See Dunn v. Roberts, 963 F.2d 308, 313 (10th Cir. 1992); see also Doe v. Superior
Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 888, 892-93 (Ct. App. 1995) ("The problem in this case is that the
record is insufficient to determine whether [Doe] has access to a 'competent' psychiatrist
or psychologist. . . . [T] his is not a run-of-mill [psychiatric testimony] case and the request
is for someone with experience in [battered woman syndrome and post-traumatic stress
syndrome].").
410
See, e.g., State v. Coker, 412 N.W.2d 589, 593 (Iowa 1987) (expert to assist with
intoxication defense); People v. Tyson, 618 N.Y.S.2d 796 (App. Div. 1994) (voiceprint expert); see also Sommers v. Commonwealth, 843 S.W.2d 879, 882-85 (Ky. 1992) (finding that
failure to appoint arson expert violated state statute designed to implement due process
right). For a general discussion of these other types of experts, see Michael J.Yaworsky,
Annotation, Right of Indigent Defendant in State Criminal Case to Assistance of Chemist, Toxicologist, Technician, NarcoticsExpert, or Similar Nonmedical Specialist in Substance Analysis, 74 A.L.R.
4th 388 (1989); MichaelJ. Yaworsky, Annotation, Right of IndigentDefendant in State Criminal
Case to Assistance of Expert in Social Attitudes, 74 A.L.R. 4th 330 (1989).
411
See supra note 396 and accompanying text.
412
ExparteDubose,662 So. 2d 1189, 1192-94 (Ala. 1995) (concluding that "the principles enunciated in Ake, and grounded in the due process guarantee of fundamental fairness, apply in a case of nonpsychiatric expert assistance"); see also Ex parteMoody, 684 So.
2d 114, 119 (Ala. 1996) (noting that "Alabama Courts have extended Ake to other types of
expert witnesses necessary to the defense" and citing cases involving DNA and ballistic
experts).
413
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 78 (1985) ("Many States, as well as the Federal
Government, currently make psychiatric assistance available to indigent defendants, and
they have not found the financial burden so great as to preclude this assistance.").
414
See id. at 78 n.4 (listing 42 states recognizing the right).
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Noncapital Cases

The extent to which the Ake right applies to proceedings other
than capital cases was immediately raised by Chief Justice Burger in
his concurring opinion, which emphasized that Ake was a death penalty case: "The facts of the case and the question presented confine
the actual holding of the Court. In capital cases the finality of the
sentence imposed warrants protections that may or may not be required in other cases." 4 15 In one of the first appellate decisions interpreting Ake, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama seized on this
4 16
point, writing that "Ake does not reach noncapital cases.
Although Ake involved a capital defendant, nothing in the majority opinion suggested that the newly-recognized right to expert assistance was limited to death penalty cases. 4 17 Justice Rehnquist, the
lone dissenter, acknowledged that the majority opinion was not so restricted. He criticized the majority for fashioning too broad a constitutional rule, and instead advocated "limit[ing] the rule to capital
cases." 418 Also instructive is the Court's decision in Little v. Streater,the
pre-Ake civil case that the Court labeled "quasi-criminal," which established that an indigent defendant in a paternity action had the right
4 19
to a blood grouping test at state expense.
Most courts assume that Ake applies to noncapital cases. As the
Eighth Circuit has noted, "we [do not] draw a decisive line for dueprocess purposes between capital and noncapital cases. '420 This position is easy to justify in terms of the Ake rationale, and it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile Little with a capital case limitation. However, extending Ake to felony cases does not end the matter.
One commentator has argued that the right to expert assistance
should encompass misdemeanor cases in which imprisonment is imposed, 42 1 the triggering standard for the right to counsel. 422 But the
extension of Ake to all felony cases significantly enlarges the scope of
Id. at 87 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
Isom v. State, 488 So. 2d 12, 13 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); accord McCord v. State, 507
So. 2d 1030, 1033 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987); see also Lorenger, supra note 33, at 545 (rejecting
extension of Ake to noncapital cases).
417
At one point in the Ake opinion, the Court spoke of the "interest in the accuracy of
a criminal proceeding that places an individual's life or liberty at risk." 470 U.S. at 78 (emphasis added).
418
Id. at 87 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
419
See supra notes 353-54 and accompanying text.
420
Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1243 (8th Cir. 1987) (en banc); see also State v.
Barnett, 909 SW.2d 423, 427-28 (Tenn. 1995) ("Certainly, there is no explicit language in
the Ake decision limiting its application to capital cases. . . . The due process principle of
fundamental fairness applies to all criminal prosecutions, and does not rest upon the severity of the sanction sought or imposed.").
421
West, supra note 36, at 1342-45.
422
See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74
(1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 33 (1972).
415

416
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the right and increases (perhaps exponentially) the funds necessary
for its implementation.
C.

Other Stages of Criminal Cases

The applicability of Ake to pretrial hearings also needs to be addressed. 4 23 Experts often provide valuable assistance on pretrial issues, including change of venue motions, 4 24 race bias injury selection,
death-qualified juries, and other issues. 4 25 Is there a right to a jury
consultant, for example? 426 What if the prosecution uses one?427 Sentencing proceedings raise similar issues. In addition to the insanity
defense, Ake involved the penalty stage of a capital case on the issue of
future dangerousness. 428 That issue, however, is peculiar to only a few
states. There are, however, numerous other issues in death penalty
cases that may be addressed by experts. 429 For instance, mental condition is often a mitigating factor, 43° and mitigation experts are often
423
See United States v. Barney, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1313 (D. Utah 1999) (reporting
that "research has not disclosed a case where an appointment of an expert has been authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) for plea negotiation purposes where the expert
would not function as a source of evidence for trial" but reasoning that the statutory language "would seem to be broad enough, that on a proper showing of necessity, such an
appointment may be allowed").
424
See Mason v. Mitchell, 95 F. Supp. 2d 744, 776 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (rejecting claim
that trial court improperly refused to provide funding "for a mass media expert to assist
counsel in demonstrating that a change of venue was necessary because the jury pool had
been tainted by pre-trial publicity").
425
See Ex parte Dubose, 662 So. 2d 1189, 1192-94 (Ala. 1995) (citing Alabama cases
involving requests for expert assistance in connection with change of venue motions, race
bias, polling, jury selection, and death-qualified juries).
426
See Moore v. Johnson, 225 F.3d 495, 503 (5th Cir. 2000) ("While the wealthiest of
defendants might elect to spend their defense funds on jury consultants, indigent defendants are not privileged to force the state to expend its funds on this exercise in bolstering
an attorney's fundamental skills."); United States v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283, 1315-16 (7th
Cir. 1976) (holding that denial of CJA request for clinical psychologist to assist in jury
selection was not error); Jackson v. Anderson, 141 F. Supp. 2d 811, 853-55 (N.D. Ohio
2001) (denying funds).
427
See Kevin Sack, Research Guided Jury Selection in Bombing Trial, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,
2001, at A12 (reporting that, at the suggestion of ajury consultant retained for the trial of
a former Klansman, "[p]rosecutors organized two focus groups and polled nearly 500 residents of the Birmingham area this year to help them understand community attitudes
about racial issues in general and about the church bombing in particular").
428
See supra note 74 and accompanying text (noting the future dangerousness "roots"
of Ake ).
429
See Starr v. Lockhart, 23 F.3d 1280, 1287-89 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that failure to
appoint mental health expert to assist defendant's claim of mental retardation at death
penalty hearing violated Ake); James v. State, 613 N.E.2d 15, 21 (Ind. 1993) ("In cases
where a defendant faces the death penalty, we also have held that the failure to allow the
defendant appropriate resources to retain an expert who would give an opinion concerning the statutory mitigator, may require reversal of the death penalty."). But seeWainwright
v. Norris, 872 F. Supp. 574, 587 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (concluding that refusal to appoint expert
sociologist to testify about prison life at capital sentencing did not violate due process).
430
See, e.g., OHo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (3) (Anderson 2003).
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sought. 43 1 In a recent case, Wiggins v. Smith,432 the Supreme Court

found counsel's conduct during the mitigation phase of a capital case
deficient. Standard practice in Maryland capital cases included the
preparation of a social history report, and even though funds were
available for the retention of a forensic social worker, counsel chose
43 4
not to commission such a report. 43 3 Similarly, in State v. Bocharski,
the defendant eventually gave up trying to obtain funds for hiring a
mitigation specialist, which typically requires between $20,000 to
$100,000. 4 3 5

In remanding for resentencing, the court wrote: "It is

clear that the defendant struggled to obtain funding during the entire
presentencing period, including an eight-week hiatus in which he was
essentially prevented from continuing the mitigation investigation because of the county's reluctance to pay for it."436 Finally, Ake's application to post-conviction proceedings is only beginning to be
litigated.

D.

4 37

"Civil" Proceedings

Other proceedings closely related to criminal prosecutions but
designated as "civil" may also require expert assistance. 438 Sexual

431
SeeJohn M. Fabian, Death Penalty Mitigation and the Role of the Forensic Psychologist, 27
LAW & PSYCHOL. Rrv. 73 (2003); Pamela Blume Leonard, A New Professionfor an Old Need:
Why a Mitigation Specialist Must Be Included on the CapitalDefense Team, 31 HOFSTRA L. REv.
1143 (2003); Jonathan P. Tomes, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't: The Use of Mitigation Experts in Death Penalty Litigation,24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 359 (1997). But see Moore, 225 F.3d
at 503 ("[Defendant] provides no explanation of how a mitigation expert might have provided 'critical' assistance to a defense team already including a lawyer and psychiatrist,
both cognizant of the role of mitigating evidence in staving off the death penalty."); Mason
v. Mitchell, 95 F. Supp. 2d 744, 776 (N.D. Ohio 2000) ("In this case, the state did not
present any evidence of Petitioner's future dangerousness. Therefore, the court's denial
of a mental health expert at the sentencing phase would not constitute an Ake violation.").
432
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
433
See id. at 522.
434
22 P.3d 43 (Ariz. 2001) (en banc).
435
See id. at 52-53.
4-36
Id. at 52.
437
See Stubbs v. Gomez, 189 F.3d 1099, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting argument "that
the district court abused its discretion in denying [petitioner's] request for funding to
retain an expert to testify about whether the prosecutor's explanations for his peremptories were race-based or pretextual" and affirming denial of petition for habeas corpus);
Hoffman v. Arave, 73 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1201 (D. Idaho 1998) ("[T]he indigent's right to
psychiatric assistance has never been extended beyond the trial and sentencing level to
include post-conviction relief proceedings. The petitioner has not cited .. .a single case
which so extends the right to expert psychological or psychiatric assistance under Ake.").
438
See, e.g.,
Medine, supra note 35, at 303-17.
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predator proceedings 43 9 are a prominent recent example. 440 Other
possibilities are probation and parole revocation hearings, 44 as well as
prison disciplinary hearings. 44 2 Furthermore, juvenile court delinquency 4 43 and transfer 444 cases often require experts.
439
In Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), the Supreme Court upheld the Kansas
Sexually Violent Predator Act in the face of challenges on substantive due process, double
jeopardy, and ex post facto grounds. See id. at 350. The Court held that the Act's definition of "mental abnormality" satisfied the substantive due process requirements for civil
commitment. See id. at 356. The statute provided indigents with counsel and an examination by a mental health expert. See id. at 353. Significantly, individuals were afforded the
opportunity to present and cross-examine witnesses and review documentary evidence. See
id.
440
In Commonwealth v. Dube, 796 N.E.2d 859 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003), the court held that
the lack of expert testimony on sexual dangerousness doomed a commitment petition. See
id. at 868-69; see also In re Kortte, 738 N.E.2d 983, 988 (11. App. Ct. 2000) (holding that
principle of Ake applies to civil proceedings under the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons
Commitment Act); State v. Eppinger, 743 N.E.2d 881, 886 (Ohio 2001) (holding that an
expert must be appointed to an indigent defendant in a sexual offender civil commitment
proceeding "if the court determines . . . that such services are reasonably necessary to
determine whether the offender is likely to engage in [sexually oriented offenses in] the
future").
441
The Supreme Court has held that probation revocation, see Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
411 U.S. 778 (1973), and parole revocation proceedings, see Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471 (1972), must satisfy due process standards. See also Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb.
Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979) (holding that Nebraska parole procedure satisfied due process requirements). In this context, due process recognizes a defendant's right to offer evidence and a limited right to confront the state's evidence. See
Mor-issey, 408 U.S. at 488-89. This would appear to encompass expert testimony in some
situations. See United States v. Stumpf, 54 F. Supp. 2d 972, 973 (D. Nev. 1999) (holding
PharmChem sweat patch test for cocaine detection reliable in proceeding to revoke supervised release); United States v. Sample, 378 F. Supp. 44, 53-54 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (admitting
voiceprint evidence in probation revocation hearing).
442
In a 1985 case, a federal district court wrote that "[a] part of the due process guarantee is that an individual not suffer punitive action as a result of an inaccurate scientific
procedure." Higgs v. Wilson, 616 F. Supp. 226, 230-32 (W.D. Ky. 1985) (concluding that
using EMIT urinalysis drug test without a confirmatory test in prison disciplinary proceedings violates due process and granting preliminary injunction), vacated and remanded sub
nom., Higgs v. Bland, 793 F.2d 1291 (6th Cir. 1986), appealfollowing remand, 888 F.2d 443
(6th Cir. 1989) (affirming denial of preliminary injunction).
443
In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the Supreme Court held that due process safeguards applied to juvenile court delinquency hearings. See id. at 30-31. Specifically, the
Court held that due process in this context included the right to notice, counsel, confrontation and the privilege against compelled self-incrimination. See id. at 31-57. In subsequent cases, the Court held that the standard of proof in criminal cases was constitutional
in nature and applied in delinquency proceedings against juveniles, see In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970), as did the prohibition against double jeopardy, see Breed v.Jones, 421 U.S.
519 (1975). The Court, however, refused to extend the right to jury trial to juvenile cases.
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). Despite the holding in McKeiver, however,
there seems little reason to believe that the Ake right would not apply in juvenile delinquency hearings. See id. at 543 ("All the litigants here agree that the applicable due process
standard in juvenile proceedings, as developed by Gault and Winship, is fundamental
fairness.").
444
Transfer of jurisdiction refers to the process by which a juvenile court relinquishes
jurisdiction and refers ajuvenile case to the criminal courts for prosecution. This process,
variously described as waiver, certification, or bind-over, has been a unique part of the
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In addition to delinquency jurisdiction, juvenile courts adjudicate
neglect, dependency, and abuse cases, and the Supreme Court has
held that due process applies in this context as well. 445 Testimony by
psychologists, caseworkers, and counselors is often admitted in dependency and neglect cases. 446 Medical testimony concerning the battered child syndrome and shaken baby syndrome has similarly been
admitted in physical abuse cases. 447 Not surprisingly, several courts
have extended Ake to permanent custody proceedings. 448 Finally, civil
commitment proceedings frequently involve expert testimony, 4 49 and

juvenile court system since the establishment of the first juvenile court. See Kemplen v.
Maryland, 428 F.2d 169, 173 (4th Cir. 1970) ("There is no proceeding for adults comparable directly to the juvenile jurisdiction waiver hearing."). In Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541 (1966), the Supreme Court invalidated a transfer proceeding. According to the Court,
transfer is a "critically important" stage of the juvenile process, id. at 556, and "there is no
place in our system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous consequences without
ceremony-without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of
reasons," id. at 554. Experts testify often in these cases. See, e.g., State v. Waston, 547
N.E.2d. 1181, 1183 (Ohio 1989) ("At the hearing, the court clinic psychiatrist... testified
that appellant showed 'no evidence of any psychiatric disorder.'"). Nevertheless, some
courts have held Ake inapplicable in this context. See State ex reL. a Juvenile v. Hoose, 539
N.E.2d 704, 706 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) ("This court is of the view that Ake does not establish
that petitioner is entitled at this [waiver proceeding] to the appointment of a private psychiatric examiner at the expense of the state." (citation omitted)); accord State v. Whisenant, 711 N.E.2d 1016, 1026 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).
445
See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758 (1982) ("In parental rights termination
proceedings, the private interest affected is commanding; the risk of error from using a
preponderance standard is substantial; and the countervailing governmental interest favoring that standard is comparatively slight."); Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27,
31-32 (1981) (finding a parent's interest in a termination proceeding to be "a commanding one" and holding that due process may, in some cases, require the appointment of
counsel for indigent parents).
446
See, e.g., In re Webb, 581 N.E.2d 570, 574 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (admitting physician's clinical impression that children had been sexually abused was not error); In re
Brown, 573 N.E.2d 1217, 1220 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (admitting social worker's testimony
about mother's "past parenting history and her ability to comply with prior reunification
plans regarding her other children" was not error); In re Green, 480 N.E.2d 492, 493 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1984) ("[The] juvenile court granted appellant's motion requesting the court to
order a psychological evaluation of her by a psychologist named by the appellant, at county
expense, due to appellant's indigency."); see also MARTIN R. GARDNER, UNDERSTANDINGJUVENILE LAw § 4.03[A], at 68 (1997) ("Expert testimony is often essential in proving child
abuse.").
447
See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text (discussing medical examiners and
coroners).
448
See, e.g., In re Egbert Children, 651 N.E.2d 38, 39-40 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994); In re
Shaeffer Children, 621 N.E.2d 426, 431 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); In re Brown, No. C-850878,
1986 WL 13385, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 26, 1986).
449
Because the typical civil commitment proceeding may result in the loss of liberty, it
is subject to due process safeguards. For example, in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418
(1979), the United States Supreme Court ruled that a person committed to a mental institution in a civil proceeding must be shown to be dangerous by clear and convincing evidence, see id. at 432-33.
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Ake has also been cited in this context. 450 These decisions clearly bring
Ake out of the criminal context. 4 51 Here, again, the Ake Court did not
seem to appreciate the implications of its decision.
V
APPLICABLE STANDARD

There is no question that the defendant has the burden of establishing the need for expert assistance. According to Ake, the accused
must make a "preliminary showing" that an issue requiring expert assistance is "likely to be a significant factor at trial. ' 452 In a later case,
Caldwell v. Mississippi,453 the Supreme Court declined to consider a
trial court's refusal to appoint fingerprint and ballistics experts because the defendant had "offered little more than undeveloped asser' 454
tions that the requested assistance would be beneficial.
The precise dimensions of the threshold showing, however, are
not clear. As the Fifth Circuit noted, "the Ake decision fails to establish a bright line test for determining when a defendant has demonstrated that sanity at the time of the offense will be a significant factor
at the time of trial." 455 Likewise, after surveying the cases, a Florida
court wrote that this issue "typically boil[s] down to an ad hoc exercise
of intuition by the appellate court that there was a substantial risk that
the failure to supply the defendant with an expert deprived the defen45 6
dant of a fair trial."

450
See Goetz v. Crosson, 41 F.3d 800, 803 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Ake and indicating
that due process requires the "provision of an independent psychiatric evaluation" for civil
commitment proceedings in certain circumstances).
451
The Supreme Court's decision in Little v. Streaterfurther supports the Ake argument
in this context. There, the Court held that an indigent defendant in a paternity action had
a right to a blood test at state expense. See supra notes 353-54 and accompanying text.
452
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74 (1985).
453
472 U.S. 320 (1985).
454
Id. at 323 n.1; see also Volson v. Blackburn, 794 F.2d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying Ake's preliminary showing requirement); Bowden v. Kemp, 767 F.2d 761, 764 (11 th Cir.
1985) (same).
455
Volson, 794 F.2d at 176; see also United States v. Kennedy, 64 F.3d 1465, 1472-73
(10th Cir. 1995) (indicating that "the need for expert accounting was ... unclear" and
concluding that the district court's denial of resources violated neither the CJA nor Ake).
456
Cade v. State, 658 So. 2d 550, 553-54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) ("Since there has
been no clear guidance given by the United States Supreme Court in constitutional terms,
the approach taken by state courts varies ....
The federal courts have been no more
precise.").
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Someplace between a defense expert "on demand" 4 57 and a showing that an expert is "absolutely necessary,

'458

a line must be drawn. 4 59

A reasonable threshold showing is needed because the system cannot
afford defense experts on "demand." Moreover, litigation incentives
tend to make motions for expert assistance somewhat routine. First,
failure to make an Ake request waives the issue for appeal 460 and may
also result in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in subsequent
proceedings.461 Second, the issue may give the defense leverage in
plea bargaining. Third, denial of the request provides another issue
for an appeal in the event of conviction. In short, because the defense
does not pay, there is no downside to making an Ake request. State v.
Mason,462 a capital case, is illustrative. The defendant received state
funds for the services of a private investigator, forensic psychiatrist,
forensic pathologist, and for DNA and other blood testing services.
He requested, but did not receive, money for experts in the following
fields: soils and trace evidence, shoeprints, eyewitness identifications,
homicide investigations, mass media, forensic psychology, DNA statis4 63
tics, and firearms.

Conversely, if the threshold standard is too high, the defendant is
placed in a "Catch-22" situation, in which the standard "demand[s]
that the defendant possess already the expertise of the witness
sought."464 Courts have adopted different standards for determining

when an expert should be appointed. Before examining them, however, several myths about the use of experts in criminal litigation
should be addressed, because they often inform court decisions on
this subject.
457
Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 712 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc) ("[D]ue process does
not require the government automatically to provide indigent defendants with expert assistance upon demand.").
458
Ex parte Moody, 684 So. 2d 114, 119 (Ala. 1996) ("To meet this standard, the indigent defendant must show, with reasonable specificity, that the expert is absolutely necessary to answer a substantial issue or question raised by the state or to support a critical
element of the defense.").
459
The Fifth Circuit has ruled that "neither the bare assertion that the defendant was
insane at the time of the offense, nor evidence of mental problems generally is sufficient to
make the threshold showing required by Ake." Williams v. Collins, 989 F.2d 841, 845 (5th
Cir. 1993). Instead, Ake requires "a factual showing sufficient to give the trial court reasonable ground to doubt his sanity at the time of the offense." Id.; see alsoYohey v. Collins, 985
F.2d 222, 227 (5th Cir. 1993) (denying habeas relief because request for ballistics expert
was based on speculative theory and defense presented no evidence that autopsy results
were inaccurate or subject to disagreement between experts); Scott v. Louisiana, 934 F.2d
631, 633 (5th Cir. 1991) (indicating that appointment of nonpsychiatric experts is proper
only if the evidence is critical to conviction and open to differing opinions).
460
See People v. Redd, 670 N.E.2d 583, 598 (Il. 1996).
461
See supra notes 329-42 and accompanying text (discussing ineffectiveness claims).
462
694 N.E.2d 932 (Ohio 1998); see also Mason v. Mitchell, 95 F. Supp. 2d 744 (N.D.
Ohio 2000) (habeas review of State v. Mason), affrd, 320 F.3d 604, 615-16 (6th Cir. 2003).
463
See id. at 943.
464
State v. Moore, 364 S.E.2d 648, 657 (N.C. 1988).
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Underlying Myths

1. Effectiveness of Cross-Examination
Appellate courts often cite the fact that the cross-examination of
the prosecution expert was effective as a reason why a defense expert
was not needed. 46 5 For example, one court wrote that "defense trial
counsel exhibited an understanding of the scientific evidence, and effectively and comprehensively cross-examined the prosecution's experts." 4 6 6 Another court went further, declaring:
[W]e disagree with [the] contention that the average attorney is illequipped to defend against [DNA] evidence. To the contrary, law
libraries-i.e., law journals, practitioners' guides, annotated law reports, CLE materials, etc.-are teeming with information and advice for lawyers preparing to deal with DNA evidence in trial. Even
a cursory perusal of the literature in this area reveals copious lists of
and
questions for defense attorneys to use in cross-examinations 46
7
other strategies for undermining the weight of DNA evidence.
This statement borders on the incredulous. First, the same reasoning applies when prosecutors seek a psychiatric evaluation of an
accused who has raised an insanity defense. There are likewise numerous texts and CLE materials on that subject, 468 and yet virtually
every jurisdiction has procedures recognizing the prosecution's right
to have the accused examined by a state psychiatrist-a prosecution expert. 4 69 The rationale for this procedure is obvious: the adversary system would be undermined if the prosecution was deprived of its own
expert.
Second, effective cross-examination of a prosecution expert frequently requires the advice of a defense expert. For example, a British DNA study found that "94 per cent of defence lawyers who
consulted an expert felt that they had been assisted by that expert,
either in their evaluation of the case and the advice they gave to their
4 70
client or in presenting their case in court.
See, e.g., Plunkett v. State, 719 P.2d 834, 839 (Okla. Crim.App. 1986). In rejecting a
465
due process right to retest, several courts have reasoned that the defendant's opportunity
to cross-examine the prosecution's expert witnesses provides sufficient protection. See
supra note 326 and accompanying text (providing examples).
466
People v. Leonard, 569 N.W.2d 663, 671 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (noting that
"[d]efense counsel's undergraduate degree is in chemistry with a minor in biophysics").
467
State v. Huchting, 927 S.W.2d 411, 420 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
Indeed, the Ake decision itself is replete with citations to such texts. See ABA CRIMI468
NAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS
469
See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(c)

(1989).

(describing the procedure for obtaining a courtordered psychiatric examination to determine sanity at time of offense). As the drafters
note, "[t]his is a common provision of state law, the constitutionality of which has been
sustained." FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2 advisory committee's note.
STEVENTON, supra note 59, at 43.
470
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Third, there is a significant difference between attacking the
opinion of an opponent's expert through cross-examination and attacking that opinion through the testimony of your own expert. 47 1 In
Daubert, the Supreme Court noted that "[v] igorous cross-examination,
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden

of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky
but admissible evidence." 4 72 In 1983, the Court upheld the admissibility of expert testimony concerning future dangerousness in capital
cases. 4 73 In so ruling, the Court noted that 'jurors should not be
barred from hearing the views of the State's psychiatrists along with
opposing views of the defendant's doctors."'47 4 Similarly, the 1992 report of
the National Academy of Sciences observed that "[m] ere cross examination by a defense attorney inexperienced in the science of DNA
testing will not be sufficient. '4 75 A forensic scientist agrees, remarking
that "[i] f cross-examination is to be the only way to discover misleading or inadequate testimony by forensic scientists, then too much is
being expected from it."476 Some courts have also recognized this
point. For instance, in De Freece v. State,47 7 the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals rejected the notion that an "admirable" cross-examination of
the prosecution expert justified the failure to appoint an expert for
the defense.

478

Finally, if this factor is relevant at all, it would only be so on appellate review under a harmless error analysis. After all, a trial court can471
See United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510, 513 (D. Md. 1973) ("The cross-examination of an expert poses a formidable task; it is the rare attorney who knows as much as
the expert."); State v. Dean, 307 N.W.2d 628, 650-51 (Wis. 1981) ("[C]ross-examination
... may not in all situations provide a sufficient basis for the jury to assess the competence
of the witness and the merits of the test.").
472
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) (emphasis added)
(citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987)).
473
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896-905 (1983).
474 Id. at 898-99 (emphasis added).
475
DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 48, at 160.
476
Douglas M. Lucas, The Ethical Responsibilitiesof the ForensicScientist: Exploring the Limits, 34J. FORENSIC Sci. 719, 724 (1989). Another commentator rejects, almost out of hand,
the argument that the "searing test of a rigorous cross-examination" is a sufficient safeguard in this context. He writes: "All that one can say to such an argument is that the
lawyers who make it should know better, and, if they do know better, as they must if they
are experienced trial lawyers, they should have more conscience than to perpetuate such a
myth." Barton L. Ingraham, The Ethics of Testimony: Conflicting Views on the Role of the Criminologist as Expert Witness, in EXPERT WITNESSES 179, 183 (Patrick R. Anderson & L. Thomas
Winfree, Jr. eds., 1987).
477
848 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
478
Id. at 160-61; accord Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1562 (E.D. Okla.
1995) ("This court disagrees that cross-examination of the State's experts was an acceptable substitute for Petitioner's own experts."), affd sub nom. on other grounds, Williamson v.
Ward, 110 F.3d 1508, 1523 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that due process, not Daubert, standard applies in habeas proceedings); People v. Lawson, 644 N.E.2d 1172, 1191-92 (IIl.
1994) (finding that defense counsel's cross-examination was not sufficient).
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not wait to review the defense counsel's cross-examination before
appointing a defense expert.
2.

"Neutral"Prosecution Experts

Courts may assume that cross-examination is adequate because
government experts are unbiased scientists. For example, the Indiana
Supreme Court upheld a trial judge's denial of funds for a DNA expert because "the neutral. . . experts here were testifying to the results
of a test 'involving precise, physical measurements and chemical testing."' 479 Eighty percent of crime laboratories, however, are controlled by the police, and most examine only evidence submitted by
the prosecution. 480 The "pro-prosecution" bias of lab experts has
48 2 and abroad. 48 3
48
often been criticized, ' both in this country
Along a similar vein, the Eighth Circuit rejected the notion that
the right to subpoena state experts is an appropriate consideration.
479
Harrison v. State, 644 N.E.2d 1243, 1253 (Ind. 1995) (quoting James v. State, 613
N.E.2d 15, 21 (Ind. 1993)).
480
See Peterson, supra note 163, at 11.
481
A 1970 federal grand jury, investigating the deaths of Black Panther leaders in a
Chicago police raid, noted that the "testimony of the firearms examiner that he could not
have refused to sign what he believed was an inadequate and preliminary report on pain of
potential discharge is highly alarming. If true, it could undermine public confidence in all
scientific analysis performed by this agency." L.W.Bradford, Problems of Ethics and Behavior
in the Forensic Sciences, 21 J. FORENSIC Sci. 763, 767 (1976) (quoting grand jury report); see
alsoJones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 991-93 (7th Cir. 1988) (describing how a Chicago crime lab technician, after talking to detectives, intentionally deleted an exculpatory
conclusion from her report in a murder case).
482
See Andre A. Moenssens, Novel Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: Some Words of
Caution, 84 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 6 (1993)

(noting that crime labs "may be so

imbued with a pro-police bias that they are willing to circumvent true scientific investigation methods for the sake of 'making their point'"); James E. Starrs, The Seamy Side of
ForensicScience: The Mephitic Stain of Fred Salem Zain, 17 Sc. SLEUTHING REV. 1, 8 (1993)
("The inbred bias of crime laboratories affiliated with law enforcement agencies must be
breached."); Symposium on Science and the Rules of Legal Procedure,101 F.R.D. 599, 642 (1983)
(Statement of Professor Joseph L. Peterson) (noting that "the police agency controls the
formal and informal system of rewards and sanctions for the laboratory examiners" and
that "[m]any of these laboratories make their services available only to law enforcement
agencies" before concluding that there exists "a legitimate issue regarding the objectivity of
laboratory personnel").
483 See David E. Bernstein, Junk Science in the United States and the Commonwealth, 21 YALE
J. INT'L L. 123, 171 (1996) ("Many reformers in the United Kingdom believe that a large
percentage of the problems that have arisen in the forensic science context are attributable
to the fact that English forensic science is almost solely the province of the state."); see also
Ian Freckelton, Science and the Legal Culture, in 2 EXPERT EVIDENCE 107, 112 (lan Freckelton
& Hugh Selby eds., 1993) (citing "unequivocal evidence that the pro-prosecution orientation of government scientists ... had not adequately been countered in England"); Paul
Wilson, Lessons from the Antipodes: Successes and Failures of Forensic Science, 67 FORENSIC SCI
INT'L 79, 82 (1994) ("The 'independence' of forensic science is often largely mythical. A
series of case records suggests that scientific testimony is frequently distorted or moulded
to fit preconceived misassumptions about the nature of the crime or the guilt or innocence
of the accused.").
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According to the court, "the ability to subpoena a state examiner and
to question that person on the stand does not amount to the expert
484
assistance required by Ake."

3.

Competence of Examiners

If government examiners were always competent, the need for
defense experts would arguably decrease. Such an assumption, however, is unwarranted. In 1989, molecular biologist Eric Lander could
correctly note: "At present, forensic science is virtually unregulatedwith the paradoxical result that clinical laboratories must meet higher
standards to be allowed to diagnose strep throat than forensic labs
must meet to put a defendant on death row." 485 Although important
reforms have been undertaken, only a few states require the accreditation of crime laboratories. 4 86 There are voluntary programs, such as
the American Society of Crime Lab Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board (ASCLD/LAB), but many laboratories remain
unaccredited.

487

484
Starr v. Lockhart, 23 F.3d 1280, 1289 (8th Cir. 1994); see also Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1561-62 (E.D. Okla. 1995) ("[W]hen forensic evidence and expert
testimony are critical parts of the criminal prosecution of an indigent defendant, due process requires the State to provide an expert who is not beholden to the prosecution."), affd
sub nom. on other grounds, Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508, 1522 (10th Cir. 1997); De
Freece v. State, 848 S.W.2d 150, 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) ("We reject the notion that a
'court's expert' necessarily fulfills the role of psychiatric assistant to the indigent accused
envisioned by Ake.... In [this] context the phrase 'court's expert' is an oxymoron.").
485
Eric Lander, DNA Fingerprintingon Trial, 339 NATURE 501, 505 (1989); see also Randolph N. Jonakait, Forensic Science: The Need for Regulation, 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 109, 191
(1991) ("All available information indicates that forensic science laboratories perform
poorly. . . . Current regulation of clinical labs indicates that a regulatory system can improve crime laboratories. . . . [F]orensic facilities should at least be required to undergo
mandatory, blind proficiency testing, and the results of this testing should be made
public.").
486
See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-b(1) (McKinney 1996); OKLA. STAT. AN'N. tit. 74,
§ 150.37 (A) (3) (West Supp. 2004); TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.35(d) (Vernon Supp.
2004).
487
The President of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences observed:
Unfortunately, while the ASCLD/LAB program has been successful in accrediting over 200 laboratories, a large number of forensic laboratories in
the U.S. remain unaccredited by any agency. A similar situation exists with
death investigation agencies accredited by the National Association of Medical Examiners (NAME); forty such medical systems have been accredited,
covering only about 25% of the U.S. population. The same dichotomy
exists in certification programs for the practicing forensic scientist, even
though forensic certification boards for all the major disciples have been in
existence for over a decade. Why have forensic laboratories and individuals
been so reluctant to become accredited or certified?
Graham R. Jones, The Changing Practice of Forensic Science, 47 J. FORENSIC Sci. 437, 438
(2002).
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Proficiency testing in the forensic sciences dates back to 1978,488
and later studies demonstrated its feasibility. 489 Nevertheless, some
courts have criticized current proficiency testing in fingerprint 490 and
handwriting comparisons 49 1 as not being sufficiently rigorous. In
short, we do not know much about competence, and proficiency testing, which is designed to be an indicator of competence, will affirmatively mislead if it is not rigorous enough. Thus, competence cannot
be assumed under current conditions.
B.

Various Formulations of the Standard

Courts have construed Ake in diverse ways. Some courts define
the standard as whether there is a reasonable probability or necessity
that an expert would aid in the defense. 492 Other courts require a
showing of "particularized need. ' '493 It is not clear that these two for488

SeeJOSEPH L. PETERSON ET AL., CRIME LABORATORY PROFICIENCY TESTING RESEARCH

PROGRAM 251 (1978) (reporting that 71.2% of the crime laboratories tested provided unacceptable results in a blood test, 51.4% made errors in matching paint samples, 35.5% erred
in a soil examination, and 28.2% made mistakes in firearms identifications); D. Michael
Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxyfor Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification "Expertise," 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731, 748 (1989) (reviewing five handwriting
comparison proficiency tests that showed that, at best, "[d]ocument examiners were correct 57% of the time and incorrect 43% of the time").
489 SeeJoseph L. Peterson & Penelope N. Markham, Crime Laboratory Proficiency Testing
Results, 1978-1991, 40J. FORENSIC SC. 994, 1009 (1995) (reviewing the ability of laboratories to determine if there was a common origin shared by an unknown and a known sample for evidence ranging from firearms, to hair, to questioned documents).
490 See, e.g., United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 274 (4th Cir. 2003) (Michael, J., dissenting) ("Proficiency testing is typically based on a study of prints that are far superior to
those usually retrieved from a crime scene."); United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d
549, 565 (E.D. Pa. 2002) ("On the record made before me, the FBI [fingerprint] examiners got very high proficiency grades, but the tests they took did not .... [O]n the present
record I conclude that the proficiency tests are less demanding than they should be.").
491
See, e.g., Crisp, 324 F.3d at 279 (Michael, J., dissenting) ("Moreover, although the
government's expert here testified to his success on proficiency tests, the government provides no reason for us to believe that these tests are realistic assessments of an examiner's
ability to perform the tasks required in his field."); United States v. Lewis, 220 F. Supp. 2d
548, 554 (S.D. W. Va. 2002) ("There were aspects of Mr. Cawley's testimony that undermined his credibility .... Mr. Cawley said that his peers always agreed with each others'
results and always got it right. Peer review in such a 'Lake Woebegone' environment is not
meaningful.").
492
See, e.g.,
State v. Williams, 800 P.2d 1240, 1247 (Ariz. 1987) ("[A] criminal defendant is entitled to a mental examination by court-appointed psychiatrists if he can establish
'that reasonable grounds for an examination exist."' (quoting Ariz. R. Crim. P. 113)); Sommers v. Kentucky, 843 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Ky. 1992) (finding the denial of the defendant's
motions for funds to provide expert assistance constituted prejudicial error where the defendant had demonstrated "reasonable necessity").
493 See Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920, 925 (Va. 1996) ("Our research
reveals that most courts which have considered the question . . .have held that the Due
Process and Equal Protection clauses require the appointment of non-psychiatric experts
to indigent defendants depending upon whether the defendants made a particularized
showing of the need for the assistance of such experts.").
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mulations differ in result. A reasonable probability standard is defensible-albeit, often unhelpful in specific cases.
A number of courts, however, have added a second requirement.
For example, the Eleventh Circuit has stated "that a defendant must
show the trial court that there exists a reasonable probability both [1]
that an expert would be of assistance to the defense and [2] that de4 94
nial of expert assistance would result in a fundamentally unfair trial."
The second prong erects a formidable and unjustifiable obstacle to
the appointment of experts. It is one thing to make a pretrial showing
that assistance is needed; it is quite another to make a pretrialshowing
that the trial would be fundamentally unfair without the expert. This
becomes more obvious as the court spells out the requisite showing:
Thus, if a defendant wants an expert to assist his attorney in confronting the prosecution's proof-by preparing counsel to cross-examine the prosecution's experts or by providing rebuttal
testimony-he must inform the court of the nature of the prosecution's case and how the requested expert would be useful. At the
very least, he must inform the trial court about the nature of the
495
crime and the evidence linking him to the crime.
One problem with this demanding standard is the lack of adequate defense discovery. The court acknowledged this problem in a
footnote 496 but appeared unaware that such discovery is often not
49 7
available.
The two-pronged approach also affects the harmless error analysis in a way that disadvantages the accused. 49 8 Under a single-pronged
494

Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 712 (11th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added).

Id. (adding that "[b]y the same token, if the defendant desires the appointment of
an expert so that he can present an affirmative defense, such as insanity, he must demonstrate a substantial basis for the defense," and that to do so, his "showing must also include
a specific description of the expert or experts desired [and] . . . should inform the court
why the particular expert is necessary."); see also State v. Touchet, 642 So. 2d 1213, 1216
(La. 1994) ("To meet [the Moore] standard, a defendant must ordinarily establish, with a
reasonable degree of specificity, that the assistance is required to answer a substantial issue
or question that is raised by the prosecution's case or to support a critical element of the
defense.").
496
Moore, 809 F.2d at 712 n.10 ("In ajurisdiction still employing 'trial by ambush,' the
defendant might have to ask the court to make the prosecutor disclose the theory of his
case and the results of any tests that may have been performed by government experts or at
the government's request.").
497
See infra text accompanying notes 708-13 (discussing discovery issues).
498
Courts have divided over whether an Ake violation may be deemed harmless error.
Certain violations are "regarded as so elemental that their existence abrogates the basic
structure of a constitutional trial, and which are therefore not subject to harmless error
analysis." Starr v. Lockhart, 23 F.3d 1280, 1291 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing the following rights
as not subject to harmless error analysis: "the right to counsel, trial by a biased judge,
exclusion of members of the defendants' race from the grand jury, deprivation of the fight
to self-representation, and denial of the right to a public trial"). However, the Lockhart
court ruled that an Ake violation is subject to harmless error analysis. Id. at 1292; see also
Castro v. Oklahoma, 71 F.3d 1502, 1514-16 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that the trial court's
495
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test, once an Ake violation has been found (there is a reasonable
probability that an expert would aid in the defense), an appellate
court determines whether the error was harmless. The prosecution
would have the burden of showing harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. 499 In contrast, under the two-pronged approach, the de50 0
fendant has the burden of showing an unfair trial.
C.

Relevant Factors

Instead of parsing the various formulations of the Ake standard, a
more informative approach focuses on the factors that are relevant to
the appointment decision.
1.

Timeliness & Specificity

The threshold showing should include procedural requirements
such as timeliness 50 1 and reasonable specificity. 50 2 How specific the
denial of funds to the defendant was not harmless error); Brewer v. Reynolds, 51 F.3d
1519, 1529 (10th Cir. 1995) (agreeing that harmless error analysis should apply, but struggling to decide which standard for harmlessness is appropriate).
In contrast, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that an Ake violation is a "structural" error, and therefore not subject to a harmless error analysis. See Rey v. State, 897
S.W.2d 333, 345 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) ("We can conceive of few errors that are more
structural in nature than one which eliminates a basic tool of an adequate defense and in
doing so dramatically affects the accuracy of the jury's determination."); see also Lorenger,
supra note 33, at 541-64 (arguing that harmless error analysis should not apply to either
the guilt phase or the sentencing phase of a capital case where the defendant was denied a
psychiatrist).
In Tuggle v. Netherland, 516 U.S. 10 (1995), the Supreme Court did not decide this
issue, but remanded the case for a determination of "whether harmless-error analysis is
applicable to this case." Id. at 14. On remand, the Fourth Circuit ruled that an Ake error is
indeed subject to harmless error analysis. See Tuggle v. Netherland, 79 F.3d 1386, 1392
(4th Cir. 1996).
499
See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
500
The "fair trial" prong seems to function much like the "materiality" requirement in
Brady or the "prejudice" requirement in the ineffective assistance of counsel cases. See 5
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 319, § 27.6(d), at 947 ("An additional group of violations were
destined not be analyzed under the Chapman'sharmless error test because they were harmful by definition .... Examples include a finding that counsel's representation was ineffective . . . or that nondisclosed exculpatory evidence was material .... ").
501
See, e.g., Cade v. State, 658 So. 2d 550, 555 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (finding prejudicial error where the trial court refused to provide expert assistance for the defendant,
because the defendant's request was timely and specific: he identified the expert he was
seeking, the tasks the expert was going to perform, and the experts hourly rate was provided); Finn v. State, 558 S.E.2d 717, 720 (Ga. 2002) ("[T]he defendant's right was contingent on 'a motion timely made.' . . . The record shows that Finn had ample time within
which to investigate the possibilities of DNA testing and that he failed to act diligently until
after his procedurally deficient motion was denied.").
502
See, e.g., Ex parte Moody, 684 So. 2d 114, 119 (Ala. 1996) ("To meet this standard,
the indigent defendant must show, with reasonable specificity, that the expert is absolutely
necessary to answer a substantial issue or question raised by the state or to support a critical
element of the defense.").
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request needs to be is open to debate. 50 3 As one court stated: "Defense counsel should not have to attempt to train himself in the technical subject before being allowed the assistance of an expert;
nevertheless, just by virtue of the lawyer's role, some level of understanding is expected."' 50 4 The court went on to observe:
Counsel should be able to articulate a basis for requiring an expert
beyond telling the judge that the subject is "complicated." This
would seem to be especially true of forensic sciences commonly involved in criminal cases, such as fingerprinting, ballistics, handwriting and DNA identification. Counsel should be expected at least to
know what is in the legal literature and in case law about the
topic.

50 5

The Illinois Supreme Court has held that the defendant is not
required to identify a specific expert or estimate that expert's fees,
finding that it would be a constitutional violation when the expert was
"necessary to proving a crucial issue in the case." 50 6 Because finding
qualified defense experts is often difficult, 50 7 unrealistic specificity
should not be demanded.

503
According to two commentators, a motion for the appointment of an expert
should include:
(1) The type of expert necessary; (2) The assistance the expert will provide
to the defense; (3) The name, qualifications, fees, etc. of the desired expert; (4) The reasonableness of the expert's fees and other costs; (5) The
objective bases for the request (specific factual reasons for why an expert is
necessary); (6) The subjective bases for the request (personal observations
of your client such as possible emotional problems or drug addiction, etc.
about which you wish to have an expert testify); (7) The legal necessity for
the expert's testimony, i.e., what element will it attack; (8) The legal entitlement to an independent expert; and, (9) The inadequacy of available government experts.
Nancy Hollander & Lauren M. Baldwin, Expert Testimony in Criminal Trials: Creative Uses,

Creative Attacks, CHAMPION, Dec. 1991, at 6, 12.
Cade, 658 So. 2d at 555.
Id. at 555. See, also, the Georgia Supreme Court's instructions that:
[A]n indigent defendant must disclose "with a reasonable degree of precision" (1) the reason the evidence to be examined is critical; (2) the type of
scientific testimony needed; (3) what the expert proposes to do with the
evidence; and (4) the projected cost of retaining the expert. Without detailed information, neither the trial court, nor an appellate court, can determine whether the funds are necessary to protect the defendant's due
process rights.
Finn, 558 S.E.2d at 720.
People v. Lawson, 644 N.E.2d 1172, 1191 (Ill. 1994).
506
Judge Weinstein has observed: "Courts, as gatekeepers, must be aware of how diffi507
cult it can be for some parties-particularly indigent criminal defendants-to obtain an
expert to testify. The fact that one side may lack adequate resources with which to fully
develop its case is a constant problem." Jack B. Weinstein, Science, and the Challenges of
Expert Testimony in the Courtroom, 77 OR. L. REv. 1005, 1008 (1998).
504
505
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Preliminary Assessment

Some courts have denied Ake requests because they were either
exploratory50 8 or speculative. 50 9 A valid exploratory request should be
distinguished from one that is merely a shot in the dark. There are
times when an Ake request, of necessity, must be exploratory-an attorney may need an expert to determine if there is a meritorious scientific evidence issue in the case. For example, faced with blood
spatter evidence for the first time, a lawyer may not be able to assess
whether there is a basis for challenging such evidence. Thus, despite
the exploratory nature of the request, an expert should be
5 10
provided.
Similarly, in Harrison v. State,51 a bite-mark case in which the accused received the death penalty for the murder of a seven-year-old
girl, the prosecution expert testified that the defendant had bitten the
victim more than forty times, but the trial court nevertheless rejected
a defense request for an expert. 51 2 To demonstrate a "particularized
need" for a defense expert, the trial judge required that the expert
first review the evidence and write an affidavit.5 13 This puts the defense in a difficult position, because without compensation most experts will not review evidence or prepare an affidavit. 5 14 In Harrison,
by the time of the appeal, an expert had been found; not only did he
dispute the "match," he concluded that the "marks were not from
515
bites.
A limited Ake right should be recognized for a preliminary analysis if a good faith showing is made. 5 16 Here, a two-step process should
508
SeeJames v. State, 613 N.E.2d 15, 21 (Ind. 1993) (listing as one factor for a trial
court to consider in determining whether a defendant is entitled to funds for an expert is
"whether the purpose of the expert is exploratory only").
509
See, e.g., Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 227 (5th Cir. 1993) (denying habeas relief
because the defendant's request for a ballistics expert was based on his first counsel's speculation that "'more than one bullet may have penetrated more than one person."').
510
See James, 613 N.E.2d at 21 ("Knowledge concerning cross-examination of blood
spatter experts is not the kind of experience that defense counsel would normally be expected to possess."). But see Stewart v. Commonwealth, 427 S.E.2d 394, 405 (Va. 1993)
("Stewart cites no cases that indicate ... assistance [from a blood spatter expert] is required in order to provide the constitutionally required 'basic tools of an adequate
defense."').
511
635 So. 2d 894 (Miss. 1994).
512
See id. at 895-97.
513
See Debra Cassens Moss, Death, Habeas and Good Lawers: BalancingFairnessand Finality, 78 A.B.A. J., Dec. 1992, at 83, 85.
514
See id.
515
See id.
516
One pre-Ake court commented:
In the nature of things it may be difficult, in advance of trial, for counsel
representing an indigent defendant to demonstrate an undoubted need for
such funds. However, he can at least advise the court as to the general lines
of inquiry he wishes to pursue, being as specific as possible.
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be adopted. Enough money for an initial assessment should be authorized, with the understanding that further funds may be forthcoming based on the expert's affidavit that a significant issue is
51 7
involved.
3.

Expert as Advisor v. Trial Witness

In some situations an expert is needed as an advisor both pretrial
and during trial for the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses.
The Court in Ake recognized this point when it wrote that the expert
would "conduct a professional examination on issues relevant to the
... defense, to help determine whether the insanity defense is viable,
to present testimony, and to assist in preparingthe cross-examination of a

State's psychiatric witnesses." 5 18 Thus, courts recognize that Ake encompasses more than a testifying defense expert; it requires a consulting
5 19
expert.
Federal Rule of Evidence 615, which governs the sequestration of
witnesses, recognizes the need for consulting experts in this circumstance-the rule recognizes an exception for witnesses "whose presence is shown .

.

. to be essential to the presentation of the party's

cause." 520 This category "contemplates such persons as an agent who
handled the transaction being litigated or an expert needed to advise

52
counsel in the management of the litigation." '

Puett v. Superior Court, 158 Cal. Rptr. 266, 267 (Ct. App. 1979).
517
That said, in order to allow the defendant to fully benefit even from the preliminary assessment, there should not be disclosure requirements imposed after the defendant's initial meetings with the court-appointed psychiatrist. Following this logic, the
Georgia Supreme Court has ruled that an indigent defendant's refusal to submit to a psychiatric examination is not a valid reason to reject a request for the appointment of a
defense witness: "[A] defendant who obtains expert assistance under Ake need not submit
to an examination of a state expert until he has had an opportunity to decide whether to
present expert assistance at trial." Bright v. State, 455 S.E.2d 37, 48 (Ga. 1995).
518
Ake v. Oklahoma, 407 U.S. 68, 82 (1985).
519
See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 939 S.W.2d 148, 153 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) ("[D]ue process, at a minimum, requires expert aid in an evaluation of a defendant's case in an effort
to present it in the best possible light to the jury.").
520
FED. R. EVID. 615.
521
FED. R. EVID. 615 advisory committee's note; see, e.g., Malek v. Fed. Ins. Co., 994
F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that the district court erred in sequestering the plaintiff's expert where the defense expert's testimony differed from his reports, and those differences included important conclusions bearing on the question of arson, making the
presence of the plaintiffs expert during this testimony necessary to the presentation of the
plaintiffs case); see also 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 50, at 190 Uohn William Strong ed.,
4th ed. 1992) ("An example of a witness whose presence may be essential is an expert
witness."); 6JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1841, at 475-76 n.4 (1976) (referencing a
variety of jurisdictions that had decided to omit prospective witnesses from sequestration
on the grounds their assistance in the management of the case would be indispensable).
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4. Novelty
There is a special need for outside experts when novel scientific
evidence is introduced. 5 22 Paradoxically, there is often a lack of defense experts in these cases precisely because the procedure is new.
With novel techniques, there is often a delay before independent experts appreciate how science is being used in the courtroom. 523 For
instance, "voiceprint" evidence 52 4 was introduced in the early 1970s,
but in 1979 a National Academy of Sciences report noted that a "striking fact about the trials involving voicegram evidence to date is the
very large proportion in which the only experts testifying were those
called by the state. '525 The report also concluded that the reported
estimates of error rates were generally an inadequate basis for forensic
applications 526 and not "valid over the range of conditions usually met
in practice." 52 7 Numerous cases, however, had admitted voiceprint evidence in the decade before the report was issued. 5 28
522
See Chao v. State, 780 A.2d 1060, 1067 (Del. 2001) ("[1]n an unusual case, an indigent defendant may be entitled to public funds to retain an expert on complex or novel
technical issues ....").
523
One of the justifications for the Frye rule, Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.
Cir. 1923), which requires that the scientific technique gain "general acceptance" in the
scientific community as a prerequisite to admissibility, focuses on this point: the Frye test
guarantees that "a minimal reserve of experts exists who can critically examine the validity
of a scientific determination in a particular case." United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741,
743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence:
Frye v. United States, A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1208-23 (1980) (looking at the parameters courts applying Frye's general acceptance standard have established).
524
Voice identification by spectrographic examination of speech samples was often
referred to as "voiceprint" evidence. See, e.g, United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1197
n.5 (2d Cir. 1978). It is a graphic display of sound that is dispersed "into an array of its
time, frequency, and intensity components." Id. at 1197.
525

NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF VOICE IDENTIFICATION

49 (1979) [hereinafter VOICE IDENTIFICATION]; see also People v. Chapter, 13 CRM. L. REP.
(BNA) 2479 (Cal. Super. 1973) ("In approximately eighty percent of the twenty-five
[voiceprint] cases in which such expert testimony/opinion was admitted there was no opposing expert testimony on the issue of reliability and general acceptability of the scientific
community ....").
526 VOICE IDENTIFICATION, supra note 525, at 60 ("Estimates of error rates now available
pertain to only a few of the many combinations of conditions encountered in real-life situations. These estimates do not constitute a generally adequate basis for ajudicial or legislative body to use in making judgments concerning the reliability and acceptability of auralvisual voice identification in forensic applications.").
527
Id. at 58 ("The presently available experimental evidence about error rates consists
of results from a relatively small number of separate, uncoordinated experiments."). The
Report also commented that "[a]ll the scientific results and forensic experiences to date,
taken together, do not constitute an adequate objective basis for determining the error
rates to be expected for voice identification testimony given in forensic cases generally."
Id. at 68-69.
528
See, e.g., Williams, 583 F.2d at 1200 (holding that, where the court used "all of the
safeguards to ensure reliability, and to prevent a misleading of the jury," the voiceprint
evidence was admissible); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 466-67 (4th Cir. 1975)
(finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting voiceprint evidence, as
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The early DNA cases repeated this pattern. There was no defense
expert in Andrews v. State,5 29 the first reported appellate case considering the admissibility of DNA evidence. 5 30 Nor was there a defense expert in Spencer v. Commonwealth,53 1 the first DNA execution case.5 3 2 At
trial, a prosecution expert "testified unequivocally that there was no
disagreement in the scientific community about the reliability of DNA
print testing" 53 3 and "the record [was] replete with uncontradicted
expert testimony that 'no dissent whatsoever [exists] in the scientific
community' concerning the reliability of the DNA printing technique." 534 Later events completely undermined these statements. It
took two National Academy of Science reports to sort out the disagree5 35
ments in DNA analysis.

that court "adequately guarded against dangers inherent in the use of newly developed
scientific tests"); United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 33 n.12 (6th Cir. 1975) (deciding
that a scientific process that was deemed "reliable" met the Frye test of "general acceptance"); United States v. Sample, 378 F. Supp. 44, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (admitting voiceprint
evidence in a probation revocation hearing, where the standard governing admissibility
was that "testimony by a witness as to matters which are beyond the ken of the layman will
be admissible if relevant and the witness is qualified to give an opinion."); Hodo v. Superior Court, 106 Cal. Rptr. 547, 547 (Ct. App. 1973) (relying on the four years of scientific
research in voiceprint identification to hold that it was scientifically reliable and generally
acceptable, and therefore admissible); Alea v. State, 265 So. 2d 96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972)
(looking at the law of Florida and that of other jurisdictions to hold that it was not reversible error to allow the expert to give testimony on voiceprint identification); Worley v.
State, 263 So. 2d 613, 614 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 1972) ("[V]oiceprints were properly admitted
to corroborate defendant's identification by other means."); State v. Williams, 388 A.2d
500, 503-04 (Me. 1978) (refusing to adopt a precondition of "general acceptance" for
admissibility on novel scientific principles, and looking only to the relevance and helpfulness to the factfinder in deciding that voiceprint evidence is admissible); Commonwealth v.
Lykus, 327 N.E.2d 671, 679 (Mass. 1975) (qualifying the admission of voiceprint by subjecting it "to the closest ofjudicial scrutiny, particularly in any case where there is an absence
of evidence of voiceprint identification other than that of the voiceprint."); State ex rel.
Trimble v. Hedman, 192 N.W.2d 432, 447-48 (Minn. 1971) (admitting voiceprints as corroborative evidence); People v. Rogers, 385 N.Y.S.2d 228, 234 (Sup. Ct. 1976) ("[I]t is
abundantly clear that voice spectrogram analysis is highly reliable when contrasted with
more analogous areas of forensic disciplines that are commonly admitted into evidence.");
State v. Olderman, 336 N.E.2d 442 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975) ("[V]oice exemplars are, when
properly qualified, admissible.").
529 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
530 See id. at 843 ("We have found no other appellate decision addressing the admissibility of DNA identification evidence in criminal cases.").
531
384 S.E.2d 785 (Va. 1989).
532
See Murderer Put to Death in Virginia: First U.S. Execution Based on DNA Tests, N.Y.
TisEs, Apr. 28, 1994, at A19 (reporting on Mr. Spencer's execution after he was convicted
of raping and strangling four women, none of whom survived to identify him).
533 Spencer, 384 S.E.2d at 792.
534
Id.at 797 (second alteration in original).
535
See supra note 48; see also Paul C. Giannelli, The DNA Story: An Alternative View, 88J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 380, 395-400 (1997) (detailing the misconceptions about DNA
evidence).
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Testimony by ProsecutionExperts

The prosecution's use of expert testimony is, of course, a relevant
factor in determining whether to appoint a defense expert, for, as Justice Cardozo noted, "a defendant may be at an unfair disadvantage, if
he is unable because of poverty to parry by his own witnesses the
thrusts of those against him." 536 Several cases illustrate this point.

In Washington v. State,5 37 a capital case, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals ruled that a defendant was not entitled to the appointment of a defense expert, even though a prosecution expert had
testified that the defendant had made the bite mark found on the
murder victim. 538

Moreover, the prosecution expert conceded that

he had used a novel method of comparison that no one else had ever
used, and he also testified that only "one in a billion people" had a
particular characteristic shared by the defendant. 5 39 The basis for this
astounding statistic was not revealed and was obviously something a
defense expert should have carefully scrutinized.
In Sommers v. Commonwealth,540 the Kentucky Supreme Court
ruled that the trial court erred by failing to appoint a defense pathologist and arson expert, while the prosecution called six experts. 5 4 1 The
court cited a number of factors to support its holding, including the
defense's indication that the state's witnesses had demonstrated an
unwillingness to cooperate with the defense.5 42
The presence of a prosecution expert, however, should not automatically require the appointment of a defense expert. For example,
in virtually every homicide case a forensic pathologist or other expert
will testify on the cause of death. If the accused asserts an alibi defense, the cause of death may not be disputed and thus a defense
pathologist would not be needed.
6.

Absence of ProsecutionExperts

In one case, the Eighth Circuit indicated that the absence of a
prosecution expert is a relevant factor in deciding the appointment
issue, and it may have been in that case. 54 3 The absence of a prosecuReilly v. Berry, 166 N.E. 165, 167 (N.Y. 1929).
836 P.2d 673 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992).
See id. at 676-77.
539
Id. at 678 (Parks, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
540
843 S.W.2d 879, 883-85 (Ky. 1992).
541
See id. at 884-85.
542
See id. at 884.
543
See Mendoza v. Leapley, 5 F.3d 341, 342 (8th Cir. 1993) ("The State did not present
psychological evidence, so Mendoza did not need an expert in order to respond to damaging evidence of the same type."); see also Mason v. Mitchell, 95 F. Supp. 2d 744, 775 (N.D.
Ohio 2000) (finding no error in the trial court's denial of a soils expert where
"[p]etitioner does not dispute that the state never argued that soil from the crime scene
536
537
538
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tion expert, however, does not necessarily indicate that there is no
need for a defense expert. The most obvious examples involve affirmative defenses, such as insanity (as in Ake),544 battered woman syndrome in self-defense, 545 and psychological experts in entrapment
cases.

54 6

Cases in which a prosecution witness has been hypnotized pretrial
are another example. 54 7 In these circumstances, a defense expert may
be needed to explain how hypnosis affects lay witness testimony. 548
The same is true with repressed memories. 549 The Eighth Circuit explained it this way:
was found on Petitioner's person, clothing, or shoes after the murder, and that Petitioner
repeatedly made that point during the trial").
544
See Schultz v. Page, 313 F.3d 1010, 1016 (7th Cir. 2002):
[T]he State's decision to order a psychiatric examination of a defendant
[raising an insanity defense] has little to do with an indigent defendant's
right under Ake to have a mental health expert assist in the preparation of
his defense. . . . The absence of such an examination by the State, however, cannot be used by a court to determine that an indigent defendant is
not entitled to an examination when the defendant initiates the request for
one.
545
See Dunn v. Roberts, 963 F.2d 308, 313 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that, where the
trial judge was on notice that "evidence of battered woman syndrome would likely have
bearing on whether Petitioner had the state of mind necessary to commit the crime," his
refusal of Petitioner's request for expert assitance would deny her "an adequate opportunity to prepare and present her defense"); Doe v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 888,
892 (Ct. App. 1995):
The problem in this case is that the record is insufficient to determine
whether Jane has access to a "competent" psychiatrist or psychologist. ....
[T]his is not a run-of-the-mill case and the request is for someone with experience in [battered woman syndrome and post-traumatic stress syndrome]. . . . [I]f none of the panel members has the required expertise,
Jane is entitled to the appointment of someone who does ....
546
See, e.g.,
United States v. Nunn, 940 F.2d 1148, 1149 (8th Cir. 1991) ("Expert testimony of a psychiatrist or psychologist is admissible to prove a defendant's unusual susceptibility to inducement."); United States v. Newman, 849 F.2d 156, 165 (5th Cir. 1988)
(holding that, when an entrapment defense is raised, a defense expert may testify to any
mental disease or defect that shows the defendant is particularly susceptible to inducement
or persuasion); United States v. Hill, 655 F.2d 512, 516 (3d Cir. 1981) ("Testimony by an
expert concerning a defendant's susceptibility to influence may be relevant to an entrapment defense."); United States v. Benveniste, 564 F.2d 335, 339 (9th Cir. 1977) (recognizing the authority for the proposition that expert testimony on the issue of predisposition as
it relates to an entrapment defense should be admissible, but reviewing the trial court's
refusal to allow that testimony under an abuse of discretion standard and finding no such
abuse). See generally State v. Shuck, 953 S.W.2d 662 (Tenn. 1997) (holding that a neuropsychologist's testimony concerning a defendant's acute susceptibility to inducement in support of an entrapment defense was admissible).
547
See, e.g., Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1243-44 (8th Cir. 1987) (deciding
that, where the victim, after an alleged rape, was hypnotized by a police officer trying to get
an identification of her assailant, an expert in hypnosis should have been provided to the
defendant to "explain the limitations of hypnosis [and) theories of memory").
548
See supra note 96 (citing authorities).
549

See supra note 97 (citing authorities).
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We see no rational reason that a defendant be allowed an Ake expert
only if the prosecution is relying on an opposing expert. Often, one
party needs expert testimony to explain that conditions are other
than they superficially seem to be, while the opposing party is con550
tent with the lay person's unaided assessment of the situation.
7.

Centrality of Expert Issue

Courts often focus on whether the requested expert testimony
concerns an issue that is "crucial,"551 "critical," 55 2 "central,"5 53 or the
like. 55 4 For instance, the Illinois Supreme Court found a constitutional violation because a shoeprint and fingerprint expert was "necessary to proving a crucial issue in the case. ' 555 Perhaps the best
description of this factor is the "relative importance ' 556 of the issue
because the above terms set the bar too high. Ake itself used the
'55 7
phrase "likely to be a significant factor at trial.
8.

Complexity of Evidence

The complexity of a scientific technique often supports the appointment of a defense expert. In a leading neutron activation analy550
Starr v. Lockhart, 23 F.3d 1280, 1290 n.8 (8th Cir. 1994); see also Castro v.
Oklahoma, 71 F.3d 1502,1514 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding that the Akedutywas triggered "by
the State's presentation of any evidence of Mr. Castro's future dangerousness or continuing threat to society[,]" regardless of whether the State presented psychiatric testimony
during the sentencing phase).
551
See, e.g., Sommers v. Commonwealth, 843 S.W.2d 879, 884-85 (Ky. 1992) (holding
that the trial court's failure to appoint a defense pathologist and arson expert constituted
prejudicial error where the cause of death and the genesis of the fire were matters of
crucial dispute, "resolvable only through circumstantial evidence and expert opinion").
552
See, e.g., Scott v. Louisiana, 934 F.2d 631, 633 (5th Cir. 1991) (explaining that nonpsychiatric experts would be appointed only if the evidence is "both 'critical' to conviction
and subject to varying expert opinion"); Ex parte Dubose, 662 So. 2d 1189, 1194-95 (Ala.
1995) (holding that an Ake expert is required only when the evidence is "'critical',-the
only evidence linking the accused with the crime or proving an element of the corpus
delicti").
553
See, e.g., Cade v. State, 658 So. 2d 550, 554-55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (looking at
the centrality of DNA evidence to the state case in determining whether the trial court
abused its discretion in refusing to appoint an expert for the indigent defendant).
554
See, e.g., Ex parte Moody, 684 So. 2d 114, 119 (Ala. 1996) ("To meet this standard,
the indigent defendant must show, with reasonable specificity, that the expert is absolutely
necessary to answer a substantial issue or question raised by the state or to support a critical
element of the defense."); Scott v. State, 593 N.E.2d 198, 200 (Ind. 1992) (adding that the
trial court should consider whether the expert will help answer "a substantial question or
simply an ancillary one. For example, if the State's principal evidence linking the defendant to the crime is sufficiently technical that it is commonly the subject of expert testimony, the trial court should strongly consider providing an expert." (citations omitted)).
555
People v. Lawson, 644 N.E.2d 1172, 1191 (Ill. 1994).
556
See, e.g., Harrison v. State, 635 So. 2d 894, 901 (Miss. 1994) ("The relative importance of the testimony offered by the State's experts is one factor to consider in assessing
the fairness of the trial.").
557
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74 (1985).
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sis case, the Sixth Circuit noted: "[I]f the government sees fit to use
this time consuming, expensive means of fact-finding, it must both
allow time for a defendant to make similar tests, and in the instance of
an indigent defendant, a means to provide for payment for same. '558
DNA profiling also exemplifies this factor. In Dubose v. State,559
the court wrote: "Given the complexity of DNA technology, it is doubtful that a defense attorney will have the requisite knowledge to effectively examine [such evidence] without expert assistance. '560 Another
court identified the "highly technical" nature of DNA evidence as a
factor in the appointment decision. 5 61 Other courts 562 and commentators, 5 63 as well as the 1992 National Academy of Sciences report, recognize the need for defense experts in this context. The Report
states: "Defense counsel must have access to adequate expert assistance, even when the admissibility of the results of analytical techniques is not in question, because there is still a need to review the
quality of the laboratory work and the interpretation of the results." 564
This view is not universally accepted, however. The Michigan
Court of Appeals has observed that "only two courts have held that
whenever the prosecution intends to introduce DNA evidence against
a defendant at trial, the defendant has a due process right to an appointment of a DNA expert to assist in his defense." 565 This position
is problematic even as the admissibility of DNA analysis becomes more
558
United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 441 (6th Cir. 1970); see also Chao v. State, 780
A.2d 1060, 1067 (Del. 2001) ("[1n an unusual case, an indigent defendant may be entitled to public funds to retain an expert on complex or novel technical issues .
.
559
662 So. 2d 1189 (Ala. 1995).
560
Id. at 1196; see also Rey v. State, 897 S.W.2d 333, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (holding that, once the defense had established that the cause of death would be a significant
factor at trial, the defense was entitled to the assistance of a pathologist, who would not
only testify on the defendant's behalf, but would also provide technical assistance, evaluate
the strength of the defense, and identify weaknesses in the State's case by preparing counsel to cross-examine the opposing experts).
561
See Cade v. State, 658 So. 2d 550, 554 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
562
See, e.g., Polk v. State, 612 So. 2d 381, 393-94 (Miss. 1992) (including in the appendix guidelines for future DNA cases, such as the "imperative that no defendant have
[DNA] evidence admitted against him without the benefit of an independent expert witness to evaluate the data on his behalf').
563
See supra note 27 (listing authorities).
564
DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 48, at 147. The Report also states: "Because of the
potential power of DNA evidence, authorities must make funds available to pay for expert
witnesses[." Id. at 149.
565
People v. Leonard, 569 N.W.2d 663, 669 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997); accord State v.
Huchting, 927 S.W.2d 411, 420 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (disagreeing with the argument that
the average attorney is unable to defend against DNA evidence, because "[e]ven a cursory
perusal of the literature in this area reveals copious lists of questions for defense attorneys
to use in cross-examinations and other strategies for undermining the weight of DNA evidence"); Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920, 925 (Va. 1996) (recognizing that Ake
guarantees the "'basic tools of an adequate defense[,]' [which] may include the appointment of non-psychiatric experts[,]" but requiring the defendant to show that the assistance
of the expert is "likely to be a significant factor in his defense" and that he will be
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common. 566 The importance of defense DNA experts is illustrated by
the O.J. Simpson trial, where a prosecution expert, a leading population geneticist, made a simple computation mistake that was revealed
during cross-examination. 5 67 Moreover, there are still significant in568
terpretative issues in DNA profiling.
9.

Routine Tests

The recognition of complexity as an appropriate Ake factor does
not mean that defense experts are not needed when the prosecution
offers the results of routine tests. As illustrated by several fingerprint
cases, even the most basic techniques are subject to error. For example, in Imbler v. Craven,569 the expert failed to observe an exculpatory
fingerprint in a murder case in which the death penalty was imposed. 5 70 In another murder case, State v. Caldwell,5 71 the court wrote:
"The fingerprint expert's testimony was damning-and it was
572

false."

Several firearms identification cases are also instructive. In 1989,
the L.A. Police arrested Rickey Ross for the murder of three prostitutes.5 73 A detective who worked as an examiner in the Department's
firearms laboratory made a positive match between the bullets that
had killed the prostitutes and a bullet fired from Ross's 9-millimeter
prejudiced by the lack of that assistance before the Commonwealth appoints the expert
(citations omitted)).
The novelty of DNA evidence is a distinct factor and was discussed earlier. See supra
566
notes 522-35 and accompanying text; see also Prater v. State, 820 S.W.2d 429, 439 (Ark.
1991) (holding that the trial court may not refuse to appoint a defense expert, even "because of a shortage of county funds," for the accused's expert must have the chance "to
examine the evidence, procedures, and protocol" ).
See David H. Kaye, Cross-ExaminingScience, JURIMETRICS, Winter 1996, at vii.
567
568 As several commentators have noted:
The complexity of short tandem repeat (STR) samples makes it difficult if
not impossible for a lawyer to evaluate the evidence without expert assistance. Defense lawyers generally need expert assistance to look behind the
laboratory report and evaluate whether its conclusions are fully supported
by the underlying data. Defense lawyers may also need expert assistance to
develop and assess alternative theories of the evidence. Experts can also be
helpful, and often are necessary, to assess whether laboratory error or inadvertent transfer of DNA might plausibly account for the incriminating
results.
William C. Thompson et al., EvaluatingForensic DNA Evidence: EssentialElements of a Competent Defense Review (Part 2), CHAMPION, May 2003, at 24, 26.
569
298 F. Supp. 795 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
570
See id. at 810.
322 N.W.2d 574 (Minn. 1982).
571
Id. at 586. See generallyJames E. Starrs, A Miscue in FingerprintIdentification: Causes
572
and Concerns, 12J. POLICE ScI. & ADMIN. 287 (1984) (discussing the "fingerprint fiasco" that
affected the Caldwell trial due to error committed by both the prosecution and defense
experts, which ultimately led to the revocation of their certification).
573
See Bob Baker & Paul Lieberman, Faulty Ballistics in Deputy's Arrest: Eagernessto 'Make'
Gun Cited in LAPD Lab Error, L.A. TIMES, May 22, 1989, at 1.
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Smith & Wesson. 574 Based on the same evidence, however, a defense
expert reached the opposite conclusion-Ross's gun could not have
fired the fatal bullets. 5 75 Two independent experts came to yet another conclusion: there was insufficient evidence to draw any conclusions. 576 The case against Ross was dropped. 577 In In re Kirschke,578 a
prosecution expert testified that an evidence bullet had been fired by
a particular firearm and that "no other in the world was the murder
weapon. ' 579 However, in post-conviction proceedings court-appointed experts testified that a positive identification could not be
made. 58 0 Although the court found that the expert had "negligently
presented false demonstrative evidence in support of his ballistics testimony,"58' it denied post-conviction relief because the defendant had
failed to challenge the testimony at trial, even though he had the opportunity to do so.
Further, post-Daubert cases have unmasked the lack of empirical
support for many common techniques. A recent editorial in the prestigious scientific journal, Science, is entitled: "Forensic Science: Oxymoron?" 5 2 This sentiment has been echoed by commentators for the
58 3
National Academy of Sciences.
574

See id.
See id. at 18.
576
See id. ("'[T]he points of identity [between the murder bullets and the test bullets]
that were noted by the LAPD were attributable to chance or random correspondence.'").
577
See id. This was not the first time that the Los Angeles crime laboratory had stumbled. A prior misidentification occurred in the investigation of Sirhan Sirhan for the assassination of Bobby Kennedy:
In People v. Sirhan seven independent examiners were appointed by the presidingjudge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to reexamine the
purported firearms bullet comparison post trial. The examiners were
unanimous in their findings that the identification testified to at the grand
jury indictment and in the trial were misrepresented in that the purported
identification of bullets lodged in victim Kennedy . . . with Sirhan's gun
were non-existent. In both of these cases discovery and cross examination
were lacking.
Lowell Bradford, Forensic Firearms Identification: Competence or Incompetence, FORUM, (July/
Aug. 1978), at 14.
578
125 Cal. Rptr. 680 (Ct. App. 1975).
579
Id. at 683.
580
See id. at 684.
581
Id. at 682.
582
Donald Kennedy, Editorial, Forensic Science: Oxymoron?, 302 Sci. 1625 (2003) (discussing the cancellation of a National Academy of Sciences project designed to examine
various forensic science techniques because the Departments of Justice and Defense insisted on a right of review that the Academy had refused to other grant sponsors).
583
See, e.g., Donald Kennedy & Richard A. Merrill, Assessing ForensicScience, IssuEs IN
Sci. & TECH., Fall 2003, at 33, 34:
The increased use of DNA analysis, which has undergone extensive validation, has thrown into relief the less firmly credentialed status of other forensic science identification techniques (fingerprints, fiber analysis, hair
analysis, ballistics, bite marks, and tool marks). These have not undergone
the type of extensive testing and verification that is the hallmark of science
575
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Courts, however, have often been obtuse to these issues, 58 4 as illustrated by several judicial notice cases. Under current practice,judicial notice is limited to indisputable facts, 58 5 such as the law of
thermodynamics. 58 6 Nevertheless, courts have taken judicial notice of
the reliability of hair comparisons 58 7 even though this evidence lacks
empirical support.58 8 Similarly, the validity of bite-mark evidence has
been judicially noticed, 58 9 but despite this acceptance, "the fundamental scientific basis for bitemark analysis has never been
590
established."
10.

Differing Opinions & Subjectivity

Several courts emphasize that appointment of defense experts is
more appropriate when the subject area tends to involve differing
elsewhere. These techniques rely on the skill of the examiner, but since the
practitioners have not been subjected to rigorous proficiency testing reliable error rates are not known.
584 The paraffin test for gunshot residues is an example. The test is supposed to detect
nitrite and nitrate deposits on the hand of a person who has fired a gun, but the problem
with the test is its nonspecificity-"a significant number of substances other than gunpowder residues contain nitrates and therefore also produce positive results." See Giannelli,
supra note 523, at 1227.
585 See FED. R. EVID. 201(b) ("A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute .... ").
586 See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 n.l1 (1993)
("[T]heories that are so firmly established as to have attained the status of scientific law,
such as the laws of thermodynamics, properly are subject to judicial notice under Federal
Rule of Evidence 201.").
587 See, e.g., Johnson v. Commonwealth, 12 S.W.3d 258, 263 (Ky. 2000) ("Based upon
the overwhelming acceptance of this evidence by other jurisdictions, as well as our own
history of routine admission of this evidence at trial, trial courts in Kentucky can take
judicial notice that this particular method or technique is deemed scientifically reliable.").
588 See Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1558 (E.D. Okl. 1995) ("This court
has been unsuccessful in its attempts to locate any indication that expert hair comparison
testimony meets any of the requirements of Daubert."); Clive A. Stafford Smith & Patrick D.
Goodman, Forensic Hair Comparison Analysis: Nineteenth Century Science or Twentieth Century
Snake Oil?, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 227, 231 (1996) ("If the purveyors of this dubious
science cannot do a better job of validating hair analysis than they have done so far, forensic hair comparison analysis should be excluded altogether from criminal trials."). See generally Paul C. Giannelli & Emmie West, Forensic Science: Hair ComparisonEvidence, 37 CRIM. L.
BULL. 514 (2001) (discussing DNA cases in which hair evidence was used to convict the
innocent).
589 See, e.g., State v. Richards, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) ("[B]ite mark
evidence is admissible without a preliminary determination of reliability ....
); People v.
Middleton, 429 N.E.2d 100, 101 (N.Y. 1981) ("The reliability of bite mark evidence as a
means of identification is sufficiently established in the scientific community to make such
evidence admissible in a criminal case, without separately establishing scientific reliability
in each case."); State v. Armstrong, 369 S.E.2d 870, 877 (W. Va. 1988) (authorizing courts
to take judicial notice of the "general reliability of bite-mark evidence as a means of positive identification").
590 I.A. Pretty & D. Sweet, The Scientific Basis for Human Bitemark Analyses-A Critical
Review, 41 SCi. &JUST. 85, 86 (2001).
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opinions, 59' something also noted in Ake. 592 For example, in a DNA
case, the Indiana Supreme Court upheld a trial judge's denial of
funds for a DNA expert, writing: "Psychiatry is an extremely uncertain
field dealing with the mysteries of the human mind where expert
opinions can be expected to and do differ widely. In contrast, the
neutral [DNA] experts here were testifying to the results of a test 'in593
volving precise, physical measurements and chemical testing."'
One aspect of this argument is problematic. 59 4 Courts often do
not appreciate the amount of subjectivity associated with scientific evidence. Firearms identification is an example. Even though based on
objective data (striation marks on a bullet), the conclusion about a
match comes down to the examiner's subjective judgment. 59 5 Ques-

591
See, e.g., Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 227 (5th Cir. 1993) (upholding the trial
court's denial of funding for forensic and ballistic experts where there was no suggestion
that the autopsy reports were "inaccurate or in any manner subject to disagreement between experts"); Scott v. Louisiana, 934 F.2d 631, 633 (5th Cir. 1991) (concluding that the
trial court did not err in denying a defense motion for a ballistics expert where the defendant failed to show that "the ballistic evidence would have been open to varying expert
interpretation");James v. State, 613 N.E.2d 15, 21 (Ind. 1993) (citing as one of the factors
a court should consider in deciding whether a defendant is entitled to an expert "whether
the nature of the expert testimony involves precise physical measurements and chemical
testing, the results of which were not subject to dispute").
592
See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985) ("Psychiatry is not, however, an exact
science, and psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes mental illness,
on the appropriate diagnosis to be attached to given behavior and symptoms, on cure and
treatment, and on likelihood of future dangerousness.").
593
Harrison v. State, 644 N.E.2d 1243, 1253 (Ind. 1995) (quotingJames, 613 N.E.2d at
21).
594
In fact, the Alabama Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion from the
Harrison court in a case concerning DNA. See Ex parte Dubose, 662 So. 2d 1189, 1194-99
(Ala. 1995). The court recognized that one factor in determining whether the defendant
is entitled to an expert to independently examine physical evidence is whether that evidence "is subject to varying expert opinions," id. at 1194, and then observed that, "[g]iven
the complexity of DNA technology, it is doubtful that a defense attorney will have the
requisite knowledge to effectively [examine such evidence] without expert assistance[,]"
id. at 1196.
595
SeeJOSEPH L. PETERSON ET AL., CRIME LABORATORY PROFICIENCY TESTING RESEARCH
PROGRAM 207 (1978) ("Ultimately, unless other issues are involved, it remains for the examiner to determine for himself the modicum of proof necessary to arrive at a definitive
opinion.").

1396

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:1305

tioned documents, 59 6 bite marks, 597 and even fingerprints 59 8 fall into

the same category.
Subjectivity may be a problem even when instrumentation is employed. Several commentators have noted that "[a]lthough current
DNA tests rely heavily on computer-automated equipment, the interpretation of the results often requires subjective judgment. When
faced with an ambiguous situation, where the call could go either way,
crime lab analysts frequently slant their interpretations in ways that
support prosecution theories." 59 9 Mixture samples, degradation, allelic dropout, spurious peaks, and false peaks must be evaluated in interpreting some DNA electropherograms. 60 0 A British study (albeit
small) found that "38 per cent of defence lawyers who had obtained
an independent analysis" of DNA evidence received reports that "differed from those of the prosecutions' expert." 60 In addition, the
presentation of DNA evidence raises other issues, such as whether juries should be informed of the probability of false positives in addition
to the conventional approach of giving only the coincidental (ran60 2
dom) match probability.
596
See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 220 F. Supp. 2d 548, 554 (S.D. W. Va. 2002) (noting
that the handwriting expert was unable to offer any "explanation of the standards used in
handwriting analysis[,]" and that the only reason why he used twenty-five samples to compare the handwriting was because that was the number typically used); United States v.
Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1104 (D. Alaska 2001) ("The technique of comparing known
writings with questioned documents appears to be entirely subjective and entirely lacking
in controlling standards.").
597
See 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARDJ. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 13-4, at
588 (3d ed. 1999 & Supp. 2003) ("Although the expert's conclusions are based on objective data, the opinion is essentially a subjective one. There is no accepted minimum number of points of identity required for a positive identification." (citations omitted)).
598
See, e.g., United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 276 (4th Cir. 2003) (Michael, J., dissenting) ("In short, the government did not establish that there are objective standards in
the fingerprint examination field to guide examiners in making their comparisons.");
United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 555 (E.D. Pa. 2002) ("'While there may be
good reason for not relying on a minimum point standard-or for requiring a minimum
number, as some state and foreign jurisdictions do-it is evident that there is no one standard 'controlling the technique's operation."' (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993))).
599
William C. Thompson et al., EvaluatingForensic DNA Evidence: EssentialElements of a
Competent Defense Review, CHAMPION, May 2003, at 16, 18. This was also true of earlier DNA
techniques, such as RFLP. See William C. Thompson & Simon Ford, DNA 7yping: Acceptance
and Weight of the New Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REV. 45, 81-89 (1989) ("There are
currently no formal standards for determining what constitutes a match between two DNA
prints. Whether a match is declared between two prints is a subjective judgment for the
forensic expert.").
600
See Thompson, Essential Elements, supra note 599, at 18-24.
601
STEVENTON, supra note 59, at 42.
602
See William C. Thompson et al., How the Probabilityof a False PositiveAffects the Value of
DNA Evidence, 48J. FORENSIC SCI. 47, 47 (2003) ("A false positive might occur due to error
in the collection or handling of samples, misinterpretation of test results, or incorrect reporting of test results.").
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A high degree of subjectivity does not render an analysis invalid,
but it does mean that there may be room for disagreement-the more
subjectivity, the more chance for error. Moreover, under current
practice, external information provided to lab analysts may taint their
conclusions. For example, "Peter DeForest has described investigators
who responded to inconclusive results by saying to forensic examiners:
'Would it help if I told you we know he's the guy who did it?"'603

11.

Admissibility of Expert Testimony

If the testimony is not admissible, there is often no need for a
defense expert, 60 4 especially where the evidence lacks scientific support. However, admissibility should not always be determinative. For
example, requests for defense polygraph experts are not uncommon. 60 5 The majority of courts60 6 still exclude polygraph results, al-

though a few post-Daubert cases may represent an evolving trend
toward admissibility. 60 7 The polygraph is nevertheless used extensively in criminal practice, albeit on the periphery of the trial. "Courts
have admitted polygraph evidence in . . . suppression hearings, senand prison
tencing hearings, motions for new trial proceedings ....
60
plea
courts
have
enforced
some
Moreover,
disciplinary hearings."

bargains based on polygraph evidence. 60 9 In this situation, it is the use
603
D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectations and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1, 39 (2002).
Sometimes the testimony is not admissible because it is not beyond the ken of the
604
jury. In Scott v. State, the Court wrote:
Asking whether a particular service is "necessary" to assure an adequate defense begs the question. In attempting to decide what is necessary, a trial
court should determine whether the proposed expert's services would bear
on an issue which is generally regarded to be within the common experience of the average person, or on one for which expert opinion would be
necessary. If the requested services could be performed by counsel, an expert need not be provided. An expert need not be appointed if it is improbable that the proposed expert could demonstrate that which the
defendant desires. The appointing of an expert is not necessary when the
purpose of the expert appears to be exploratory only.
593 N.E.2d 198, 200 (Ind. 1992) (citations omitted).
605
See supra note 173 (citing cases).
Further, many jurisdictions admit polygraph evidence upon stipulation. See 1 GiAN606
NELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 597, § 8-4(C) (discussing the rationale behind and the
conditions necessary for admission of polygraph evidence upon stipulation of the parties).
607
See Paul C. Giannelli, PolygraphEvidence: Post-Daubert, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 895, 896-98
(1998) (looking at the effect Dauberthas had on some federal courts in pushing them to at
least remove the per se barrier against the admissibility of polygraph evidence).
608
1 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 597, § 8-6.
609
In some cases prosecutors have gone beyond stipulating to the admissibility of test
results and have agreed to dismiss charges if the defendant passes a polygraph examination. See id. § 8-4(C) (discussing pretrial agreement cases); see also United States v. Santiago-Gonzalez, 66 F.3d 3, 6-7 n.1 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Swinehart, 614 F.2d
853 (3d Cir. 1980), for the proposition that the government can condition a plea agreement on the defendant passing a polygraph test).
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of polygraphs, not their admissibility, that should determine whether
appointment of an expert is appropriate.
12.

Cost

In Ex parteMoody, 6 10 the court cited the "anticipated costs of such
an expert" 61 ' as relevant. Although some cases mention

cost, 6 12

few

explicitly state that it is a germane factor. This may be because the Ake
Court summarily dismissed cost. 6 13 As a society, we often state that

cost should not be a factor in criminal cases, but this is obviously an
ideal. The cost can be quite high. For example, in United States v.
Yee, 6 14 a defense DNA expert received $28,000 in compensation. A
judge faced with an appointment request for an expert that involved
$500 as opposed to $20,000 will, in all probability, take this factor into
account. 61 5 If so, it is far better to acknowledge that cost is a factor
than it is to pretend that it is not.
13.

Summary

Determining when a defense expert should be appointed is the
most intractable issue left unresolved by Ake. Before the standard can
be defined, the myths about litigation-the effectiveness of cross-examination in this context, the neutrality of prosecution experts, and
their competence-must be understood. Moreover, the standard
should not require the accused to establish that the trial would be
unfair in addition to showing a reasonable probability that expert assistance is needed. Finally, although defining the standard is impor6 16
tant, the factors outlined above may be more so.

684 So. 2d 114 (Ala. 1996).
Id. at 122.
612
See, e.g., Wainwright v. Norris, 872 F. Supp. 574, 584-87 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (holding
that the trial court did not prejudice the defendant when it awarded $500 for an expert in
ballistics and gunshot residue, even though the defense requested another $1000); Dubose
v. State, 662 So. 2d 1156, 1170-72 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (referring to an affidavit submitted to the trial court that estimated expected fees for expert witnesses to range from
$10,000 to $30,000); Cade v. State, 658 So. 2d 550, 554 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (noting
that the expert's estimated fees were in the $3,000 range).
613
See supra text accompanying note 366 (discussing state's economic interest).
614
134 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. 1991).
615
Interview with James Wooley, former Assistant U.S. Attorney who tried the case
(Mar. 16, 2004). See also People v. Wilkerson, 463 N.E.2d 139, 144-45 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)
(denying the defendant's request for the court to order the surgical removal of bullet from
his buttocks because it was an elective surgery, and because it cost over $350 more than the
amount that could be paid for a "defendant's necessary expert witnesses"); State v.
Gonderman, 531 N.W.2d 11, 12 (N.D. 1995) (upholding the trial court's failure to appoint
a "nocturnal penile study" expert to establish the accused's impotence because that fact
was neither an element of the case nor a defense thereto).
616
In addition to the above factors, the Florida Court of Appeals noted that the cases
had suggested other factors: whether "the remaining evidence against the defendant was
... overwhelming ....
[whether the] scientific evidence... is impressive to ajury ....
[and
610
611
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VI
ROLE OF THE EXPERT

A.

Neutral or Partisan Expert

Ake failed to specify clearly the role of the expert. It is uncertain
from Ake whether the appointment of a neutral expert (who reports
to the court) is sufficient or whether a "partisan" defense expert is
required. 6 17 At one point in the opinion, the Court stated that the
defendant has the right to "one competent psychiatrist" when insanity
is raised 618 and later observed that this did not include the "right to
choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to receive funds to hire
his own." 6 19 Neither of these passages, however, is conclusive, and
other parts of the opinion point toward a partisan role. For example,
the Court also wrote that the accused is guaranteed "access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and
assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense."620 This
expert would "conduct a professional examination on issues relevant
to the defense, to help determine whether the insanity defense is viable, to present testimony, and to assist in preparingthe cross-examination
62 1
of a State's psychiatric witnesses."
The lower courts are split on this issue. The Fifth Circuit held
that "a court-appointed psychiatrist, whose opinion and testimony is
available to both sides, satisfies [the accused's] rights." 62 2 In contrast,
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that the appointment of a
"disinterested" expert does not satisfy the demands of Ake, arguing
62 3
that "the phrase 'court's expert' is an oxymoron in this context."
As the court explained:
In an adversarial system due process requires at least a reasonably
level playing field at trial. In the present context that means more
than just an examination by a "neutral" psychiatrist. It also means
the appointment of a psychiatrist to provide technical assistance to
the accused, to help evaluate the strength of his defense, to offer his
whether] the literature and case law suggest [that the methodology] can be vulnerable to
attack." Cade, 658 So. 2d at 554.
617 See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("I see no reason
why the defendant should be entitled to an opposing view, or to a 'defense' advocate.").
618
Id. at 79.
619
Id. at 83.
620
Id. at 92.
621 Id. at 82 (emphasis added).
622 Granviel v. Lynaugh, 881 F.2d 185, 191-92 (5th Cir. 1989) ("The state is not required to permit defendants to shop around for a favorable expert . . . [The defendant]
has no right to the appointment of a psychiatrist who will reach biased or only favorable
conclusions."); see also Commonwealth v. Reid, 642 A.2d 453, 457 (Pa. 1994) (holding that
the trial court satisfied Ake when it offered the defendant the "opportunity to be examined
by a neutral court-appointed psychiatrist").
623 De Freece v. State, 848 S.W.2d 150, 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
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own expert diagnosis at trial if it is favorable to that defense, and to
identify the weaknesses in the State's case, if any, by testifying himself and/or preparing counsel to cross-examine opposing experts.
We recognize that the accused is not entitled to a psychiatrist of his
choice, or even to one who believes the accused was insane at the
time of the offense. Ake makes this much clear. But even a psychiatrist who ultimately believes the accused was sane can prove invaluable by pointing out contrary indicators and exposing flaws in the
624
diagnoses of [the] State's witnesses.

624

Id. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has observed:

That duty [to appoint a psychiatrist] cannot be satisfied with the appointment of an expert who ultimately testifies contrary to the defense on the
issue of competence. The essential benefit of having an expert in the first
place is denied the defendant when the services of the doctor must be
shared with the prosecution. In this case, the benefit sought was not only
the testimony of a psychiatrist to present the defendant's side of the case,
but also the assistance of an expert to interpret the findings of an expert
witness and to aid in the preparation of his cross-examination. Without
that assistance, the defendant was deprived of the fair trial due process
demands.
United States v. Sloan, 776 F.2d 926, 929 (10th Cir. 1985); accord Dunn v. Roberts, 963 F.2d
308, 312 (10th Cir. 1992) ("[Dlenying access to the assistance of a psychiatric expert to
perform an examination relevant to defense issues and to assist in developing the defense
would be a deprivation of due process."); Liles v. Saffle, 945 F.2d 333, 340 (10th Cir. 1991)
(allowing the defendant to assert a due process challenge to the trial court's refusal to
appoint a psychiatrist, even though he did not raise an insanity defense, because the right
to psychiatric assistance includes the right to help in deciding not to raise mental impairment claims); United States v. Austin, 933 F.2d 833, 841 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Sloan).
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Other decisions, both federal 62 5 and state, 6 2 6 support this view. The
Supreme Court later declined to address the issue in one case, 6 2 7 but
in another wrote: "The Ake error prevented petitioner from developing his own psychiatric evidence to rebut the Commonwealth's evidence and to enhance his defense in mitigation. As a result, the
Commonwealth's psychiatric evidence went unchallenged, which may
628
have unfairly increased its persuasiveness in the eyes of the jury."
The different passages in Ake are reconcilable by analogy to the
right-to-counsel cases. An indigent defendant has the right to counsel, who is obviously partisan, but not the unqualified right to choose
who that counsel will be. 629 As the Alabama Supreme Court has rec625 See, e.g., Powell v. Collins, 332 F.3d 376, 391-92 (6th Cir. 2003) (joining with some
of its sister circuits to hold "that an indigent criminal defendant's constitutional right to
psychiatric assistance in preparing an insanity defense is not satisfied by court appointment
of a 'neutral' psychiatrist-i.e., one whose report is available to both the defense and the
prosecution"); Castro v. Oklahoma, 71 F.3d 1502, 1515 (10th Cir. 1995) ("Dr. Hamilton's
refusal to testify on Mr. Castro's behalf in and of itself makes his assistance inadequate. In
explicating the right to expert psychiatric assistance at sentencing, the Court in Akespecifically noted part of the expert's role included taking the stand."); Cowley v. Stricklin, 929
F.2d 640, 643 (1lth Cir. 1991) (instructing that the trial court should not have refused the
defendant's request for psychiatric assistance, simply because it had some evidence that the
defendant was sane at the time of the crime, because the defendant made the necessary
showing that "psychiatric expertise would aid his defense significantly"); Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1990) ("The right to psychiatric assistance does not
mean the right to place the report of a 'neutral' psychiatrist before the court; rather it
means the right to use the services of a psychiatrist in whatever capacity defense counsel
deems appropriate . . . ."); Buttrum v. Black, 721 F. Supp. 1268, 1312-13 (N.D. Ga. 1989)
("Ake contemplates a psychiatrist who will work closely with the defense by conducting an
independent examination, testifying if necessary, and preparing for the sentencing phase
of the trial.").
626 See, e.g., Binion v. Commonwealth, 891 S.W.2d 383, 386 (Ky. 1995) ("[Tlhere must
be an appointment of a psychiatrist to provide assistance to the accused to help evaluate
the strength of his defense, to offer his own expert diagnoses at trial, and to identify weaknesses in the prosecution's case."); Harrison v. State, 635 So. 2d 894, 902 (Miss. 1994)
("Due process and fundamental fairness required the lower court to allow the defense
access to an independent pathologist.... ."); Polk v. State, 612 So. 2d 381, 394 (Miss. 1992)
(holding that due process requires that a defendant "be allowed reasonable funds for access to an expert who can independently evaluate the evidence presented against him by
the State, analyze it, and present that analysis at trial").
627 See Vickers v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 1033, 1036 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Ake
requires the appointment of a psychiatrist who will assist in the preparation of the defense,
not one who will merely give an independent assessment to the judge or jury.").
628 Tuggle v. Netherland, 516 U.S. 10, 13 (1995).
629 See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624 (1989) ("A
defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to spend another person's money for services
rendered by an attorney even if those funds are the only way that that defendant will be
able to retain the attorney of his choice."); Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 162
(1988) ("[W]here a court justifiably finds an actual conflict of interest, there can be no
doubt that it may decline a proffer of waiver[, even from one of the defendants himself,]
and insist that defendants be separately represented."). See generally 2 LAFAvE ET AL., supra
note 319, at 549-50 ("The indigent has no right to counsel of his choice even though that
attorney is available and his appointment would not be more costly to the state than the
appointment of the attorney that the trial court would otherwise select.").
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ognized, "an indigent defendant is not entitled to legal counsel of his
choice, when counsel is to be paid by public funds, but rather is entitled to competent legal representation." 630 The court also held that
"an indigent defendant is not entitled to the expert of his particular
choice, but is entitled to a competent expert in the field of expertise
that has been found necessary to the defense.

'631

Here, as elsewhere

in this Part, the right-to-counsel rationale brings this issue into sharp
relief and makes it clear that a neutral expert is incompatible with the
Ake right.

B.

63 2

Ex parte Applications

A related procedural issue is whether the application for a defense expert must be ex parte. The answer turns on which view of the
expert's role is adopted. If the accused has a right to a partisan expert, then the proceedings seeking appointment should be ex parte, as
they are under the Criminal Justice Act. 633 The Ake decision does not

explicitly address this issue, although at one point the Court spoke in
passing of an "ex parte threshold showing. ' 63 4 After that reference, several lower courts have directly ruled that an accused has the right to
635
an ex parte hearing.

630

Ex pate Moody, 684 So. 2d 114, 121-22 (Ala. 1996).

631

Id. at

121.

632 If a neutral expert does not satisfy Ake, neither will a prosecution expert. See Starr
v. Lockhart, 23 F.3d 1280, 1289 (8th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he ability to subpoena a state examiner and to question that person on the stand does not amount to the expert assistance
required by Ake.").
633
See supra text accompanying notes 208-10.
634
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82 (1985).
635
See, e.g., Moody, 684 So. 2d at 120 ("[A]n indigent criminal defendant is entitled to
an ex parte hearing on whether expert assistance is necessary, based on the Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments .... ");Brooks v. State, 385 S.E.2d 81, 84 (Ga. 1989) ("[In
making the requisite showing defendant could be placed in a position of revealing his
theory of the case. He therefore has a legitimate interest in making the showing exparte.");
McGregor v. State, 733 P.2d 416, 416-17 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987) (ordering an evidentiary
hearing on whether defendant falls within Ake to be conducted ex pane because the presence or participation of the state would "thwart the Supreme Court's attempt to place
indigent defendants . . . on a level of equality with nonindigent defendants"); State v.
Barnett, 909 S.W.2d 423, 428 (Tenn. 1995) (reading Ake to require an ex pane hearing
because "[i]ndigent defendants who must seek state-funding to hire a psychiatric expert
should not be required to reveal their theory of defense when their more affluent counterparts . . .are not required to reveal their theory of defense, or the identity of experts");
Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 192-93 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (explaining that,
"[w]hile the Supreme Court's suggestion that the threshold showing should be made ex
parte is dicta, it is consistent with [Ake's] due process principles" because otherwise, the
defendant would either have to reveal his theories for his defense and other items of his
work product or forfeit the appointment of an expert).
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Other courts, however, have rejected the constitutional argument. 636 The Louisiana Supreme Court, for instance, has noted that

in criminal cases "ex parte treatment is not the rule, but rather the
exception, and that, in order to deviate from the general rule of open
and contradictory hearings, there must be a showing of good
cause. ''63 7 The court then concluded that "although the initial application for funding for expert services will be considered ex parte, unless
the defendant demonstrates some particularized prejudice to him by
state participation in the hearing, the hearing on the funding will be
conducted in a contradictory manner.

638

This argument is unpersuasive. While most court business should
be open, it is not rare to conduct either in camera hearings 639 or ex
parteproceedings. 640 More importantly, the court does not specify the
prosecutor's role in this context. On what basis could a prosecutor
oppose appointment? This is simply not an adversarial proceeding,
and a prosecutor's responsibility does not extend to protecting the
636
See, e.g., State v. Apelt, 861 P.2d 634, 650 (Ariz. 1993) ("[W]e do not believe that
the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of due process and equal protection encompass
such a right [to an ex parte hearing]."); Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 437 S.E.2d 566, 571
(Va. 1993) ("We perceive no reason to depart from our previous holding that there is no
constitutional right to [an ex parte] hearing."); State v. Floody, 481 N.W.2d 242, 254-56
(S.D. 1992) (explaining that, although distributing the reports of defense experts would
reveal the defendant's trial strategy, it would not violate his due process rights).
In a somewhat different approach, the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that
the constitutional requirement to hold an ex parte hearing depends on the type of expert
the defendant is seeking; specifically, the court has drawn the distinction between motions
for a fingerprint expert and a psychiatrist. See, e.g.,
State v. Phipps, 418 S.E.2d 178, 190
(N.C. 1992) (stating that, when the defendant requested an ex parte hearing for seeking
additional funds to hire a fingerprint expert, "the decision to grant an ex parte hearing is
within the trial court's discretion. Though such a hearing may in fact be the better practice, it is not always constitutionally required under Ake."). According to the court, the key
difference between a hearing on the question of an indigent defendant's right to a fingerprint expert and one on the question of his right to a psychiatric expert is that the object
of adversarial scrutiny is not mere physical evidence, but the defendant himself. The matter is not tactile and objective, but one of an intensely sensitive, personal nature. See State v.
Ballard, 428 S.E.2d 178, 180 (N.C. 1993). Thus, an open hearing involving an independent psychological evaluation "necessarily impinges upon the defendant's right to the assistance of counsel and his privilege against self-incrimination." Id.; accord State v. Bates, 428
S.E.2d 693, 695 (N.C. 1993) (holding that Ballard applies whether requested expert is a
psychiatrist or forensic psychologist).
637
State v. Touchet, 642 So. 2d 1213, 1220 (La. 1994) (emphasis added).
638
Id.
639
See, e.g.,
United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 568 (1989) (holding trial judge could
conduct an in camera review of allegedly privileged communications to determine whether
they fell within the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege); United States v.
Spires, 3 F.3d 1234, 1238 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Our precedents demonstrate that in [confidential informant] disclosure cases an in camera hearing is favored procedure. Other circuits
have also noted the advantages of that procedure." (citations omitted)).
640
See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 4 (giving the judge the authority to issue an arrest warrant
on the request of the prosecuting attorney); FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d)(2) (disallowing the
presence of defense attorneys while the grand jury is in session).
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public coffers. Further, the prosecutor's presence intrudes into de64 1
fense counsel's ability to develop a defense.

C.

Prosecution Use of Defense Experts

Another issue concerns the prosecution's use of a defense expert
at trial if the defense declines to call that expert as a witness. For the
most part, these cases developed independently of Ake but should be
informed by that decision. 642 Two different uses of experts must be
distinguished. First, an expert may be retained for the purpose of testifying at trial. In this situation, any privilege is waived. 643 Second, an
expert may be retained for consultation; that is, to provide the attorney with information needed to determine whether a scientific defense is feasible. If such an expert provides an adverse opinion, the
question arises whether the attorney-client privilege, the work product
privilege, or the right to counsel precludes the prosecution from call644
ing the defense-retained expert as a government witness.
641
See, e.g., United States v. Abreu, 202 F.3d 386, 388 (1st Cir. 2000) ("Because the
government was present [at a hearing to determine whether the defendant should be afforded an evaluation by a licensed psychologist before sentencing], defense counsel declined to place on the record certain confidential matters that formed part of the basis for
the application.").
642
There are some exceptions. See, e.g., Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153, 1159-60
(9th Cir. 1990) (citing attorney-client privilege in rejecting neutral expert approach); Van
White v. State, 990 P.2d 253, 270 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999) ("[T]he attorney-client privilege
is applicable where defense counsel is provided a court-appointed expert to aid in his
client's defense. This privilege is maintained whether or not the defense calls that expert
at trial."). But see State v. McDaniel, 485 N.W.2d 630, 633 (Iowa 1992) (holding that the
prosecution's use of a court-appointed defense expert did not violate the defendant's right
to due process or effective assistance of counsel). See generally Elizabeth F. Maringer, Note,
Witness for the Prosecution:ProsecutorialDiscovey of Information Generated by Non-Testifying Defense PsychiatricExperts, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 653 (1993) (looking at the constitutional questions still left to be answered after Ake, including whether the prosecution can, and should,
have access to court-appointed defense expert reports).
643
See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239 (1975) ("Respondent, by electing to
present the investigator as a witness, waived the [work product] privilege with respect to
matters covered in his testimony."); United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1046-47 (3d
Cir. 1975) (explaining that an expert's disclosures to an attorney are privileged "at least
until he is placed on the witness stand"); Pouncy v. State, 353 So. 2d 640, 642 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1977) (recognizing that the attorney-client privilege, as applied to the defendant's
psychiatrists, had not been waived where the defense had not called them as witnesses);
State v. Mingo, 392 A.2d 590, 595 (NJ. 1978) ("[B]y signifying an intention to use the
expert as a trial witness, the defense waives the confidentiality which otherwise attaches to
the reports to which his contemplated testimony will relate."); see alsoJack H. Friedenthal,
Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party'sExpert Information, 14 STAN. L. REv. 455, 464-65 (1962)
("A party ought not to be permitted to thwart effective cross-examination of a material
witness whom he will call at trial merely by invoking the attorney-client privilege to prohibit
pretrial discovery.").
644
See generally Stephen A. Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals:Lauyers and Psychiatrists,
66 VA. L. REV. 597 (1980) (laying out the various communication privileges, their reach to
non-lawyers, and the question of whether those privileges prevent a defense-retained expert from testifying against the defendant); Dan Nelson, Comment, Discovery of Attorney-
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Attorney-Client Privilege

Numerous courts have held that the attorney-client privilege covers communications made to an attorney by an expert retained for the
purpose of providing information necessary for proper representation. 6 45 This appears to be the majority view, 6 4 6 and the one favored
by the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 6 47 The argument
Expert Communications: Current State of and Suggestions for, Federal and Missouri Practice, 57
Mo. L. REV. 247 (1992) (surveying federal and Missouri standards for protection and discovery of attorney work product); Note, Protectingthe Confidentiality ofPretrialPsychiatricDisclosures: A Survey of Standards, 51 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 409 (1976) (evaluating the protection
afforded by the various privileges).
645
See, e.g., Alvarez, 519 F.2d at 1046-47 (deciding that disclosures made by a defenseretained psychiatrist to the attorney are protected under the privilege, unless and until the
psychiatrist takes the stand); United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961) (holding that the presence of an accountant, "while the client is relating a complicated tax story
to the lawyer," does not destroy the privilege); United States v. Layton, 90 F.R.D. 520, 525
(N.D. Cal. 1981) ("[E]ven if the psychotherapist-patient privilege is made inapplicable by
defendant's assertion of a psychiatric defense, the attorney-client privilege shields these
communiciations."); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 11, 13 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (extending the privilege to a financial expert, but finding that the privilege was waived); Houston v. State, 602 P.2d 784, 791 (Ala. 1979) (addressing the possibility that a claim of
attorney-client privilege might be sustained vis-Ai-vis a psychiatrist); People v. Lines, 531
P.2d 793, 802-03 (Cal. 1975) (protecting communications between a court-appointed psychiatrist and the defendant); Miller v. District Court, 737 P.2d 834, 836-38 (Colo. 1987)
(following "a majority of the courts" to hold that communications between a defendant
and his defense-retained psychiatrist are protected); Pouncy, 353 So. 2d at 642 (applying
privilege to psychiatrist); People v. Knippenberg, 362 N.E.2d 681, 684 (Ill. 1977) (applying
the privilege to statements the defendant made to a defense investigator); State v. Pratt,
398 A.2d 421, 423-25 (Md. 1979) (concluding that communications made by the defendant to his psychiatrist are protected, even when the defendant pleads insanity as a defense); People v. Hilliker, 185 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) ("[S]ince the
privilege clearly extends to confidential communications made directly by the client to the
attorney, there is nothing to dictate a different result where that communication is made
to the attorney by an agent on behalf of the client, such as a doctor or psychiatrist."); State
v. Kociolek, 129 A.2d 417, 423-25 (N.J. 1957) (explaining that the attorney-client privilege
extends to communications between the attorney and a scientific expert, such as a psychiatrist, who is aiding in the preparation of a defense); State v. Hitopoulus, 309 S.E.2d 747,
748-49 (S.C. 1983) (protecting defendant-psychiatrist communications that were made to
aid in the preparation of a defense). See generally Michael G. Walsh, Annotation, Applicability of Attorney-Client Privilege to Communications Made in Presence of or Solely to or by ThirdPerson,
14 A.L.R.4th 594, § 2(a) (1982) (summarizing the general judicial trends in the application of the attorney-client privilege when a third party is involved).
646
See Pratt,398 A.2d at 423 ("[Such protection] is now almost universally accepted in
this country."); see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Noll, 662 A.2d 1123, 1126 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)
("[T]he information gathered by [the accident reconstructionist] should be protected by
the attorney work product doctrine and the attorney-client privilege."); see also Edward J.
Imwinkelried, The Applicability of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Non-Testifying Experts: Reestablishing the Boundaries Between the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Protection, 68
WASH. L.Q 19, 21-23 (1990) (surveying the recent trend in favor of extending the attorney-client privilege to expert information).
647
The drafters proposed a rule that would extend the privilege to nontestifying experts. See FED. R. EvID. 503 (proposed 1971) (including "one employed to assist the lawyer
in the rendition of professional legal services" in the ambit of those protected by the
privilege).
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supporting this rule rests on the attorney's need to obtain expert advice. As one court has stated: "Only a foolhardy lawyer would determine tactical and evidentiary strategy in a case with psychiatric issues
without the guidance and interpretation of psychiatrists and others
skilled in this field. '648 An attorney, however, might not seek such
assistance if an expert's adverse opinion could be introduced by the
prosecution:
Breaching the attorney-client privilege .

.

. would have the effect of

inhibiting the free exercise of a defense attorney's informed judgment by confronting him with the likelihood that, in taking a step
obviously crucial to his client's defense, he is creating a potential
64 9
government witness who theretofore did not exist.
Other courts have rejected the extension of the attorney-client
privilege in this context, although their reasons vary. First, some
courts limit the privilege to communications between the attorney
and client. 650 Under this view, experts and other agents are not covered by the privilege. 65 1 Second, other courts hold that the privilege
extends only to confidential communications and thus does not apply
to experts who do not rely on the client's confidential communications in reaching their opinions. Under this view, the privilege may

The ABA has adopted the same position. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH
7-3.3 (b) (1989) (restricting prosecutorial access to the results of defense-initiated mental health evaluations of the defendant whenever the defendant does not intend
to call the expert as a witness).
648
United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1047 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
649
Pratt, 398 A.2d at 426.
650
See, e.g., State v. Riddle, 8 P.3d 980, 990 (Or. 2000) (disqualifying a party's expert
from testifying for the opposing party only if "his or her opinion discloses, either directly
or indirectly, or is based on, any confidential communication between the lawyer, the client, and/or the expert[," and it is not possible to segregate the expert's opinion from that
confidential communication).
651
See, e.g., State v. Schaaf, 819 P.2d 909, 918 (Ariz. 1991) ("[W]e find it to be within
the trial court's broad discretion to determine whether an expert witness will be required
to testify, even if it was the other party who initially retained the expert witness."); State v.
Carter, 641 S.W.2d 54, 57 (Mo. 1982) ("The privilege is limited to communications between the attorney and the client. It operates only to render the attorney incompetent to
testify to confidential communications made to him by a client." (citation omitted)); State
v. Hamlet, 944 P.2d 1026, 1031 (Wash. 1997) (finding that the attorney-client privilege and
the Sixth Amendment are not violated when the court orders "disclosure of the name of
the nontestifying expert retained by the defense for purposes of a diminished capacity
defense" or when the state calls "that expert as a State's witness to rebut evidence of a
diminished capacity defense").
STANDARDS
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extend to a psychiatrist, 652 but not a fingerprint analyst, 653 scientific
expert, 654 or medical examiner. 65 5 Third, still other courts hold that
the privilege is waived when the defense introduces scientific evidence. Accordingly, a defendant who raises an insanity defense waives
the privilege with respect to all psychiatrists who have examined the
656
defendant.
The applicability of the privilege in this context is problematic,
for the privilege protects attorney-client communications, and that is
not the issue here. Indeed, Professor Imwinkelried has argued that
the privilege should not be extended to experts because such an ap652

See, e.g., People v. Knuckles, 650 N.E.2d 974, 978 (Ill. 1995) (distinguishing the

denial of the privilege to a fingerprint expert's testimony on the ground that a psychiatrist's opinion as to the defendant's sanity "will almost invariably result in large part from
confidential communications with the defendant which would be directly or indirectly revealed if the psychiatrist testified on behalf of the State" (quoting lower court)).
653 See, e.g., People v. Speck, 242 N.E.2d 208, 221 (I11.
1968) (rejecting the attorneyclient privilege as applied to a fingerprint expert because "there was no testimony as to any
conversations between [the expert] and the defendant or defendant's attorney").
654 See, e.g.,
United States v. Pipkins, 528 F.2d 559, 563-64 (5th Cir. 1976) (declining to
hold that handwriting exemplars were confidential communications within ambit of the
attorney-client privilege); Morris v. State, 477 A.2d 1206, 1211 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984)
(refusing to extend the attorney-client privilege to communications made by the defendant to an expert in order to provide him with information necessary to his examination of
a shirt worn by the defendant).
655 See, e.g.,
Rose v. State, 591 So. 2d 195, 197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that
autopsy information, which related to the infant that defendant was charged with killing
and which the defense attorney turned over to the defendant's pathologist, was not
privileged).
656 See Gray v. District Court, 884 P.2d 286, 293 (Colo. 1994) (holding that, when a
defendant puts his mental condition at issue, he "waives the right to claim the attorneyclient and physician/psychologist-patient privileges, and a prosecution's use of testimony
of a defense-retained psychiatrist, who is not called by the defendant to testify at trial, is
admissible at trial"); State v. Carter, 641 S.W.2d 54, 57 (Mo. 1982); People v. Edney, 350
N.E.2d 400, 402-03 (N.Y. 1976) (finding no reason to protect communications made to a
psychiatrist when the defendant puts his sanity in issue); Hamlet, 944 P.2d at 1030 (by
asserting a defense of diminished capacity or insanity, defendant waives attorney-client
privilege as to evidence concerning his mental state); State v. Pawlyk, 800 P.2d 338, 345
(Wash. 1990) ("If defendant asserts an insanity defense, evidence pertaining to that defense must be available to both sides at trial."); Trusky v. State, 7 P.3d 5, 10 (Wyo. 2000)
("[A defendant] may not argue a deficient mental condition and, at the same time, claim
protection by privilege."); see also Woods v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182, 187 (Ct.
App. 1994) ("[W]hile communications with an expert retained to assist in the preparation
of a defense may initially be protected by the attorney-client privilege, the privilege is
waived where . . . the expert is identified, a substantial portion of his . . . evaluation is

disclosed in his report, and the report is released."). But see United States v. Alvarez, 519
F.2d 1036, 1046 (3d Cir. 1975) ("If the expert is later used as a witness on behalf of the
defendant[, only then] the cloak of [the attorney-client] privilege ends."); Houston v.
State, 602 P.2d 784, 791 (Alaska 1979) (protecting statements made by the defendant to
the psychiatrist, even when the insanity defense was raised, unless the psychiatrist took the
stand); State v. Pratt, 398 A.2d 421, 424-25 (Md. 1979) (rejecting the argument that the
interposition of an insanity defense waives the attorney-client privilege over a defendant's
statements to his psychiatrist on the grounds that such a result would lead to a chilling
effect on defendant-expert communications).
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proach would convert the narrow privilege into a broad rule of incompetency. 6 57 Instead, he contends that the work product rule should

preclude access to a defense expert's opinion unless a substantial
658
showing of need is demonstrated.
2.

Work Product Rule

A federal district court has applied the work product rule to preclude a defense ballistics expert from being called as a prosecution
witness. 659 Although the court acknowledged that it was entering "relatively uncharted waters and the case-law is an insufficient and contradictory navigational aid," 6 60 it found that the opinions that the
prosecution sought to introduce in its case-in-chief "were developed at
the request of, and in consultation with, the defendants' attorneys for
use within those attorney's [sic] internal strategic processes."' 66' The
court also noted that "exhaustive research has disclosed no criminal
case in which a federal court has permitted the government to elicit
testimony from a defendant's consultative expert concerning that expert's efforts or opinions undertaken or developed at the request of a
662
defense attorney in preparation for a criminal trial.
Not only is the work product rationale more cogent than the attorney-client privilege, it also leaves room for exceptional cases. For
instance, in State v. Cosey,6 6 3 the defense exhausted, during DNA testing, the remaining testable crime scene semen specimen, which precluded the prosecution from performing additional, more
657
See Imwinkelried, supra note 646, at 31-48 (arguing that the courts should distinguish between the client's communications and the expert's information that falls outside
of that limited area of protection, and highlighting the problems that occur if the courts
refuse to do so).
658
See id. at 37-38; see also Robert P. Mosteller, Discovery Against the Defense: Tilting the
Adversarial Balance, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1567, 1657-64 (1986) (advocating that the work product doctrine be used to protect the defense expert's preparation from prosecutorial discovery if it is not going to be used at trial) .
659
See United States v. Walker, 910 F. Supp. 861, 864 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (precluding the
government from questioning defense experts on their investigation, opinions, or conclusions "unless the government first makes a showing of substantial need of that testimony
and inability to obtain the substantial equivalent of that testimony without undue
hardship").
660
Id. at 866.
Id. at 865.
661
662
Id. at 864; see also State v. Dunn, 571 S.E.2d 650, 660 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (concluding that "the trial court erred when it allowed the State to compel testimony from employees of Lab Corp that defendant did not plan to call as witnesses. We believe that in so
doing, the trial court infringed upon the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel, and unnecessarily breached the work-product privilege."). But see
State v. Riddle, 8 P.3d 980, 989 (Or. 2000) ("We conclude that there is no absolute privilege . . . that prevents an expert whom a litigant has employed to investigate a factual
problem from testifying for the other side as to the expert's thoughts and conclusions that
are segregated from confidential communications.").
652 So. 2d 993 (La. 1995).
663
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sophisticated DNA testing similar to that performed by the defense.
The defendant neither intended to use the DNA tests at trial nor call
the analyst as a witness. The Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that
"fundamental fairness and the extraordinary circumstances presented
by this case dictate that the prosecution be allowed to obtain copies of
66 4
the test results in question.
3.

Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel

In addition to the attorney-client and work product privileges, defendants have argued that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel precludes the use of defense-retained experts by
the prosecution. Several courts have accepted this argument:
A defense attorney should be completely free and unfettered in
making a decision as fundamental as that concerning the retention
of an expert to assist him. Reliance upon the confidentiality of an
expert's advice itself is a crucial aspect of a defense attorney's ability
to consult with and advise his client. If the confidentiality of that
advice cannot be anticipated, the attorney might well forgo seeking
6 65
such assistance, to the consequent detriment of his client's cause.
Similarly, Professor Mosteller has argued that a "rule allowing any incriminating information developed during defense preparation to be
used against the defendant would impair both a vigorous defense effort, which is central to the adversary system, and the defendant-counsel relationship."666

664

Id. at 994.

State v. Mingo, 392 A.2d 590, 595 (NJ. 1978); see also Pawlyk v. Wood, 248 F.3d 815,
828-29 (9th Cir. 2001) (Canby,J., dissenting) ("In my view, a psychiatrist retained to assist
the defense is not to be treated as a run-of-the-mill witness; due process requires recognition of his or her position as a member of the defense team. Defense counsel should be
able to employ the services of such a psychiatrist in preparing an insanity defense without
running the risk of involuntarily creating evidence for the prosecution."); United States v.
Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1047 (3d Cir. 1975) ("The attorney must be free to make an informedjudgment with respect to the best course for the defense without the inhibition of
creating a potential government witness."); Hutchinson v. People, 742 P.2d 875, 881 (Colo.
1987) ("[W]e cannot sanction the prosecution's decision ... to offer the defense's handwriting expert as a witness in its case-in-chief. Absent compelling justification or waiver, we
believe that such a practice violates a defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel.");
People v. Knippenberg, 362 N.E.2d 681, 684-85 (Ill.
1977) (protecting statements given by
the defendant to an investigator for the Illinois Defender Project that the defense attorney
had contacted for assistance with the case).
666
Mosteller, supra note 658, at 1668; see also 4 LAFAvE ET AL., supra note 319, § 20.4 (f),
at 908 ("The basic rationale of the Sixth Amendment objection to required pretrial disclosure of such information is that the disclosure has a chilling effect upon the investigative
efforts of counsel and therefore undermines the defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel.").
665
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Notwithstanding the persuasiveness of this argument, many
courts have rejected it.66 7 Ake implicitly addresses this issue and
should protect defendants in this context. Nevertheless, only a few
cases have recognized the relevance of Ake to this issue. In Taylor v.
State,6 68 at the defendant's request, the trial court appointed a DNA
expert only to examine semen in a rape case. 6 69 The expert reported
that the defendant's DNA fell within a class of persons (one chance in
a twelve million random match) that could have deposited the semen. 670 The report was also sent to the prosecutor, who immediately
made the expert a prosecution witness. 6 71 On these grounds, the Taylor court held that the scientist had not been acting as a defense expert to the extent Ake demanded: "[The expert] furnished her
inculpatory scientific conclusions to all parties, including the prosecution.... If [the expert] was genuinely appellant's DNA expert, then
her conclusions were the work-product of defense counsel and would
never have been provided to the prosecutor. ' 672 Therefore, the court

remanded the case for a determination of whether the defendant had
met the threshold burden required for securing a court-appointed exSee, e.g.,
Noggle v. Marshall, 706 F.2d 1408, 1414-15 (6th Cir. 1983) ("[I]t seems
667
undesirable at this time to canonize the majority rule on the attorney-psychiatrist-client
privilege and freeze it into constitutional form not amenable to change by rule, statute, or
further case-law development."); Granviel v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 673, 683 (5th Cir. 1981) (denying the defendant's request for habeas corpus relief under its view that the right to
effective assistance of counsel does not require that psychiatric testimony be excluded on
the basis of the defendant's attorney-client privilege); United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith,
425 F. Supp. 1038, 1054 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that the state's interest in "accurate factfinding" outweighed any possible prejudice that admission of the defendant's statements
to his psychiatrist may have caused, where those statements were used for the limited purpose of establishing the basis for the psychiatrist's evaluation of the defendant's sanity);
App. Ct. 2000) ("Upon consideration of the
People v. Spiezer, 735 N.E.2d 1017, 1026 (Ill.
holding in Noggle, we are not persuaded that the sixth amendment guard against undue
interference .. .necessarily applies to discovery issues regarding expert witnesses."); State
v. Craney, 347 N.W.2d 668, 676-77 (Iowa 1984) (holding that there is no "constitutionalized attorney-client privilege for a defendant's communications to a mental expert"); State
v. Dodis, 314 N.W.2d 233, 240-41 (Minn. 1982) (finding that it would be a constitutionally
anomalous result if the defense was allowed to prohibit the prosecution from calling the
defense psychiatrist to testify); State v. Carter, 641 S.W.2d 54, 59 (Mo. 1982) ("The physician-patient privilege and the attorney-client privilege are to be used for preserving legitimate confidential communications, not for suppressing the truth after the privileged one
lets the bars down."); Haynes v. State, 739 P.2d 497, 503 (Nev. 1987) (opting to follow
those courts that hold that a defense expert's testimony on the defendant's sanity is admissible); State v. Richey, 595 N.E.2d 915, 922 (Ohio 1992) ("The prosecutor's use of a defense expert does not violate an accused's Sixth Amendment right to counsel."); Pawlyk,
800 P.2d at 347 (holding that, where the defendant raises an insanity defense, the trial
court may order the defense to turn over written reports prepared by defense psychiatrists
on the issue of the defendant's sanity).
668
939 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
See id. at 150.
669
See id.
670
671
See id.
672
Id. at 152 (emphasis omitted).
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pert. 67 3 Significantly, the court also recognized that Ake encompasses

more than a testifying defense expert; it requires a consulting expert, for
"due process, at a minimum, requires expert aid in an evaluation of a
defendant's case in an effort to present it in the best possible light to
674
the jury.
D.

Right to Examine Prosecution Witnesses
Many state discovery provisions6 75 and constitutionally-based deci-

sions 676 recognize a right to test or retest evidence.

Ake reinforces

these cases.
A more difficult issue concerns whether the right to an expert
includes the right to require an alleged victim to be examined by that
expert. Courts have taken different approaches to this issue. 677 The
Id. at 153.
Id. The court also observed that due process does "not require a defendant to be
furnished with a testifying expert who would unequivocally support an exculpatory theory
of the defense. Thus, a defendant is not entitled to 'shop' for experts-at the State's expense-until he unearths a person who supports his theory of the case." Id. at 152.
675
See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2 R. 2.14(2) (b) (West 2003) (allowing for the defendant to move to inspect or subject to testing evidence seized by the state in relation to the
crime); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 718 (West 2003) (authorizing courts to order the
district attorney to permit the defendant to examine and test evidence within the custody
of the state planned for use at trial and favorable to the defendant); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A903(e) (2001) (giving the defendant the right to move for an order allowing the defense to
inspect the state's evidence, including the results of physical and mental examinations and
physical evidence); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.51(E) (West 2001) (stating that the accused in a drug case may perform an independent analysis of the substance that is the basis
of the allegation); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.23(5) (West 1998) ("[T]he court may order the
production of any item of physical evidence which is intended to be introduced at the trial
for scientific analysis.... ."); see alsoJames v. Commonwealth, 482 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Ky. 1972)
(requiring the Commonwealth to furnish chemist reports and drug samples to the defendant); State v. Cloutier, 302 A.2d 84, 89 (Me. 1973) (evaluating the conditions under
which a court should grant a defense motion for independent drug analysis); People v.
White, 358 N.E.2d 1031, 1032 (N.Y. 1976) (holding that the defendant was entitled to
pretrial discovery that would allow him to conduct his own tests on the drugs which gave
rise to his indictment); State v. Gaddis, 530 S.W.2d 64, 69 (Tenn. 1975) (interpreting a
state statute as giving a defendant the right to an independent inspection by his own expert of a sample of a controlled substance); Terrell v. State, 521 S.W.2d 618, 618 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1975) (discussing a defendant's motion for discovery of marihuana samples for
independent chemical testing). See generally Annotation, Right of Accused in State Courts to
Have Expert Inspect, Examine, or Test Physical Evidence in Possession of Prosecution-Modern
Cases, 27 A.L.R.4th 1188 (1984) (surveying the "general trend among state courts toward
the expansion of criminal discovery." Id. § 2(a)).
676
See supra text accompanying notes 324-26.
677
Courts have adopted several approaches to physical examinations. Some courts
recognize a due process right to such an examination, while others allow an examination if
the defendant can demonstrate a compelling need. See Montoya, supra note 325, at 884-88
(using the hypothetical of a sexual assault prosecution in which the state puts the victim's
physical condition in issue to analyze the merit of these divergent rationales); Troy Andrew
Eid, Comment, A Fourth Amendment Approach to Compulsory Physical Examinations of Sex Offense Victims, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 873, 880-89 (1990) (surveying the state courts that hold
that accused sex defendants have a due process right to compulsory physical examinations
673
674
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strongest argument in favor of a defense examination is a case in
which the prosecution has conducted an examination. For example,
the Nevada Supreme Court has held that "it is error to deny a defendant the assistance of a defense psychologist or psychiatrist to examine the child-victim and testify at trial when the State is provided
such assistance." 678 Although this issue developed independently of

Ake, Ake informs its resolution. Citing Ake, the Illinois Supreme Court
wrote that "it is fundamentally unfair that the State was able to present
the testimony of an examining expert but the defendant was limited
'6 79
to the testimony of a nonexamining expert.
E.

Interference with the Right to an Expert

Several Ake-type decisions raise state-interference issues that are
similar to right-to-counsel issues. 6 0 Citing Ake, the New York Court of
Appeals in People v. Santana68 1 ruled that precluding defense counsel
from consulting with his own expert during the cross-examination of
the prosecution expert was reversible error. 68 2 In a prior case, the
Supreme Court had held that an order precluding a defendant and
of the alleged victim, and the various findings they require in order to trigger that entitlement). A similar diversity of opinion exists concerning involuntary psychological or psychiatric examinations. See Montoya, supra note 325, at 887 nn.277-80 (citing cases going both
ways from various jurisdictions that decide the issue based either on a recognition of the
trial court's discretion, a finding that there are no constitutional requirements to order
such an examination, or an equitable variation that disallows the prosecution to present
testimony based on the examination of the alleged victim if the defendant could not present comparable testimony).
678
Lickey v. State, 827 P.2d 824, 826 (Nev. 1992); see also State v. Bronson, 779 A.2d 95,
97 (Conn. 2001) ("The dispositive issue is whether the defendant was entitled to a courtappointed expert's examination of the alleged child victim when, during the child's testimony, her ability to testify reliably in the presence of the defendant suddenly came into
question. We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the defendant was entitled to such an examination.").
679
People v. Wheeler, 602 N.E.2d 826, 833 (Ill.
1992); see also State v. Maday, 507
N.W.2d 365, 372 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) ("When the state manifests an intent during its casein-chief to present testimony of one or more experts, who have personally examined a
victim of an alleged sexual assault, and will testify that the victim's behavior is consistent
with the behaviors of other victims of sexual assault, a defendant may request a psychological examination of the victim.").
680
Cases on ineffective assistance of counsel can be grouped into several broad categories, one of which involves state interference with the right to counsel. See generally Herring
v. NewYork, 422 U.S. 853 (1975) (refusing to recognize as constitutional a state statute that
gave trial judges authority to deny defense counsel the opportunity to make a closing summation); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972) (finding unconstitutional a state law
that limited defense counsel's right to choose when the defendant should testify); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961) (holding that a state statute that prevented defense
counsel from eliciting the defendant's testimony through direct examination unconstitutionally impinged on the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel).
The other categories involve (1) conflicts of interest and (2)incompetence. See 3 LAFAVE
ET AL., supra note 319, § 11.7(d) (discussing the three categories of ineffective assistance).
681
600 N.E.2d 201 (N.Y. 1992).
682
See id. at 205.
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his attorney from discussing evidence during an overnight recess vio6 83
lated the right to effective assistance of counsel.

In Prince v. Superior Court,

68 4

the trial judge ordered that a DNA

sample be divided between the prosecution and defense for testing
and that a representative of the state be present at the defense testing. 68 5 The California Court of Appeals reversed, holding such an or686
der violated the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel.
The court commented that "[e]ffective assistance of counsel includes
the assistance of experts in preparing a defense and communication
with them in confidence. 6 87
In State v. DeMarco,688 a New Jersey appellate court ruled that the
prosecution may not compel discovery of DNA reports prepared by
68 9
the defendant's expert witness for other clients in unrelated cases.
Therefore, the court issued a protective order:
Although we do not determine the applicability of the privileges or
Mingo's Sixth Amendment analysis, their underlying policies inform
our view of the issue. Dr. Blake's reports contain private and critical
information which should be shielded from undue public exposure.
Moreover, litigators, public and private, should have access to the
assistance of retained experts with a minimum of risk that their reports, which otherwise have not been placed in the public domain,
690
will surface in unrelated litigation.
Here, again, there is a confluence
principles.
F.

of Ake and right-to-counsel

Right to an Effective Expert

Several defendants have argued that Ake includes the right to effective expert assistance. As mentioned previously, the Court in Ake did
refer to the right to "one competent psychiatrist."' 691 Nevertheless, the
lower courts have rejected this argument. According to the Fourth
Circuit: "To inaugurate a constitutional or procedural rule of an inef683
See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976) ("We hold that an order
preventing [a defendant] from consulting his counsel 'about anything' during a 17-hour
overnight recess between his direct- and cross-examination impinged upon his right to the
assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment."). But see Perry v. Leeke, 488
U.S. 272, 281-82 (1989) (upholding a trial judge's order prohibiting the defendant from
talking with anyone, including his defense counsel, during a fifteen-minute break between
direct examination and the beginning of cross-examination).
684
10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855 (Ct. App. 1992).
685
See id. at 856-57.
686
See id. at 858.
687
Id. at 857-58 (citations omitted).
688
646 A.2d 431 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
689
See id. at 437.
690 Id. at 436-37; see supra text accompanying note 665 (quoting Mingo).
691 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 79 (1985).
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fective expert witness in lieu of the constitutional standard of an ineffective attorney . . . is going further than the federal procedural

demands of a fair trial and the constitution require." 69 2 Similarly, the
Seventh Circuit objected that such a rule would require federal courts

"to engage in a form of 'psychiatric medical malpractice' review." 69 3

The Ninth Circuit also declined to become enmeshed in such "a
psycho-legal quagmire.

'6 94

These opinions dismiss the issue too quickly. First, rejecting the
"right to an effective expert" argument often means the issue will simply be converted into an ineffective assistance of counsel claimbased on the defense attorney's failure to obtain the appointment of a
competent expert. 695 An expert's views may be so incompatible with
service as a defense expert that the right to an expert is undermined.
For example, a mental health expert's personal views in Ramdass v.
Angelone69 6 made it impossible for him to aid in presenting mitigating
factors at a capital sentencing hearing. 6 97 Indeed, he would have
made a great prosecution witness:
692
Waye v. Murray, 884 F.2d 765, 767 (4th Cir. 1989) (claim that a psychiatrist should
have performed better on the witness stand); see also Wilson v. Greene, 155 F.3d 396, 401
(4th Cir. 1998) ("The Constitution does not entitle a criminal defendant to the effective
assistance of an expert witness. ... Although Ake refers to an 'appropriate' evaluation, we
doubt that the Due Process Clause prescribes a malpractice standard for a court appointed
psychiatrist's performance. Rather, the decision in Ake reflects primarily a concern with
ensuring a defendant access to a psychiatrist or psychologist, not with guaranteeing a particular substantive result.").
693 Silagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 1013 (7th Cir. 1990).
694
Harris v. Vasquez, 943 F.2d 930, 951 (9th Cir. 1991); accord Bloom v. Vasquez, 840
F. Supp. 1362, 1373 (C.D. Cal. 1993) ("Ake does not provide a legal basis for challenging in
a federal habeas corpus proceeding the competency of the defense psychiatrist used at
trial .... The Constitution does not recognize a right to the effective assistance of a psychiatrist or the effective assistance of a witness."); see also Gordon B. Burns, The Right to the
Effective Assistance of a PsychiatristUnder Ake v. Oklahoma, 30 CRIM. L. BULL. 429, 456 (1994)
("[I]f the psychiatrist's assistance proves ineffective, due process allows the defendant to
obtain another psychiatrist upon making an adequate showing to the trial court. If the
defendant fails to make such a showing, the due process clause offers no refuge.").
695
See, e.g., Pruett v. Thompson, 996 F.2d 1560, 1573-74 (4th Cir. 1993) (ruling that
defendant failed to prove ineffectiveness when he claimed that his lawyer should have
known that the psychiatrist's examination of the defendant was flawed); Poyner v. Murray,
964 F.2d 1404, 1418-19 (4th Cir. 1992) (rejecting the proposition that "if a defense attorney has not produced a witness who would agree with the after-the-fact diagnosis..., then
the attorney is ineffective"); Washington v. Murray, 952 F.2d 1472, 1481 (4th Cir. 1991)
(denying defendant's ineffectiveness claim that counsel should have obtained a psychiatrist
who would give an independent opinion of his mental capacity, rather than relying on the
opinion of the state psychologist).
696
187 F.3d 396 (4th Cir. 1999).
697
Id. at 410-11 n.1 (Murnaghan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Dr.
Stanton Samenow's professed and public views make him incompetent to aid a defendant
in finding and presenting mitigating factors at a defendant's sentencing phase ....
Dr.
Samenow's published works state that circumstances have nothing to do with criminal violations and that 'providing the criminal with an opportunity to present excuses deferred
him and us further and further from change.' . . . Dr. Samenow's views obviate his ability

2004]

AKE V. OKLAHOMA

1415

Dr. Samenow has publicly stated that criminals are a "different
breed of person," who seek to manipulate the system for their own
ends. He has abandoned sociologic, psychologic, and mental illness
explanations for criminal behavior and holds the view that "most
diagnoses of mental illness [in criminals] resulted from the criminal's fabrications."

698

The concurring opinion goes on to state that while "Ake does not require 'effective assistance of a psychiatric expert[,]'. . . the Supreme
Court requires more than just a warm body with a prefix attached to
his name" and that "competence and appropriateness, based on objective professional criteria, are entirely different than
69 9
effectiveness.
Second, the appointment of an expert in the wrong field does
not satisfy Ake. For example, in Castro v. Oklahoma,70 0 the Tenth Circuit declined to decide the competence issue but nevertheless
remarked:
We believe a serious question whether Dr. Hamilton was competent
to provide expert psychiatric assistance exists. Dr. Hamilton's specialties in child and geriatric psychiatry probably render him unqualified to offer an expert opinion on many of the issues raised in
a capital murder trial. A forensic psychiatrist or psychologist is the
70 1
proper specialist for such a task.

to evaluate mitigating factors relating to the history or character of a criminal defendant
'because he is of the opinion that no mitigating factors exist.'").
It is also worth noting that Dr. Samenow has been at the center of other constitutional
challenges. See, e.g.,
Wright v. Angelone, 151 F.3d 151, 161 (4th Cir. 1998) ("Wright's
claim that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to conduct a reasonable
investigation before recommending Dr. Stanton Samenow to the court as a mental health
expert is also without merit.").
698
Ramdass, 187 F.3d at 410-11 n.1 (Murnaghan, J., concurring) (citation omitted)
(alteration in original).
699
Id.
700
71 F.3d 1502 (10th Cir. 1995).
701
Id. at 1515; see also Powell v. Collins, 332 F.3d 376, 396 (6th Cir. 2003) ("Dr.
Schmidtgoessling testified that she was not qualified to conduct the type of examination
necessary for mitigation. As a result, Petitioner was denied the very type of assistance for
which Ake provides-'an appropriate examination'-even if we were to have agreed that
Dr. Schmidtgoessling's assignment to Petitioner's case was enough."); Wilson v. Greene,
155 F.3d 396, 409 n.1 (4th Cir. 1998) (Michael, J., concurring) ("[N]one of our cases
control the narrow issue raised by Wilson, whether an indigent defendant has a right to an
appropriate examination that meets the standard of care set by the psychiatric
profession.").
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VII
REFORMS

As noted earlier, Ake left the implementation of the right to a
defense expert to the states. 70 2 Several systemic reforms, if fully implemented, could provide a better approach to the issue than the current
system of ad hoc judicial appointment.
One suggestion is a public defender organization responsible for
contracting all defense experts, 70 3 including those needed by appointed counsel. This would avoid having a judge protect the public
fisc, which a motion for appointment implicitly involves. This is an
uncomfortable position for a neutral judicial officer; it is not like the
appointment of counsel where determining indigency is the only issue. The drawback with this proposal is the funding. The widespread
failure of the criminal justice system to implement the right to counsel
casts doubt on the feasibility of this approach. Texas executed over
70 4
300 prisoners before a state-wide defender system was even enacted.
Other approaches focus on crime laboratories-defense laboratories, independent government laboratories, or private laboratories.
Creation of a defense crime laboratory would also raise funding issues.
The underfunding of police crime laboratories in this country is
chronic. 70 5 There is no reason to expect greater resources would be
devoted to a defense lab. The Illinois Governor's Commission on
702 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985) ("[A]s in the case of the provision of
counsel we leave to the State the decision on how to implement this right.").
703

See, e.g.,
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 120.04(C)(1) (Anderson 2004) (giving the public

defender the responsibility, in providing legal representation, of obtaining expert
testimony).
704 See Rodney Ellis & Hanna Liebman Dershowitz, Slouching Toward Fair Defense in
Texas, CHAMPION, Jan./Feb. 2003, at 52, 52 ("Not very long ago, Texas was 40 years behind
in how it provided representation to poor people accused of crimes. We were, in fact, the
national poster child for how not to provide indigent defense services.").
705
In 1967, President Johnson's Crime Commission noted that "the great majority of
police department laboratories have only minimal equipment and lack highly skilled personnel able to use the modern equipment now being developed." PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OFJUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 255
(1967). In 1973, President Nixon's Crime Commission commented: "Too many police
crime laboratories have been set up on budgets that preclude the recruitment of qualified,
professional personnel." NAT'L ADVISORY COMM, ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GOALS, REPORT ON POLICE 304 (1973). Twenty years later, a report on Washington State
[
crime labs revealed that a " s] taggering backlog of cases hinders investigations of murder,
rape, arson, and other major crimes[.]" Tomas Guillen & Eric Nalder, Overwhelming Evidence: Crime Labs in Crisis, SEATTLE TIMES, Jun. 19, 1994, at Al. At any time, "thousands of
pieces of evidence collected from crime scenes sit unanalyzed and ignored on shelves in
laboratories and police stations across the state." Id. at A14. A USA Today survey reached
the same conclusion: "Evidence that could imprison the guilty or free the innocent is languishing on shelves and piling up in refrigerators of the [nation's] overwhelmed and un-

derfunded crime labs." Becky Beaupre & Peter Eisler, Crime Lab Crisis: Evidence Backlog
Imperils Justice, USA TODAY, Aug. 20, 1996, at IA. In one case a suspected serial rapist was
released:

2004]

AKE V. OKLAHOMA

1417

Capital Punishment recommended the creation of an independent
70 6
state laboratory as a way to provide access to forensic services.
While independent crime labs are a possibility, they may not be politically viable. Although private crime laboratories have apparently had
some success in Britain, 70 7 it is not clear that they would be feasible in
this country.
Two less expensive reforms are realistic. First, public defenders
can hire forensic science experts-someone with a scientific background whose job it is to stay current with recent developments and
act as a resource for defense attorneys. Hopefully, this person could
develop contacts with independent experts who could function as defense experts. A minority in the Illinois Governor's Commission on
Capital Punishment recommended the hiring of defense forensic
scientists by public defender offices as a less expensive but equally effective reform.
The second reform is expanded discovery. 70 8 Discovery in criminal cases is far less extensive than it is in civil cases. 709 There are no
[B]ecause it was going to take months to get the DNA results needed to
prove [the] case. Weeks later, [the suspect] raped victim No. 4 as she slept
in her own home. When the DNA tests finally came back-18 months after
samples first went to the lab-a jury convicted [the suspect] of all four
rapes.
Id.
706
See REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 22 (Ill.
2002)
("An independent state forensic laboratory should be created, operated by civilian personnel, with its own budget, separate from any police agency or supervision."). See generally
Giannelli, Abuse, supra note 14, at 439 (using a variety of recent cases to illustrate the abuse
of scientific evidence at trial, such as experts' police-prosecution bias, and arguing that
laboratories should therefore be transferred from police control to the control of independent medical examiner offices).
707
The British have experimented with a "market system" provided by nongovernment experts: "The [Forensic Science Service] predicts that, in the medium term, 20 per
cent of the market will go to non-FSS sources." MIKE REDMAYNE, EXPERT EVIDENCE AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 27 (2001).
708
See Giannelli, Criminal Discovery, supra note 8, at 800-02 (highlighting the limitations on discovery during criminal trials).
709
In civil cases, discovery includes the automatic identification of experts, comprehensive written reports, and a special deposition provision for experts. See FED. R. Civ. P.
26(a) (2) (A)-(C) (directing litigants to disclose the identity of any expert they may use at
trial, along with a written report, at least ninety days before trial). Opponents of liberal
discovery in criminal cases have argued that it will encourage perjury, lead to the intimidation of wimesses, and, because of the Fifth Amendment, "be a one-way street." See, e.g., 2
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 252, at 63 (3d ed. 2000). With
scientific evidence, however, the traditional arguments against criminal discovery lose
whatever force they might otherwise have. The first argument fails because "it is virtually
impossible for evidence or information of this kind to be distorted or misused because of
its advance disclosure." Commentary, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE RELATING TO
DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL 67 (Approved Draft 1970). Also, there is no evidence that experts have been intimidated, probably because the evidence could be
retested or another expert could testify about the examination. See 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra
note 319, § 20.3(f), at 861 ("Once the report is prepared, the scientific expert's position is
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discovery depositions in most jurisdictions. 7 10 In some, there is no
requirement that the defense even be notified that an expert will testify for the prosecution. 711 In others, laboratory notes need not be
disclosed. 7 12 And, in others, laboratory reports are woefully
713
uninformative.
Determining whether defense counsel should seek the appointment of a defense expert often requires a preliminary assessment by
an expert.7 14 An expert might be willing to review several documents
but not want to become further involved in a case without compensation. Comprehensive reports are a better solution than defense counsel not being able to make a sufficient showing for the appointment of
an expert when one should have been appointed, or appointing an
expert when one is not needed.
CONCLUSION

In 1985, the Ake Court could not have anticipated how the advent
of DNA evidence would revolutionize forensic science or how the
Dauberttrilogy would alter the judicial approach to scientific evidence.
It could not have foreseen the scientific fraud cases or the expanded
use of social science and modus operandi experts. All of these developments have increased the need for defense experts.
While Ake settled the core issue by recognizing a right to expert
assistance, significant issues were left unresolved. Ake's rationale exnot readily influenced, and therefore disclosure presents little danger of prompting perjury or intimidation."). Finally, the Self-incrimination Clause as presently interpreted by
the Supreme Court presents little impediment to reciprocal prosecution discovery of scientific proof. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970) ("We decline to hold that the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guarantees the defendant the right to surprise the State with an alibi defense."),
710
See Giannelli, Criminal Discovery, supra note 8, at 800 n.56.
711
See, e.g., United States v. Shue, 766 F.2d 1122, 1135 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that
the defendant was not entitled to the oral report that an FBI photographic expert provided
to the government); United States v. Johnson, 713 F.2d 654, 659 (11th Cir. 1983) ("A
criminal defendant has no absolute right to a list of the government's witnesses in advance
of the trial."). This changed in federal, but not state, practice with the adoption of Federal
Rule 16(a) (1) (G), which requires a pretrial summary of an expert's opinion.
712 Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 785, 791 (Va. 1989) (explaining that the
discovery rules did not allow for the discovery of documents connected to the investigation
or prosecution of the case).
713
The Journal of Forensic Sciences, the official publication of the American Academy
of Forensic Sciences, published a symposium on the ethical responsibilities of forensic
scientists in 1989. One article discussed a number of laboratory reporting practices, including "[1.] 'The preparation of reports containing minimal information in order not to
give the 'other side' ammunition for cross-examination' ... [2.] 'The reporting of findings
without an interpretation on the assumption that if an interpretation is required it can be
provided from the witness box' ... [and 3.] 'Omitting some significant point from a report
to trap an unsuspecting cross-examiner. . . .'" Douglas M. Lucas, The Ethical Responsibilities
of the Forensic Scientist: Exploring the Limits, 34J. FoRENSIC Sci. 719, 724 (1989).
714
See supra text accompanying notes 508-17.
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tends to nonpsychiatric experts, to noncapital trials, and to other proceedings such as juvenile transfer hearings and sex offender
commitments. Developing a useful standard for the appointment decision remains critical; courts have often applied a far too demanding
standard. Finally, the role of the expert should be viewed as
grounded in the right to counsel-i.e., a defense rather than neutral
expert should be provided.
In sum, although the need for defense experts is more important
today than when Ake was decided, the cases demonstrate that the right
to expert assistance has not been effectively implemented.

